II.11. Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding


1. Peacekeeping: the dissociative approach

The classical approach to peace has very often suggested balance of power. This approach is basically dissociative: the antagonists are kept away from each other under mutual threats of considerable punishment if they transgress, particularly if they transgress into each other’s territory [1]. Often balance of power is accompanied by other dissociative social measures, such as mutual prejudice (social distance), not to mention such classical approaches as the use of geography in the form of distance (an ocean, a desert) or impediments (a river, a mountain chain). If the two social forces mentioned — the threat of destructive behavior and an attitude of hatred and/or contempt — are insufficient to keep them apart, third parties may be called in (or call themselves in) to exercise peacekeeping operations, e.g. patrolling the borderline. And if the two geographical factors prove insufficient, technology may be used to supplement geography, in the form of mines, electromagnetic fences, etc. [2].

The dissociative approach has some merits. It is equitable, if not egalitarian, since it prescribes a social vacuum, or close to a vacuum between the antagonists, and in a vacuum there can be no exploitation. If there is inequality, it is not because one exploits the other.

But the demerits are more conspicuous.

Basically, in this structure, arms are targeted. There has to be not only capacity to destroy, but also some credibility that this capacity will be used, and no doubt as to who the enemy is. The impact of this in terms of creating a garrison state within, and a world of fear without, is well known. There is power, but little balance, or at the most some precarious dynamic balance. This dynamism in the arms race is contagious: because of the coupling of the world’s conflicts it spreads to other parts of the world, through vertical and horizontal proliferation [3], or simply through imitation.
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Second, the world no longer fits this approach. Geography has become largely irrelevant; there is no geographical distance or impediment that technology cannot overbid. Technology can then be met with more technology, creating artificial fences, etc., but that is tantamount to some new kind of arms race. Prejudice can be counted upon in crises, but not in general: people move too much around and start knowing each other too well. As to weapons: they are increasingly becoming too dangerous to be used. For that reason there is also a proliferation of small-scale and "outdated" weapons — but the argument holds to a large extent.

It is in this context the call arises for third parties to supplement the dangerous dissociative strategies engaged in by the first and second parties. When a war breaks out between two groups, a status quo has been interrupted; and one approach to the problem of war is the effort to reestablish the status quo ante. This is an actor-oriented approach since it aims at preventing actors from engaging in "evil actions". It does not immediately ask whether status quo is worth preserving, reestablishing and maintaining, or whether it possibly was even inferior to a violent encounter because of the structural violence built into it. Such questions lie outside the scope of that approach: the intention is to "keep the peace", meaning maintaining absence of direct violence. By that method "time is gained", it is often said, and peacemaking and peacebuilding can proceed parallel to the peacekeeping. The problem to be explored here is why this seems to be so difficult [4].

If the two parties at war can themselves get disentangled from the deadly embrace and get back to status quo (and they sometimes can), then the question of third parties does not arise. But we shall assume that the peacekeeping is carried out by third parties. That immediately raises three questions:

— What kind of first and second parties are there?
— What kind of third parties are possible?
— What are the means at the disposal of the third parties to bring about a status quo?

We shall see that it is impossible to discuss this without a typology of wars and the underlying conflicts.

For the basic dilemma of peacekeeping as it is defined above is not how to find a third party, legitimize its actions under some formula of collective security, and make it capable of performing its roles adequately. These are the problems that, characteristically, have attracted most attention [5]. Rather the basic dilemma seems to be how peacekeeping as an approach can differentiate between horizontal, vertical, and "diagonal" wars [6] — and not just treat them all naively as "wars", "trouble", "shooting in the streets", etc.
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A good case can be made for peacekeeping in a horizontal conflict, in a conflict between equals with no element of dominance. If associative mechanisms (see next section) have either not been tried or have been found insufficient in preserving peace, the next approach will have to be dissociation, unless one wants the war. That is: if geography proves insufficient, improve it with technology; and if the social forces of social distance and balance of power prove insufficient (and they have by definition proved insufficient, there is "trouble") — the assistance of third parties might be tried to keep the belligerents apart.

The difficulty is that only a fraction of wars are horizontal. If they are few in numbers, they may nonetheless be large in scope — like some aspects of World Wars I and II (and unlike the wars of liberation after 1945) [7]. In these few cases peacekeeping cannot, deliberately or not, be a means to maintain a dominance structure; it is truly a third party. But if it intervenes and freezes a status quo in a vertical conflict between periphery and center, then, whether wanting to or not, it is simply a party to the conflict siding objectively with the side most interested in preserving the status quo. This is elementary, but it is too often forgotten.

We shall then distinguish between intra-national, intra-regional, and international peacekeeping.

_Intra-national peacekeeping_ is nothing new: this is what the state is supposed to perform, one of its major functions. The state intervenes in vertical as well as horizontal internal conflicts; it is unnecessary here to explore further how state intervention in vertical conflicts, e.g. against striking workers, traditionally makes the state a second rather than a third party to such conflicts [8].

_Intra-regional peacekeeping_ is nothing new either. Within its sphere of influence the country with the power monopoly, the hegemonial power, has always exercised horizontal and vertical peacekeeping. It has kept peace among periphery states as well as stopped the Periphery from launching attacks against the Center. What is said above for international peacekeeping applies also here [9].

What is new is _international peacekeeping_, under the UN Charter, or as earlier envisaged by the Covenant of the League of Nations [10]. It is immediately seen that under the present type of world "order" this must be very limited in scope. This type of peacekeeping cannot in general intervene in the two types of internal wars. Under the doctrine of nonintervention in internal affairs the nation-state has a monopoly on peacekeeping inside its domain of jurisdiction. Further, it cannot in general intervene in intra-
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regional wars, whether they are between two Periphery nations inside the empire, or are simply imperialistic wars. Under doctrines of regional peacekeeping (Monroe and Brezhnev doctrines, as opposed to Chapter 8 of the UN Charter), the region has a near-monopoly on peacekeeping inside its domain of jurisdiction [11].

This rules out very many types of wars, e.g. the whole cluster of Indochina wars [12]. It rules out various types of subversive wars, as well as internationalized class wars, since the internal component is so high. They are basically internal wars, only that there is also an element of international “assistance” or “coordination”. There may be a case for patrolling waterways, for enforcing nonintervention and things of that kind, but that is not the same as peacekeeping. Under the present system such wars are most likely to be dealt with under the formulas of intranational or intra-regional peacekeeping mentioned above, shielding off the international community from efforts to penetrate too deeply into “internal affairs”.

This leaves us then with wars between Center nations, and wars between Periphery nations, as candidates for truly international peacekeeping. But there is still one more filter, the third dilemma of international peacekeeping: it is intended for the weak, not for the strong. Elements of the instrument are used in the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, between India and Pakistan and so on; but not between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between the Soviet Union and China. It can be used in wars between Periphery states provided they are not both within the same region. But it cannot, so far, be used between superpowers, probably not even between big powers. This is not just because the UN is weak. It is rather because in that case the big powers would no longer be big, and certainly not be superpowers. The rationalization may be in terms of quality and quantity of the military machinery: no one else is sophisticated and strong enough to keep peace between us! But the other interpretation is deeper and more in accordance with facts [13].

