

THE ART OF PEACE

Global Peace Studies 101:
Theory and Practice

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[6] 3 Africas: Muslim Precolonial Post-colonial

Africa was also colonized by Europe, but later and shortly. And Islam came to the North early AH (After Hegira, 622 AD), is firmly established. And slavery has a long tradition

As a consequence Africans to the North of Sahara, white Africa, have Arab names, speak Arabic and believe in Islam. Less so, but quite a lot, also South of Sahara, black Africa. Neither the sand of Sahara nor the skin color, really divide Africa.

Thus, Sudan and Nigeria, the biggest countries, have all three Africas: Islam, post-colonial elites inclining towards a colonial mother, and precolonial non-elites, some also nomadic. Both engaged in slavery, selling black Africans to Europe-USA.

Africans South of Sahara often have only European first names and African last; in LAC both are Latin. In Africa the precolonial is still visible in structures and cultures; LAC is mainly post-colonial except for precolonial cultures from Africa. But many talk the languages of Maya, Aztec and Inca empires.

As colonialism and imperialism marked and marred present Latin America, so also in Africa, with recent European interventions in Mali, Libya, Somalia. African elites on top of post-colonial Africa may invite such interventions-there is no Monroe doctrine ruling out USA-knowing and demanding, the pay-offs.

The three Africas do not come to terms with each other. White Muslim Arabs turn against precolonial Berbers, and more so the blacker they are. Post-colonial elites in the South may see Islam as contrary to their colonial ties; post-colonial people may want elite life styles with mother country schooling; even revolt.

And some precolonials will struggle for some old niches.

How about the colonial borders making 50+ states of 500+ nations? A total disrespect for others, geopolitics for own interests, bringing together people not wanting to be together, splitting those who want. But do not try to change them. Military and wars are above all about territory and borders.

There is a much better solution: open the borders, with federations within keeping those who want that apart, and confederations between keeping those who want that together. Not yet for Africa as a whole, but for parts. Like for Sudan, see below.

On my table are three books feared by the West for their truths.

*Discours*⁶³ by Patrice Lumumba 1959 argues the end of colonialism, and in favor of African unity, not against Europeans but against exploitation.

*The Green Book*⁶⁴ by Muammar Gaddafi argues direct democracy against majoritarian democracy dictatorship by 51%, and economic revolution in favor of minorities and women.

*L'Unité Culturelle de L'Afrique Noire*⁶⁵ by Cheikh Anta Diop 1959 argues that Black Africa is matriarchal, explores matriarchy, with basic needs and distribution-oriented mothers, ladders in hand, in time and in space as a source of cultural unity.

Lumumba and Gaddafi were killed at the instigation of Washington, Diop was denied his PhD at the Sorbonne in Paris. They will all live longer in human memory than their killers and detractors.

Brussels took Lumumba out of prison for independence dialogue. The sticky point was economic. Katanga seceded, Lumumba, supported by Hammarskjöld, in all likelihood also killed, fought Union Minière.

Rome (Berlusconi) came to terms with Gaddafi, even apologizing for the first state terrorism from the air, the bombing of, oases, peace lands for women, children, the old, in 1911.

But the ideas of African currency, African development bank and monetary fund, partly financed by Libyan oil, led to a bloody intervention, with much bombing by Norway, and chaos.

Paris had no sympathy, nor understanding for an economy focused on basic needs, protection of nature, and distribution.

And yet Gaddafi's approach is the only meaningful response to massive migration from all over Africa to Europe.

There is no alternative to African economic autonomy.

Then Sudan where three Africas meet for concrete vision:⁶⁶

*Sala'am Aleikum!** My task at the end of this impressive conference with 150 participants in Hermansburg on the Lüneburger Heide is to fly above the nitty-gritty of failing implementations of the many peace agreements, reporting what I see.

And indicate possible solutions that have been tried, and successfully so, elsewhere.

In no way do I say "do this, do that". But I do report what comes to my eyes at four levels: world politics, Sudan's relations to the neighbors, the Sudan construction, and the local level, particularly Darfur, the home of the *fur*. Some years ago the focus was on the South.

Let me also start with a well known African proverb: "When elephants fight, the grass suffers. And, when elephants make love, the grass also suffers."

You have two elephants let loose, the USA and China, both oil addicted, and you possess their drug. Some of the Sudan violence is a proxy war between them. And some of your neighbors tend toward one elephant, some toward the other.

So do parts and parties in Sudan. We are in Cold War II since USA-NATO-Japan started encircling Russia-China-India and some more, leading to SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from 2001. You risk becoming a battle-field.

You may also risk that one day they agree on quotas for your oil, and impose them upon you. Their egoism has no space for the effects on you, yet they are afraid of an all-out war.

Let me make three points. In addition to you, the grass, growing high, is getting very strong, maybe even sharp.

First, you are protected by human rights: the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stipulates that proceeds from the natural resources of a country should accrue to its people; neither to foreigners, nor to elites only. As you might expect, the USA did not ratify that one.

Second, you might consider doing major processing yourselves and pocket the value-added rather than exporting crude. And you would of course quote your prices in a solid currency.

Third, oil is fading out being a major key to global warming. There will be less demand. There are such alternatives as wind and solar energy, and you have plenty of both to develop.

Oil may become your doom, not a blessing. Be careful.

Flying lower I see Sudan with its many neighbors, and colonial borders not defined by your own African nations.

The border between Anglophones and Francophones is one. Some encroach on you, some court one elephant, some the other. You might consider a *confederation*, a North East Africa Community, NAC, with open borders and much cooperation.

Look beyond today's frictions, some of them elephant-generated. And watch that EU elephant herd, now trying to get its dubious acts together.

One level lower Sudan fills the view: one state, many nations by religion, language, history and geographical attachment. An Arab-Islamic nation claiming to own it all is as unacceptable as is Western colonialism, generating resistance, secessionism. In the world there are about 200 states, 2,000 nations, and 20 nation-states; the rest are multi-national like Sudan.

There are three major alternatives to unitary states and secessionism: devolution, federation, confederation.

There are about 25 *federations* in the world, housing 40% of humanity; Switzerland, India and Malaysia being very inspiring. The general formula for the 20+ functions of modern states: four handled by the Center-joint foreign, security, finance and infra-structure-and the rest handled by the Parts. Could be the 7 Sudan regions, particularly for such sensitive topics as religion, language, history and geographical attachment. Separate, equal and federally united; neither unitary, nor secessionist.

Look at Switzerland: four languages, two Christianities, none above the other. Federalism makes democracy possible as no national majority can impose itself. Nor can *sharia* be imposed. And customary, common law? "You have your code and we have ours" is fine; but even better is to combine them like when the Archbishop of Canterbury opened for some use of *sharia*. Thus, the International Islamic University Malaysia teaches both in its Faculty of Laws (in plural).

Federalism does not have to be symmetric. The South may demand extra autonomy; justice is not shoes of size 40 for all.

A Constitutional Court may mediate disputes.

I then come closer to the people in this giant land, and to the worst of all problems: 90% on less than \$1 a day. A real Golden Rule: *First priority to the basic needs of the most needy.*

And four basic needs can easily be identified:

- * *survival*, served by orderly political processes and training in nonviolence,
- * *freedom*, served by democracy,
- * *identity*, served by federalism, and
- * *wellness*, served by food, housing, clothing, medical services, education in an economy with people, not only elites, priorities. Better done by lifting the people up than by threatening, taxing, confiscating elite funds, unless illegally acquired.

The land issue at the roots of the Darfur violence is at the International Criminal Court level (as you might expect, the USA did not ratify that one either).

A distinction between public ownership and private use may be useful. The right to food is a basic right; to own land and not use it properly is anti-human, like letting fuel for cars trump food for humans.

There is too much suffering in the Sudan today, too much violence, as monuments over conflicts in search of solutions. But reconciliation without solution is pacification, lollypops that should fool nobody.

Solutions to these four basic needs conflict areas, with reconciliation, spells peace.

Peace with us all. Sala'am Aleikum.

* This talk was given before the division of Sudan in North and South; in my vie a major mistake.

Naakow Grant-Hayford: Africa - Searching for Futures

There is no such thing as “the” future of Africa. One could indeed posit, as has been done before, that politically and sociologically “Africa” as a singular concept exists but in name only. But what is in a word and why harp on this detail? As in the case of “the Americas”, derived from the name of Amerigo Vespucci, an Italian navigator, the word Africa itself, is said to be derived from the Latin negation of the word for “cold”: *a-frigus*. This does sound plausible and wouldn’t be too much of a misnomer. But of course, there are other etymological explanations - tracing the origin of the word back to roman or pharaonic times. Here is not the place to settle this open dispute. It is simply important to point out this potentially European origin of the denomination from the start, because if indeed true, it simply evidences once again how omnipresent the influence of European memes remain for matters as fundamental as “identity” and the “perception of self” when it comes to the “discovered” peoples of this planet.