To be a big power, and a fortiori to be a superpower, is to have the right to be one’s own peacekeeper. One is fully autonomous and responsible, not in any need of being looked after. If one nevertheless goes to war, then it is because this is unavoidable. There may be a small probability of miscalculation and technical error, but that can be smoothened out through systems analysis and through Center-Center direct negotiation leading to arms control! At any rate, it is not for lesser powers to try to meddle with. To be a lesser power, according to this type of thinking, carries with it the connotation of a lower level of technical rationality, of lack of experience in handling the tools of war, of a certain volatility – all factors that make
most Periphery-Periphery wars less necessary, more avoidable than Center-
Center wars. Conclusion: the target of peacekeeping is reduced to wars
between Periphery nations from different regions [14].

Let us now retrace our steps and try to indicate some measures to get
out of these three dilemmas. The world cannot do without a peacekeeping
instrument, but neither can it do with one that has so many constraints
and weaknesses either. We now take the dilemmas in the opposite order
of their presentation.

First, horizontal peacekeeping must be made more symmetric. If there is
peacekeeping in the Periphery, by the big powers, even by the superpowers
themselves, or condoned by them under a UN formula, then there must
also be some provision for Periphery peacekeeping in the Center. This idea
is much less impractical or utopian than it may sound. Many scenarios for
the initial phase of a major war in Europe are based on some type of trans-
gression across the East-West borderline that runs from North to South,
from the border between Norway and the Soviet Union down to the bor-
ders between Bulgaria and Greece/Turkey. To station UN troops along this
border, or at critical points, would be an extremely important symbol of
symmetry and global sharing of problems. The same applies to UN troops
along the Ussuri River or at other sections of the 10,000-km-long border
between China and the Soviet Union.

But this type of symmetry that many would find artificial is not the only
possibility. Symmetry can also be obtained by locking the traditional world
Center out from peacekeeping in the Periphery: This is what OAU has done
to some extent, e.g. in the Morocco-Algeria conflict, it is what the future
Organization of Latin American States in all likelihood will do, what the
Organization of Arab States might do in its domain, it is what India might
aspire to do in South Asia, and so on. As we shall argue later, we find this
regionalization sub-optimal, for if peace is indivisible, then peacekeeping
should be even more so. What would prevent such peacekeeping machineries from turning against each other? Very little. Hence, we would prefer symmetry through exchange to symmetry through dissociation [15].

Second, there is the problem of extending the sphere of applicability of
international peacekeeping. This means, unequivocally, to break through
these artificial walls called regions and states mankind has built around
itself. The unconditional doctrine of nonintervention will have to go in
either case, and that will be an extremely painful and draw-out process.

That the doctrine has to go is more than evident from the case of Bangla-
desh: under the doctrine of nonintervention, genocide of a nation aspiring
to some kind of statehood (whether full autonomy or autonomy inside
a (con)federation [16] could take place unimpeded by any effort to carry
out "peacekeeping", until, finally, India did the job [17]. Or, a contrived
example: imagine Hitler had said in 1936 that he really had no territorial ambitions at all, that all he wanted was to kill all Jews he could lay hands on? Would that constitute a case for intervention? The point is simply that with internal wars becoming more important, not less, the unlimited doctrine of nonintervention will become increasingly anachronistic, and a search for more discriminating criteria will have to start.

The same can be said about the monopoly on peacekeeping held by regions dominated by hegemonial powers. Such regions, like the US-dominated Organization of American States and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, are simply empires badly disguised. Their nature was clearly revealed when they were used to uphold structures of dominance in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, of course with the assistance of some satellites [18]. In both cases the intervention took place under the pretext that the "other side" was launching subversive warfare, the evidence extremely slim in either case [19].

The fight against intra-bloc monopoly on peacekeeping is easier than the fight against intra-national monopoly on peacekeeping. Today all over the world there is a certain sentiment against blocs dominated by one hegemonial power. Hence, by the end of this century there may be no such blocs left; they may all share the fate of the pax Britannica and the pax gallica systems (although some residuals of either still linger on) [20]. If one now imagined a general horizontalization of regions, then regional peacekeeping, like for the OAU, would obviously be different from the two examples mentioned. But the peacekeeping should still be authorized by the UN: it should be decentralized in execution rather than regionalized in authority [21]. In such regions international wars would be horizontal, not vertical — and that would simplify the problem tremendously.

Where the intranational monopoly on peacekeeping is concerned, we run against a much more deeply entrenched system, since it is a system with considerable tradition and sophistication. More particularly, we are thinking of how easily the whole population of a state can be made to turn against foreign intruders, regardless of how much they are "third parties" operating legitimately. Hence, the criterion must somehow be exactly the extent to which the third parties are wanted. But that means that not only governments should be entitled to articulate wishes, but also other groups. Of course, this already happens in the form of representatives, often smuggled out of the oppressive system, organizing lobbies around the UN etc. An obvious point is that the world must find an institutional way of representing such groups. We are thinking of a form whereby Bangladesh, Euzkadi, and Ulster would all have been able to raise their voices in a world authority, not only Pakistan, Spain, and the United Kingdom. These two groups would have highly different views on the issues
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of intra-state intervention by an international peacekeeping force. No intergovernmental authority can be relied upon in such issues — also it is rapidly becoming an anachronism because of its structural inability to cope with such problems. The prestige blow suffered by the UN in South Asia because of its inability to deal with Bangladesh can hardly be overestimated.

Third, there is the whole problem of the role of peacekeeping in connection with vertical conflict, with conflicts arising from structural violence. One could imagine three positions on this issue:

— the formalistic stand: Trouble is trouble, any war should be handled in the same way: besides, there will be no agreement as to what kind of war it is anyhow. Conclusion: third party intervention.

— the "let-it-work-itself-out" stand: A vertical war is the acting out of internal contradictions and they have to work themselves out. Ultimately the progressive forces will win, the rest of the world should stay out. Conclusion: no third party intervention (because it would support second party).

— the "use-peacekeeping-on-the-side-of-peace" stand: To keep peace in the sense of absence of direct violence is not enough, one should also make peace in the sense of abolishing structural violence. Conclusion: third party intervention, on the side of the first party.

We reject the first position as mechanistic and in practice counterproductive to the cause of peace because it preserves structural violence and (thereby) also promotes direct violence, in the longer run. We also reject the second position, among other reasons, because it may lead to drawn-out wars with no guarantee as to the result. It is cynical to tell freedom fighters in Southern Africa that they must "work it out themselves", fighting with simple arms against fighter bombers and napalm.

But the third stand is also problematic, not least because of the difficulty in deciding whether there is a clear case of dominance, and how it operates. In some cases, it is simple, however; we feel the UN should have intervened in, e.g. Southern Africa, and on the side of the freedom fighters (that the diagnosis is "simple" is revealed by the near unanimity of UN resolution). Other cases may be more problematic.

But even then, many other forms can be found. The modern war of liberation proceeds precisely by liberating territories and turning them into models of what the future state shall be once it has been liberated (from structural violence). International peacekeeping should not only consist in giving funds and know-how of various kinds to these territories, but also, as a minimum, in helping protect these territories. A peacekeeping operation in a horizontal conflict would be a two-way wall separating the parties; a peacekeeping operation in a vertical conflict should be more like a one-way wall, permitting the freedom fighters out to expand the liberated territory, but preventing the oppressors from getting in. Other formulas could be
imagined. They will not easily pass the filters directed systematically against
them in international law, so dominated by governmentalism and the actor-
oriented perspective, with all its assumptions about horizontal relations,
conflicts, and wars.

With such improvements as indicated, peacekeeping might be a very
valuable instrument, with less of the built-in servility to the status quo than
found in recent operations. But there is still more room for basic develop-
ment in this field.

The problem of third party intervention to prevent structural violence
not only direct violence, is bound to rise higher and higher on the political
agenda. We mentioned the case of a Hitler bent on killing Jews, yet protected
by the doctrine of nonintervention — if not necessarily in practice. What
if his Hitler said: "I do not want to kill them suddenly, only slowly — by
exposing them to malnutrition, protein deficiency, slum conditions, no
health facilities, no education, the most menial and dangerous work, etc."
In that case, he would only have put into words what many societies prac-
tice anyway. Of course, it sounds worse when verbalized and even intended,
but the consequence for the victim is about the same [22].

Why should this not be a case for intervention? Are we bound to wait for
the elite in that country, or the legislative assembly, to be sufficiently aroused
by compassion or self-interest to change conditions [23]? Or, does struc-
tural violence have to be converted into direct violence that can be seen as
a threat also to the outside world [24]? Is such conversion really in the
interest of mankind when clear indicators of structural violence can also
be established [25]? Or — is this only one more expression of the excessive
weight given to the actor-oriented perspective as opposed to the structure-
oriented perspective? Sooner or later this instrument will have to be made
less biased, directed not only against the destruction of human life in battle,
but also against its destruction in slums.

To take another problem: so far, the United Nations peacekeeping
forces seem to have been able to draw on considerable goodwill and enthu-
siasm in such nations as Canada and the Nordic countries [26]. To what
extent is that enthusiasm conditioned by the low likelihood that these
forces will ever be used on their own territory? Would enthusiasm decline
if that condition were no longer valid? How could the support never-
theless be maintained, if it should be maintained — as we think it should?

Finally, there is the old problem of whether police or military come
closest to fulfilling third party roles. The argument can be made that the
traditional role of the police comes closer to the third party than the
military roles, more focused as they are on first and second party activi-
ties. The experience of the police corps in some countries, with soft forms
of power and low profile in their presence, should be more compatible
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with the peacekeeping role than military forces poised for battle [27]. This argument can also be turned around: in some countries, a pattern of police brutality developed through domestic confrontation may have become a tradition very counterproductive if it practiced in a peacekeeping context. Military units might have had less habit-forming traditions in such contexts, simply due to inactivity (the Latin American case). This argument probably reduces to a flat “it all depends on who, when and where”. The argument could also be turned around in favor of police corps participation in international control of violence, to debrutalize the police units of some countries by the modifying influence of international control [28].

2. Peacemaking: the conflict resolution approach

This sounds obvious: get rid of the source of tension, the underlying conflict, and the rest will take care of itself; not only the war, but also the war race and eventually the war machinery itself will wither away. In fact, no such automatic causal chain can be assumed. Even if the conflict is solved, or about to be solved, there may still be war — for instance out of old hatred or as a projection of internal conflict. Even if there is no war the war race may still go on — partly because of the other possible war theaters, partly because of the other factors sustaining a war race. And even if the war race is stopped, the war machinery is still there; it does not disappear for such simple reasons.

Conflict resolution should, of course, always be attempted, it only depends on what kind. The world has seen far too many conflicts frozen into protraction by the dissociative approach, whether it is administered by the parties themselves or with the assistance of third parties: not to mention too many conflicts that have resulted in devastating open wars [29]. But conflict resolution should not only be seen as a way of avoiding war, but also as a way for mankind to progress, to transcend incompatibilities or contradictions that stifle progress and channel attention and all kinds of resources away from more important pursuits, away from the realization of fundamental world goals. We do not think only of the diversion of high proportions of the GNP into the military sector, but of the impact unresolved conflict has on the minds of men, becoming an obsession blocking creative thinking in other directions.

To explore this approach some perspectives on conflict and conflict resolution are indispensable. Conflict of goals exists when actors are pursuing incompatible goals, or at least goals they think are incompatible; conflict of interest is a deeper-lying condition. However, in this connection we shall start out by assuming that conflicts of interest have been converted into conflicts of goals; that interests have been consciously crystallized into goals,
and parties into actors through consciousness formation, mobilization, and organization. In other words, we assume that the conflict is essentially horizontal in this sense, although the parties may not be equal in capacity.

It is in this full-blown conflict-system that the conflict resolution approach has to operate. Conflict should not be confused with the manifestations of conflict in terms of attitude and/or behavior, usually of a negative, destructive, kind. Hatred and violence are only expressions of conflict, but they may also linger on long after the conflict has been solved—just as the conflict may remain at the latent level, as an incompatibility, with no attitudinal or behavioral manifestations at all. To try to attack conflict by regulating attitude and behavior has about the same relation to conflict resolution as curing symptoms has to real therapy.

Which, then, are the options, the possibilities for conflict resolution? Since this is not the place to give any extensive coverage to the complexities of conflict theory [30], let us go straight for the conclusion: there seem to be two major choices.

One, there is the possibility of eliminating the incompatibility, which in a sense is the ideal approach. But there are also forms of conflict resolution that preserve the incompatibility. How? Because conflict resolution is the negation of conflict: it is the condition under which actors are not pursuing incompatible goals. One way this may take place is that they stop pursuing the goals, e.g. because they get busy with other things. The goals recede sufficiently into the background for the conflict to become non-salient. There are also other, more dramatic ways.

The second choice has to do with the actor-system and the conflict-system: are they to be preserved or to be changed? Since the actor-system is a part of the conflict-system (which also includes structural elements) there are three possibilities here:

— preserve the actor-system, preserve the conflict-system;
— preserve the actor-system, change the conflict-system;
— change the actor-system (and by implication, the conflict-system).

This is not very meaningful unless spelt out, as will be done below. Only one important conclusion can be drawn already at this stage: conflict resolution may be more or less radical, meaning less or more respectful of the status quo; the list given above obviously gives increasingly radical approaches. This is important, because one’s view of conflict resolution depends on how much of status quo one wants to preserve.

Let us now combine these two choice-dimensions and fill the typology with a variety of conflict resolution approaches (Table 1).

A few words about each approach to make them meaningful:

To resolve the incompatibility is in a sense to show that there is no “real” conflict, "only" a perception. This can be done empirically, as when suffi-
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TABLE 1 Twelve approaches to conflict resolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor system</th>
<th>Conflict system</th>
<th>Incompatibility eliminated</th>
<th>Incompatibility preserved</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>preserved</td>
<td>preserved</td>
<td>1. incompatibility resolved</td>
<td>7. add positive intra-action</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. compromise</td>
<td>8. add positive inter-action</td>
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<td>changed</td>
<td>changed (expanded)</td>
<td>3. trading</td>
<td>9. add negative inter-action</td>
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<td></td>
<td>expansions to more actors</td>
<td>4. multilateralization</td>
<td>10. interaction with other actors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>changing relations</td>
<td>5. disintegration</td>
<td>11. domination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>contraction to one actor</td>
<td>6. integration</td>
<td>12. elimination</td>
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cient money, time, or energy are made available to achieve both of two competing goals; or logically, as when the incompatibility is interpreted away. In either case, what is acceptable is made compatible. This is the opposite of the compromise formula: what is compatible is made acceptable (to both parties).