There is an explanatory motive behind the negations with which this essay opens. Surely, there is a continental landmass we designate by the word “Africa”. However this term continues to convey the idea of an empirical uniformity or homogeneity which simply does not do justice to the idiomatic and sociological diversity observable on that very landmass. Depending on how precisely one decides to look at social reality on the continent, between 800 or 2000 distinct ascriptive identity groups with particular definitions and sentiments on that which is sacred, moral, ethical, aesthetic or valid populate and interact in 54 states, often across the arbitrarily drawn borders of this second largest of emerging continents. With a population that crossed the billion mark in 2009¹, the stupefying distinctiveness of these various nations and the cultural expressions and idioms by which they live, should in principle forbid any attempt to homogenize, unitize or generalize. When we speak of “futures” in plural, this is simply paying attention to the manifold contemporary trans-border social patterns of interaction between these ethno-linguistic groups. This very diversity has strong bearings on the dynamics of the contradictions along the existential faultlines that criss-cross the socio-sphere in Africa - as elsewhere. This very diversity may mean that there is a huge reservoir of contradiction-literacy and conflict-transformation-literacy to be mapped. There is a lot to be learned from African populations and how they have solved conflict-formations in the past. For instance, the idea of representative democracy may work less for group identity settings than modes of consociational democracy – but again one should not generalize.

Politically, at best, one could attest to a nominal “Africa” as seen in the administrative institutions and bodies of the utterly symbolic African Union². But if one considers the mainstream thrust of western political analysis - which posits the state and its preponderance over societal and economic viability - clearly, indicators of dysfunction and informality dominate academic literature on Africa regarding its future prospects. From this vantage point, all too often, the conclusion is that politics on the continent are a greedy and disorderly mess with the states on the continent involved in massive category killing of their own population or a political cacophony at best. Wole Soyinka once expressed, in what he called a “pure theoretical gambit”, that notwithstanding the consensus upheld by decision makers at the macro level – namely, that they would never question the borders inherited from colonialism – we may very well witness major transformations of the macro political landscape in the near future with state-borders in Africa shifting and changing to adjust more and better to the social realities on the ground.³ At this point the exo-genesis of African statehood – Berlin 1885 – holds some explanatory value for such an outlook. Statehood was arbitrarily imposed over some 200 regions of varying size which have remained intact to this day and continue to bridge the frontiers of the

¹Africa: Continent’s populatin reaches 1 billion: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200908200660.html>

²Former President Mbeki declares the AU a failiure: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2012/09/27/is-mbeki-correct-to-declare-the-au-a-failure>

³ A conversation with Wole Soyinka: <http://www.unischaft.gmxhome.de/archiv/0105/19.pdf>

present states.⁴ This is one major narrative on what we may come to witness in one of Africa's many potential futures.

Furthermore, this diversity should not be neglected particularly because it has extensive implications for the work of conflict transformation specialists. Where ever we find such an abundance of goal seeking systems and worldviews, societal contradictions will invariably abound and where contradictions abound, we are quite sure to find meaningful reflexive peace cultures to learn from, in order to expand our existing conflict-resolution repertoire. This again entails a dedicated examination of the idioms and immanent cultures of the continent. From the perspective of a peace scholar the prospect of studying the epistemic tenements of the various patterns of intelligibility employed by Africans, is quite exciting. If Africa is often perceived as the continent of violent outbreaks and misery, overcoming the underlying contradictions these emerge from, will require serious knowledge and understanding of the various articulations of deep culture extant in Africa.

Culturally, Europe has been investing much energy in continuously re-inventing itself on the basis of an existential reverence to an ancient hellenistic common denominator and remains beholden to the christian roots of scholasticism notwithstanding its expansionist secularism. In short, there is a common cultural denominator in Europe... however complex. If we listen to mainstream academia, in Africa there is none such common denominator linking the nations of the continent. However, a serious assessment of the works of scholars working along the lines of the late Cheikh Anta Diop and John Henrik Clarke might very well illustrate that evidence for a cultural continuum spanning continental swaths of space and macro-historical periods of time, has been put into the public sphere for academic, political and philosophical perusal a long time ago. It just hasn't been picked up yet. Any serious concern for a constructive future for the people on the continent will have to reactivate and explore this tradition of conscientization⁵ initiated by the likes of Dubois and Nkrumah further. Knowing your future requires you to connect to your past.

But how far back does one travel into the past to find the necessary and sufficient causes for the status quo? Ambrose Bierce's cynical aphorism on "the past" hits the nail on the head when he defines the past as

"that part of Eternity with some small fraction of which we have a slight and regrettable acquaintance. A moving line called the Present parts it from an imaginary period known as the Future. These two grand divisions of Eternity, of which the one is continually effacing the other, are entirely unlike. The one is dark with sorrow and disappointment, the other bright with prosperity and joy. The Past is the region of sobs, the Future is the realm of song. In the one crouches Memory, clad in sackcloth and ashes, mumbling penitential prayer; in the sunshine of the other Hope flies with a free wing, beckoning to temples of success and bowers of ease. Yet the Past is the Future of yesterday, the Future is the Past of to-morrow. They are one—the knowledge and the dream."