In trading, the actors are the same, but the conflict system is expanded to include more conflicts — one being traded against the other. In multilateralization, the opposite approach is taken: more actors are brought into the picture, establishing cycles of conflicts that can be cancelled off against each other. These two approaches will be considered in some detail in the next section, since they are crucial to the associative approach to peace.

There are also the possibilities of fission and fusion; of disintegration and integration. In the latter case, the two actors fuse into one — meaning, among other things, that their goals are harmonized with each other so that there can no longer be any incompatibility. Under disintegration, the opposite approach is taken: the two actors are decoupled from each other such that they are free to pursue goals without getting in each other’s way.

Then there is the other set of approaches that all assume that nothing is done with the incompatibility, at least for the time being. There are in fact three main approaches here, for the first four are only specifications of the major approach to conflict: protraction. The actors engage in other kinds of activity; they may turn inward, towards themselves (intra-action). Or they may engage in some positive interaction with each other, on the side, like spouses in protracted marital conflict. Or, they may add more conflict to the existing conflict by engaging in more negative interaction, on the assumption that one conflict may supersede the other: “If I steal
your car today and make you angry, chances are that you'll forget about it if I burn down your house tomorrow!” Then there is the possibility of expanding the system by turning the attention towards outsiders — an obvious approach in a cold war stalemate [31].

At the end come the more dramatic possibilities that few would describe as “resolution” — in our view because that term is usually taken in too narrow a sense. First there is structural violence, which appears here as domination. There are still two actors, but they are no longer in each other’s way because one is psychologically eliminated, no longer capable of formulating (let alone pursuing) autonomously developed goals. To the extent he develops goals, the dominated party will interpret the lack of goal-satisfaction as due to his own inability — as frustration rather than as conflict. Then there is elimination, meaning direct violence, preserving the incompatibility between the goals, but making it impossible for at least one of the actors to pursue its goal any longer. Whether this is obtained through physical elimination (killing, maiming), social elimination (seclusion, confinement), or geographical elimination (escape, expulsion) does not matter much; it is still direct violence.

Obviously, domination and disintegration belong to the theory of vertical conflict to remind us that even though conflicts may be resolved in the sense that actors are not pursuing incompatible goals, at the level of interests the conflict may be as rampant as ever. Disintegration of the system, withdrawal, non-cooperation, decoupling as this may be called in various places, may then be the most appropriate response.

We have given this wide spectrum in order now to say something about the entire conflict resolution approach — without going into details about the individual approaches. This is not unproblematic, because it can be done in ways that are extremely dishonest and detrimental to the parties to the conflict, particularly to the weaker parties.

But should not everything possible be done to avoid the last alternative on the list, “elimination”? Ideally, yes, but not necessarily at the expense of the next to the last, “domination”. “Better some refugees abroad after the revolution than continued oppression” [32], would be the argument; but some of the other approaches are still better, provided they do not also imply continued domination.

Thus, the most conservative approaches, carrying with them least change in the system, would be to resolve the incompatibility and to engage in compromise — followed by trading and multilateralization. But all of them are approaches that can most easily be pursued by strong actors, capable of throwing resources and resourcefulness into the conflict, changing the game a little bit, but essentially preserving the system. In the long run they may therefore be sub-optimal to approach no. 5, disintegration.
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whereby the weaker party chooses to detach himself from ties with the stronger party, and establish autonomy.

The second problem is concerned with protraction, which avoids direct confrontation as well as real solution. Essentially it is a way of gaining time, but that raises the question: gaining time for what? For "peace"? — but what does that mean? Merely to avoid elimination, and possibly also domination? Fine, but sometimes it seems to imply that efforts to eliminate the incompatibility should be avoided: in other words, that the kernel of the conflict should not really be attacked, only the periphery. Granted that holding time may be indispensable, how long is the time of grace supposed to last? How long can one freeze a conflict by trying to make the parties busy with themselves, with each other in "cooperative", "positive-sum" activities, with an occasional addition to the conflict and some channeling of energy in other directions — without really trying to tackle the basic issue?

These are fundamental problems. If satisfactory answers are not found, sooner or later more dramatic approaches like disintegration, domination, and elimination will be used. More "dramatic" does not necessarily mean more "radical". Elimination is not a radical approach. It is dishonest, because it tries to solve a conflict the easy way, by eliminating one of the actors. But it is dramatic, particularly to those to be eliminated, and it would not be strange if they would try to turn the tide of conflict resolution energy in some other direction.

This is often where the third party approach comes in — the mediators and arbitrators, the go-betweens and the conciliators. They are not so much called in by the first parties suffering from structural violence in the form of domination, as by the second parties fearing, often for good reasons, direct violence in the form of elimination. One reason for this is that the third parties usually have high status in domestic and global society, and consequently are more visible and accessible to the strong than to the weak, to the center more than to the periphery. But the relationship is deeper: it is also in terms of social cosmology in general, and outlook on conflict and conflict resolution in particular.

The entire third party approach will almost by definition be basically actor-oriented, for the third party is supposed to constitute some type of human link between the first and second parties. Obviously, there is a vast range of options as to the nature of this link. The third party may meet with one of them at a time, or with both, in a setting of carefully "controlled communication" [33], or in free association. The purpose may be to a social system what nondirective counseling is to the all-functioning person: to increase the awareness of the general situation. Or it may be to attempt a search for a solution, generated by the two parties, or by the
third party, or by all of them in cooperation. Or it may also be to arrive at a solution, decided by the two parties, or by the third party, or again by all of them in cooperation. Finally, it may even include implementing the decision.

However this may be, the basic underlying philosophy remains actor-oriented. This does not mean that there cannot be a search for a structural diagnosis of the conflict, and even proposals in the form of structural change. But these cannot be very far-reaching, for a simple reason. The whole approach is based on the idea of symmetric relationship with the parties, in the sense that the third party entertains, as much as possible, the same relationship to the two parties. (Otherwise it would not be a third party: if it should start leaning more in one direction than the other, at least before the final recommendation is produced, this would quickly be pointed out by the other party.) But this in turn means that the approach is tailored to horizontal conflict, where all these assumptions can be said to be valid, not to vertical conflict.

More specifically, it would be difficult for a third party to come up with anything but recommendations that preserve the actor-system, that preserve the structure so that the actors are still actors. At most the inclusion of some extra actors might be recommended. But a disintegration that would eliminate the social role of one of the actors would not be seen as a part of the third party role. Rather, typical approaches would be ingenious, imaginative efforts to resolve the incompatibility, or gentle persuasion leading towards a compromise. They are honest, but also system-preserving. Trading and multilateralization might be added, even though they go somewhat further in their structural implications. And protraction may be attempted in a genuine desire to gain some time, or in a less genuine desire to find a compromise between doing nothing and something that would solve the conflict.

What this adds up to is not a rejection of the third party instrument. It is indispensable as one approach in horizontal conflicts, e.g. as peacemaking added to peacekeeping. The two parties may be unable, partly because of the polarization in the conflict, to work out anything themselves; and this may lead to a call for third parties, even to the right for third parties to intervene lest the conflict spread and escalate [34] (we would only accept that “right” for the case of horizontal conflict). The real problem is when a horizontal approach is used in a vertical conflict, with efforts to make that conflict horizontal — for instance by reaching out for some highly unrepresentative “representatives” of the periphery, pretending that they are the periphery because they are willing to work inside that type of model.

There are also other problems with the third party approach. Being an alternative to direct negotiations, it may sometimes take away from the
The three approaches to peace

parties what rightfully belongs to them: the conflict with others alienating and impoverishing them. *The third parties may often be seen as processing somebody else’s conflict, as a factory processes raw materials, producing solutions, and growing in the process.* This growth may take concrete forms: added experience, accumulation and concentration of deep insight into human affairs, accumulation of status and prestige as conflict-manager, legitimation, and ultimately power because all this can be converted into innate power, resource power, and structural power [35]. In cooperating with third parties, the basis may be laid for a new structure of dominance, with a new elite of conflict-managers. The significance of this is evident in the race between the UN and the big powers to be the third party in the Middle East, able to bring “peace” to the region [36].

To conclude: the conflict resolution approach is as essential as it is problematic. It should always be attempted. Ideally, the general world level of conflict-consciousness should be raised through better distribution of insight concerning conflict, above all through autonomous creation of insight through active conflict participation — from early childhood, in the family, at school, at work. People today have largely had conflicts managed and resolved for them above their heads, by parents, teachers, employers presenting them with an artificially smooth social surface. To show a conflict has been seen as some kind of capitulation, as the negation of “harmony” and “efficiency”.

However, if the two parties are unable to use the conflict resolution approach fruitfully themselves, third parties should be available, on an institutionalized or ad hoc basis. But their use should above all be in horizontal conflict. This is not only because their role may bias them, with or against their will, in favor of the stronger party, but because active conflict participation is one of the most important ways in which a dominated periphery may become autonomous. To take active conflict participation away from participants in a horizontal conflict may only lead to a new, weak dominance structure with the third party on top. And to take conflict participation away from the participants in a vertical conflict may be a way of maintaining the underlying dominance, in fact a new dominance technique.

The major objection against the peacemaking approach is that it often grows out of an unrealistic conception of conflict resolution. According to this general approach, a solution has been arrived at when an agreement has been negotiated that can be ratified by both sides [37]. In other words, conflict resolution is largely seen as something that rests in the minds of the conflicting parties, of the actors.

This is a too narrow concept; it is also highly elitist. The actors may disintegrate, they may disappear and be superceded by new actors to whom the agreement is no longer felt as binding — as is well known. More impor-
tantly, an agreement arrived at in a certain situation, often under the pressure of a third party, is not necessarily self-supporting. It does not necessarily have built into it structural factors that will support the system in the particular state that the agreement prescribes. A sense of moral obligation, of commitment to an agreement already arrived at, is generally not enough. For that reason we have to turn toward deeper-lying factors in the relation between the parties, in order to arrive at some ideas about how a self-supporting conflict resolution could be found. And this is what we refer to as peacebuilding.

3. Peacebuilding: the associative approach

We have tried systematically to relate direct violence to structural violence—or war to dominance, to use another word-pair. Many, at times perhaps most, wars are vertical wars, with the dominated groups trying to liberate themselves from the dominance, and the dominating groups trying to maintain it. But there are also horizontal wars, between Centers, and between Peripheries, that cannot be explained in terms of domination. They may sometimes be seen as reactions to internal domination (in the Center-Center wars) and to external domination (in the Periphery-Periphery wars); but much dogmatism is needed to view all horizontal wars in such terms.

There is also a third type: the war in vacuum, the war across a zero relationship. The first colonial wars were like that, before dominance was firmly established. In the world of today, increasingly becoming a closed interaction system where everybody has something to do with everybody else, this category will decrease in importance. But if we look at the total matrix of interaction among territorial actors, a small percentage of the cells accounts for close to 100% of the total interaction; so if the others do not have exactly a zero relationship, they are not far away from it.

It is in this system of vertical, horizontal, and zero relations the means of destruction are pouring in, being churned out every day. That in itself need not be so catastrophie. A healthy body can take a lot of germs. But the world social structure is not healthy. As indicated above, the weapons produced are likely to be used, for there are good reasons for using them. Hence, it makes very much sense to ask what a “healthy world body” would look like. What structure would decrease the likelihood of violence, what is the structure of peace?

In putting the question this way the implicit hypothesis is that peace has a structure [38] different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking. Given this, what would we wish from a peace structure? Definitely not that it has built into it peacekeeping, for we would see the entire dissociative approach as a sign of capitulation, that better
methods have not been tried or not succeeded. But it should have built into it peacemaking, not as an ad hoc effort to solve a conflict that suddenly has surfaced and manifested itself in hatred and/or destructive behavior. The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present there as a reservoir for the system itself to draw upon, just as the healthy body has the ability to generate its own antibodies and does not need ad hoc administration of medicine. More particularly, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur. To give an example immediately, as an illustration but also in order to reject it: the vertical bloc consisting of one big power and several small, with the big power assuming the role of policeman. The trouble with that model is that the big power has a tendency to assume some other roles in addition, adding judge, crown witness, executioner, manager, president, field marshal, and so on, so that the net result may be absence of direct violence, but bought at the expense of a frightening amount of structural violence. Evidently, this is not what we mean when we talk about a peace structure. But it is a structure, a frequent and likely one; and the power monopoly of the big power may undoubtedly serve to reduce, even eliminate intra-bloc wars.

To find better structures let us take as a point of departure the division of interaction in vertical, horizontal and zero relations. What can be done with these relations in order to build a peace structure? One set of suggestions is presented in Table 2.

**TABLE 2 The structure of peace: a suggestion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>social relations</th>
<th>1. equity</th>
<th>2. entropy</th>
<th>3. symbiosis</th>
<th>4. broad scope</th>
<th>5. large domain</th>
<th>6. superstructure</th>
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<tr>
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</table>

The rationale for all this will be given immediately; let us first given two examples: the Nordic countries, and the European Community countries.

In both cases there is a norm of equity, no party shall be exploited [39]. This can be obtained even if there are differences in size, size being less of an impediment to equity than development level. Relations are “entropic”, meaning that not only governments — or in more general terms, the elites, the centers — participate, there is also an extremely broad variety of people-to-people interaction (although still far too top-heavy, as in all international relations). There is symbiosis, meaning a high level of interdependence: the exchange within the system is a substantial portion of the total pro-
Peacebuilding: the associative approach

duction of the members. There is a broad scope, meaning that there are many types of exchange, not only economic. There is a large domain, meaning essentially that there are more than just two or three parties to the exchange (there are five or six). Incidentally, increasing "scope" and "domain" is referred to as "deepening" and "extension", respectively, in EC parlance. Finally: there is a superstructure. It is weak in the case of the Nordic countries, merely an annual conference rotating among the capitals with a weak secretariat. It is very strong in the case of the EC, to the point where it has become transnational rather than international (the "eurocrats").

In both cases what Karl Deutsch would call a "security area" [40] has been obtained — large-scale international violence being extremely unlikely. We know of no other regions in the world where such relations can be said to obtain inter-nationally. Of course, there are many examples of states where the relations can be said to obtain intra-nationally; even very big federations like the United States, Yugoslavia, perhaps India, perhaps the Soviet Union, most definitely not Brazil. What about nonfederal states? In that case, a further step has been taken, integration. Integration means that the original actors have disappeared: no longer discernible, they have been absorbed into the superstructure.

Obviously, that applies only to districts within states, not to classes. If these six principles were also practiced among nonterritorial groups such as classes, classes would no longer exist — being ruled out by the norm of equity. Without elaborating on this, we should only note that the theory behind Table 2 says nothing about what kind of actors we have, only that if they want a peace structure, free from structural and direct violence, then they should respect those six principles. We refer to them as the conditions of association, with integration as the extreme case.

But most of our thinking will be based on actors that are states, as the major illustration. The rationale derives from development theory for the first three points, and from conflict theory for the last three.

*Equity, entropy, and symbiosis are simply the negation of antihuman conditions of exploitation, elitism, and isolation. Equity is the negation of explication between nations. It means horizontal interaction, symmetric patterns — with the ramification of implications that this implies. "Entropy" takes the idea further, inside the nation-state billiard ball. It asks: how can we prevent international interaction from being monopolized by center-center interaction? How can we give equal weight to the non-elites? By opening all kinds of interaction channels where each group in nation A (not only ministries) finds its opposite numbers in nation B — workers with workers, women's liberation with women's liberation, architects with architects, peace research with peace research, etc. [41]. For this pairing off to take place,
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some measure of homology [42] is needed, but not absolutely indispensable: people can find each other on so many bases, as indicated above.

But "entropy" does not so much point to the multiplicity of channels as to their relative weight. We have chosen the term because of the way it directs our attention to maximum disorder, meaning a more or less equal distribution of the total amount of interaction among the channels. It rules out the present system where 90%, 99%, even 100%, of what goes on between nations is handled or controlled by governments. It does not stamp out governments, only establishes a sharing between what might be called governmental and nongovernmental foreign policy — a more equal balance between them, like the balance one has in democracies between governmental and nongovernmental domestic policy. Thus, what we have here called "entropy" — no doubt a strange-sounding term to many readers — could also be referred to as "democracy" — but that term is slightly overused, to make a mild understatement.

Symbiosis is the negation of mutual isolation. We have said repeatedly that isolation, decoupling, detachment may be the only way out as an alternative to dominance if the Center is not prepared to enter into any relation of equality. But we do not see this as a lasting condition. Man needs Man, nations need each other; they should cultivate diversity, but diversity becomes meaningless without exchange. Symbiosis means that this exchange becomes so important to both of them that both know they will hurt themselves in hitting the other. Thus, through symbiosis peace becomes tied to self-interest, and we agree with those who feel that this is one (but only one!) important anchoring point.

Thus, through equality one removes dominance as a motivation for engaging in violence — as has been done meticulously through complex institution-building in federations and confederations, and in systems like the Nordic Council and the EC. Through symbiosis one strengthens the horizontal tie — if at all possible. The idea of national self-sufficiency is given up, and one engages in horizontal division of labor — "you make transistors, I make tractors". (Not: "you make oil, I make tractors"?) Relations between nations become more like relations within nations, for through the condition of entropy all kinds of groups are brought in contact with each other and share the burden of decisionmaking. The total relation is complex, but predominantly horizontal.

That does not mean that there no longer will be problems. At this point clear-cut conflicts of goals may arise, and more so, the more intensive and deeper the interaction. Precisely because they are so tightly tied together, there may be conflicts of scarcity and quarrels about sharing of costs and benefits. Goals may be incompatible in any number of ways. Of course, conflict does not necessarily lead to violence; as pointed out in the preceding

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section, there are other approaches to conflict (otherwise mankind would have disappeared a long time ago). But a structure may be more or less rich when it comes to offering possibilities for conflict resolution. Conflict resolution mechanisms may, in short, be built into the structure on a permanent and not an ad hoc basis. By that we do not mean those institutions so dear to the legalistic approach — codified norms (laws), ratification, detection mechanisms, verification, adjudication, administration of sanctions and review [43]. All this is very nice and may be fitted into the superstructure, but it is meaningful only if the infrastructure (the first five points on the list) permits conflict resolution.

Without going into the details of conflict theory, we should note two basic propositions from that multidisciplinary branch of social science we lean on concerning points 4 and 5 on the list:

**Proposition 1** — The broader the scope, the more conflicts may two actors have in common; and the more conflicts, the more possibility of conflict resolution by trading one against the other.

**Proposition 2** — The larger the domain, the more possibilities of cyclical conflict; and the more cyclical conflicts, the more possibility of multilateral clearing.

Both principles are well known from general politics. Thus, it is often said that when the three European Communities — the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Agency, and Euratom — came together, some conflicts got unstuck because of the wider scope for trading (“if you vote with me this point today, I’ll support you tomorrow on that point”). It is the principle of “widening agendas”, to use another phrase [44]. And the principle of multilateral clearing is fundamental in international trade: if A has a deficit to B, B a deficit to C and C to A, all deficits may be canceled, if there is multilateral institution (one of the many functions of the superstructure). The condition is that the deficits are in cyclical order.

In general, the broader the scope and the larger the domain, the more conflict channels and the more actors, the better. Most dangerous is the situation where there are only two actors who get stuck in a one-dimensional conflict over this piece of territory, or that way of running the organization. It is in that type of situation violence flares up as an alternative after many other approaches have been tried in vain. It is this type of situation the two conditions aim at avoiding.

We should note that the two propositions have equity as an underlying assumption. If A is much stronger than B, how should B get an upper edge somewhere that he might trade with A? And if A is much stronger than both
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b and c, the likelihood is that both have trade deficits relative to him, so what happens then to the multilateral clearing? Hence, the conditions are somehow consonant with each other, and it is only on the basis of that type of infrastructure that a superstructure should be built. This is today understood and practiced in many quarters, but there are also many examples of superstructures built over infrastructures that are far from fulfilling these conditions. All conditions may be fulfilled except the first one: the relation may be one of dominance rather than equality — and we get the vertical blocs of the Organization of American States or Warsaw Treaty Organization variety. Or the only condition satisfied may be that of equity — and we get the potentially horizontal situation now developing in Europe between an extended EC on the one hand and the CMEA countries on the other [45]. (Needless to say, an all-European superstructure built on top of that would not be a bulwark for peace either [46].) Where the first examples may be examples where direct violence is controlled at the expense of superpower hegemony, i.e. at the expense of structural violence, the last example may be one where there is no structural violence, but no wall against direct violence either.

It may be objected that this total reasoning is too structural and does not take sufficiently into account the importance of attitudes, sentiments, emotions. This is definitely true. For a dissociative structure to work really well, an element of hatred, or at least mutual prejudice, is needed; the infusion of a sentiment of togetherness, of basic identification into an associative structure would certainly strengthen it. And correspondingly, one clearly cannot build the associative structure defined above on attitudes of mutual contempt, even hatred.

However, this is also much a chicken-egg problem. A dissociative structure may lead to hatred and contempt, partly as its rationalization; an associative structure may build up a feeling of brotherhood not even registered as such because it is a natural element in the total atmosphere of cooperation. And in Western Europe, one of the examples above, feelings are mixed and ambivalent; there are positive elements on which to build an expanding associative structure, which may then in turn lead to deeper and positive sentiments.

At this point we make a major theoretical observation that to many may sound like an article of faith — which it is, but we think a reasonably well-founded one. The point is as follows:

In the disarmament debate there has been a fallacy of misplaced concreteness, an emphasis on the concrete, military software and hardware, and its reduction or abolition. The distinction insufficiently made is between a war machinery targeted on a chosen enemy — and one that is merely a potential. The difference between a missile in storage and a missile ready to
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go may be as big as the difference between one in storage and no missile at all. An associative peace structure can, in our view, accommodate much war machinery without adding to any tension. The example of the Nordic countries, not to mention the EC countries, was chosen exactly for this purpose: there is more than enough war machinery available within these security areas to guarantee total obliteration, but it is not targeted on anything within the areas (except, to some extent, on intranational “sources of unrest”). One can even carry this reasoning further: inside any modern city the pharmacies and the hardware stores alone contain enough lethal items for enterprising gangs to convert into the tools of massacres, and if they are well organized (like Al Capone and his gang in Chicago) police forces would easily be outmaneuvered. Still these massacres do not, generally, take place. The people living in these areas are protected by peace structures that often are good approximations of the ideal we have sketched in this section.

Thus, a realistic goal seems to be distargeting rather than disarmament. In the European theater, the gradual build-up of an associative peace structure (and no serious steps are being taken in that direction) would, we presume, be accompanied by a gradual, often tacit distargeting. Weapons systems would be withdrawn in the sense that the time interval needed to make them operational would become longer and longer. Now, it may be said that the ideal time interval is infinity, obtainable only through total dismantling, not only of the war machinery but also of the means of production of war machinery. But experience seems to show that if the structure is dissociative and the tension is high, little time is needed to bring a war machinery up and above any level attained before dismantling. For that reason we prefer this more graded view where distargeting is seen as an intermediate phase that may or may not later lead to disarmament.

To conclude: peace has a structure, and it is an infrastructure more than a suprastructure (although the two are dialectically related). It is also a multilevel structure. To be of any value in the fight against violence it must be built within nations as well as between nations. If liberals have a tendency to focus only on the international structure, marxists have a tendency to focus only on the intranational structure. Liberals often seem to believe that as long as good, egalitarian international institutions can be built, then the building blocs, the states, may be of any kind. And marxists seem to entertain a similar belief: as long as the states are of the right kind (“socialist”), then the inter-state system will somehow take care of itself.

What we have done in this article is an effort to combine both points of view, in the drive towards a synthesis that characterizes this analysis. But it raises at least as many problems as it solves — on paper, that is. Let us look at some of them.

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First, what about nations at very different levels of development? Answer: They should not join together in this type of structure unless the most developed are willing to relate to them in a truly horizontal way. Instead, nations at roughly the same level of development should group together in the way indicated.

Second, what will be the relations between these groups? Answer: At this level, the less developed nations would appear on a larger scale, and could more easily force or be accepted in a horizontal relationship. The principles for the associative approach should also be applied for inter-regional relations.

Third, what about relations between classes? Answer: Classes are clearly in and by themselves peacelessness, non-peace — ruled out by the very condition of equity. But the struggle for peace has countless fronts; it includes class relations, but also between regions and nations, between districts, associations, and organization for that matter.

What is attempted here is a general approach resulting in some general guidelines. The test of this type of three-pronged theory of peace lies in the applicability to concrete cases — but that is outside the scope of the present article.
Notes: II. 11.

[6] One author, Jens Erik Normann, *Hvit slave blant svarte* (White Slave among Blacks) (Oslo: Gyldendahl, 1972), argues on the basis of his own experiences in the Congo that all Norwegians in Congo were racist and manifested it whenever they had a chance. While one of the present authors has first-hand information from his own experience as police member in 1963 which gives some support of Norwegian thesis, we find it much too general and not founded on reliable sources to be acceptable.

[7] Their commitment is deeper, consequently whatever normative element there is should be more pronounced among the officers. If it were the other way round the stage would be set for a conflict between idealistic privates and more or less corrupt officers—the data show convincingly that this was not the case.

[8] But in so being they were not the only ones . . . and hardly different from participants in other continents from Western countries.

[9] This is very clearly seen from such important contributions to understanding how the Xhosa functions at this level as is found in the books by two command- ers, Odd Bull and Michael Harbottle.

[10] This theme is developed to some extent by Arthur Waskow, and by Ege, Harbottle and Rikhye. Also see the article referred to in footnote 3 above.

[11] We are well aware that this may sound like a chauvinist plea, but it is probably a fair judgment. At least the senior author has no record of expression of positive sentiment for the Norwegian military establishment.

II. 11. Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding

[1] However, the concept is not linked to the idea of territory. Rather, balance of power may be defined relative to a more general concept of "zone": I have my zone (for instance professional competence), you have yours and I have a right to aggress if you transgress. The Lorenz tradition focuses on territorial zones, the division of power theory for the modern state focuses on power zones, caste-theories, guild theories, theories of modern professions would focus on functional zones, and then there are the probably extremely important linguistic zones where similar patterns might obtain.

[2] Electromagnetic fences have been practiced or mentioned recently in connection with South Vietnam (the McNamara line) and Israel — both of them high technology enclaves (due to American aid) in zones where at least until recently guerrilla warfare was more typical. The point is, of course, that geography may be a better defense against conventional than paramilitary attacks.

[3] By "vertical proliferation" we mean the diffusion of arms to client states; by "horizontal proliferation" diffusion to states at an equal level — even to the antagonist, even through the type of tacit communication that takes place in arms control negotiations.

[4] The argument in the following pages is very much inspired by discussions at the International Peace Academy during the sessions in Vienna, summer 1970. I am particularly grateful to Rolf Ege, Michael Harbottle and Indar Jit Rikhye for making their experience with international peacekeeping so available to outsiders.

[5] The literature in the field is almost uniquely concentrated on these aspects.
[6] For this distinction see the author’s The True World, ch. 5.1—a previous version of which can be found in this volume, ch. 4.


[8] But the state can of course also intervene in horizontal, inter-national conflicts, e.g., between two districts within the state. The point is only that such conflicts usually have a vertical element, one district may be dominating the other economically or culturally for instance, and it is very rare that the “state” will come out entirely impartially relative to the conflict. Post-independence Uganda history is a good example here.


[10] But the idea is of course much older than that, and is an element in very many of those clas. originating in the West. The idea seems often to be to supplement balance of power between equals in the center of the world, e.g., the West, with some instrument of peacemaking drawn above if the balance of power breaks down, and peacemaking from the West in the rest of the world. Thus, the “unity in diversity” concept of Western models for the world is taken care of.


[12] This is not very clear, however. Even if one accepts the principle of intra-regional monopoly on peacemaking by the hegemonic power this would at most refer to France, hardly to the United States. The regional instruments forged in South-East Asia were so recent and so obviously ad hoc they could hardly be seen as constituting vertical blocks. Quite another matter is that the US seems to have conceived of not only Indochina, but South-East Asia in general, as a region which the US somehow “has”, or at least has had, and hence can “lose”. The historical roots of that idea are probably not difficult to find; the US stepped into the shoes of crumbling Spanish colonialism by means of the two wars by the turn of the century, in Cuba and in the Philippines, thereby acquiring bridgeheads for regional penetration.

[13] The parallel with feudal systems, e.g., in Medieval Europe or in Tokugawa Japan are obvious, and explicated in the author’s article in Essays IV, 10; see footnote 9 above.

[14] This refers, of course, only to inter-national, institutionalized peacemaking of the type associated with the United Nations. It is in this sense, however, that we use the term “peacemaking”—all the others may more correctly be referred to as parts of repressive practices within states and within regions, and as autonomy-preserving strategies in the Center.

[15] For symmetry through dissociation will only strengthen the relative power of the biggest country in regions of what today still in the Periphery — countries like Brazil, Nigeria, Egypt and India. Symmetry through exchange is different, it provides for Periphery peacemaking in the Center in addition to the current pattern of Center peacemaking in the Periphery; thereby keeping the world somewhat more together.

[16] Pre-1971 Pakistan was nominally a state; in practice it was a region with a center, Punjab, and a periphery consisting of East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) and various other parts of West-Pakistan. But the point is the same regardless of
Notes: II. II.

how one looks at Pakistan; that the tremendous violence of spring 1971 could take place with a world only looking at it is telling evidence of the insufficiency of the present system.

[17] Thus, of course, by no means is incompatible with the idea that India in so doing also established patterns of dominance in the subcontinent that later on may take the form of an empire, with an inner periphery inside what is today the Indian Union, and an outer periphery of client states.

[18] We are thinking of the Fuerza Interamericana de la Paz (FTP) that was operating in the Dominican Republic, and the truncated version of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Rumania refused to participate) operating in Czechoslovakia.

[19] There are many parallels between the "evidence" used in the Dominican Republic to demonstrate the advent of communism, and in Czechoslovakia for "capitalism".

[20] We are thinking of the British operation in Chad, and the French operation in Chad -- but by and large the term "residual" (used by Ali Mazrui) seems to be very appropriate.

[21] For an effort to spell these out in detail, see the author's The True Worlds, ch. 6 and, with a particular view to Europe, John Galtung, ed. Cooperation in Europe (Norswegian University Press, 1970).

[22] However, much of the thinking, not to mention the practice about peacekeeping, is linked to an implicit assumption of intention: only when there is a clear intention to commit violence, to aggress, will peacekeeping be called for. Hence, structural violence will fall outside as this grid is constructed in the Western liberal mind at present.

[23] Even if we disregard the vested interest the elite has in being blind to conditions of repression, the slowness of machineries for changing the condition -- such machineries as Western European parliaments or Eastern European party bureaucracies -- is considerable. Most of this can probably be seen more as due to the size of the modern state and the indirect nature of communication and awareness than due to the system itself. This, indeed, is a key argument in Leopold Kohler: The Breakdown of Nations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974.

[24] This pattern of reasoning is reflected in the UN Charter, and can be seen as some type of reductionism to "international peace" rather than "freedom from repression" as a supreme value. It is, of course, obvious why this type of formulation is used: there is no interference in internal affairs, there is reference to a common interest located at the international level, and there is reference to self-interest, through the idea of escalation. But the shortcomings of this type of reasoning are more than obvious: all the Government has to do is to make structural violence so efficient, if needed by adding direct violence to it, that there is no chance of any escalation, even inside the country.

[25] For an effort to establish such indicators see the author's The True Worlds, ch. 4 -- and the crystallization of the thinking in that book into the World Indicators Program conducted at the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research at the University of Oslo.

[26] I am indebted to Yash Tandon for this point.

[27] The counter-argument, that the police forces do not have the logistic experience and machineries, purely and simply in terms of communication and transportation, at their disposal is no real argument: such hardware could constitute the inputs from the military side; police forces could dominate the software.
[25] I am indebted to Chad Alger for this point.

[26] It is unnecessary to add that technology enters as a multiplier here, particularly obliterating distinctions between military and civilian parts of the population.

[27] See the author's Theories of Conflict, forthcoming.

[31] Needless to say, China has played this role in the classical East-West conflict.

[32] The relevance of this argument in connection with the Cohan revolution is obvious. In general, it is probably safe to say that the last part of our century will see many examples of emergency airlifts etc. of dominating elites in the Periphery to the Center. In general this would be a small price to pay for a conflict resolution leading to peacemaking.


[34] As mentioned in footnote 24 above this would be a typical example of the anchoring of legitimate peacekeeping in legitimate self-interest. In a world organized more like a state, so that international politics would become more like the internal politics of big federations, this type of legitimation might no longer be necessary.


[36] Kissinger's initiatives should be seen not only as an anti-Soviet (not to mention anti-Palestinian) strategy, but also as anti-racist.

[37] This is the classical definition of the task of the diplomat as the "negotiation of ratifiable documents"—which of course is a highly actor-oriented, not structure-oriented, approach to conflict resolution. A conflict resolution has somehow to be self-supporting, and by stronger forces than individual commitments expressed through signatures backed up by majorities in ruling elites.

[38] By saying "peace has a structure" the aim is exactly to focus the attention on self-supporting conditions of peace, meaning conditions that are robust enough to survive for instance, the demise or death of particular elite person. On the other hand, the idea is certainly not that any structure—however pervasive, perhaps neither intended nor clearly understood, highly invariant of the individuality of the actors participating in it—is a structure of peace. On the contrary, there are structures that are un-peace in frozen form, and structures that through their internal dynamics will almost inevitably lead to war; e.g. structures of capitalist and/or social imperialism.


[40] See Karl Deutsch. The way Karl Deutsch uses the term is very simple: it is an area of security, an area where the likelihood (presumably objective and subjective) of direct violence is very low. What is left out in Deutsch's concept and theorizing in general is an equal focus on structural violence.

[41] For a further elaboration of this, see the author's "Peace as Profession and New Peace Action Roles", Essays, L 18.

[42] Homology is the condition that obtains when each party in Nation A has an "opposite number" in nation B. Since nationbuilding has taken, and is taking, place all over the world according to a Western model that to some extent can be traced back to the 17th century in France, the condition of homology generally obtains. Particularly homologous are the parties that deal with International
Notes: II. 12, 13.

relations, such as diplomats, the military, business operations, etc.

[43] For a discussion of these concepts and their role, see this author’s “Two Approaches to Disarmament: The Legalist and The Structuralist”, Essays, II. 3.

[44] I am particularly indebted to Chad Alger for this point.


[46] But an all-European superstructure on the top of a horizontal, truly equitable situation would come very far towards a peace structure.

II. 12. Pacifism from a Sociological Point of View


II.13. Two Concepts of Defense

* Given originally as a lecture at a conference in Oslo, April 1964; published here for the first time as re-publication no. 20—10 I am indebted to Arne Naess for stimulating discussions of this topic.

* Much of the presentation is based on the node Modern Guerrilla Warfare.