Historically, the people of the continent have – their own faultlines and violent interactions put aside – been subjected to various forms of sociocidal foreign invasions and have had their fair share of exogenous darkness, sorrow and sobbing. Initially mainly by islamic raids which sapped Africa's population and social strength for generations through the trans-saharan trade, creating an east-west structure of intercontinental proportions long before Christians began their transatlantic version of the international trade in the human commodity which in turn imposed a north-south pattern of vertical interaction on the continent which perdures to this very day.⁶ This line of thought quickly leads us from the analytical question of causation to the moralist approach, more inclined to asking: who is to foot the bill? Who is at fault? Who is responsible and who is to

⁴ Amin, Samir: Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical Origin

http://www.chabotcollege.edu/faculty/kwaldo/Common%20Resources/Readings%20on%20Colonialism/Amin_African%20colonization.pdf

⁵ Anyanwu, Christian: The African and Conscientization: A Critical Approach to African Social and Political Thought with Particular Reference to Nigeria, AuthorHouse 2012.

⁶ Elizabeth Savage: The Human Commodity: Perspectives on the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade, London: Frank Cass 1992

blame? TRANSCEND's conflict transformation approach on the other hand, would ask the question how this status quo can be explained and how the harm and the insults to basic human needs necessarily implied by it, may be reduced, halted and reversed into positive peace and a sustainable satisfaction of the somatic and psychological basic needs of the afflicted. A look into the past then becomes an investigative and explanatory effort aimed at empowering the researcher to formulate constructive solutions towards "basic needs". So much to that part of the past "with which we have had a slight and regrettable acquaintance."

Our point is to overcome Bierce's "*regrettable acquaintance*" by modelling the future consciously with constructive proposals, appropriate to the creation and guarantee of physical reproduction, political freedom, cultural identity and economic wellbeing for the people of Africa.

A frequent explanation given for "maturity" is found in the formula "*when one is able to take responsibility for one's own future*". The question then becomes an endogenous one: should the bill then rather be put to the political, military, cultural and economic elites of Africa who inherited the political responsibility for their constituents after the dehumanizing exploitation at the hands of Christian monarchies & western democracies came to its nominal end in the 1960ies? Or should the bill be put to the populations themselves, which continue not to make use of their unalienable right to depose and transform their governance systems in their pursuit of happiness, fulfilment and basic needs? Is it the sycophantic Elites, or is it an irresponsible population, not quite aware of its own existential interests?⁷ Isn't the question of the futures of Africa the question of whether or not the populations will at some point become self-reliant and articulate enough to effectively demand from their representatives to be more responsive towards their explicit needs? These are the core questions which will drive Africans towards futures they desire. In closing, we ask: what are the futures the many Africans see for themselves? What does the Africa they imagine for themselves look like? What are the ways in which the peoples of Africa are currently taking responsibility for their own futures? What are the ways in which such responsibility can be taken to start with? A key principle for solution oriented conflict transformation as taught by TRANSCEND International, is the point that it is the strength of a project situated in a positive future, that pulls the actor out of the the miserabilism of frustration and manifest conflict.

Find below a heuristic scheme for a sociological inquiry on the subjects discussed above.

Conceptualizing Africa's Futures

Social Spheres	Influencing Variables	Past	Present	FutureS
Economic ⁸	endogenous	- -	- -	- -
	exogenous	- -	- -	- -
Political	endogenous	- -	- -	- -
	exogenous	- -	- -	- -
Military	endogenous	- -	- -	- -
	exogenous	- -	- -	- -
Culture	endogenous	- -	- -	- -
	exogenous	- -	- -	- -

⁷ Galtung, Johan: <http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/galtung.pdf>

⁸ Chang, Ha-Joon: <http://camara.ie/web/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Kicking-away-the-ladder.pdf>

Appendix: How to write about Africa by Binyavanga Wainaina

Always use the word 'Africa' or 'Darkness' or 'Safari' in your title. Subtitles may include the words 'Zanzibar', 'Masai', 'Zulu', 'Zambezi', 'Congo', 'Nile', 'Big', 'Sky', 'Shadow', 'Drum', 'Sun' or 'Bygone'. Also useful are words such as 'Guerrillas', 'Timeless', 'Primordial' and 'Tribal'. Note that 'People' means Africans who are not black, while 'The People' means black Africans.

Never have a picture of a well-adjusted African on the cover of your book, or in it, unless that African has won the Nobel Prize. An AK-47, prominent ribs, naked breasts: use these. If you must include an African, make sure you get one in Masai or Zulu or Dogon dress.

In your text, treat Africa as if it were one country. It is hot and dusty with rolling grasslands and huge herds of animals and tall, thin people who are starving. Or it is hot and steamy with very short people who eat primates. Don't get bogged down with precise descriptions. Africa is big: fifty-four countries, 900 million people who are too busy starving and dying and warring and emigrating to read your book. The continent is full of deserts, jungles, highlands, savannahs and many other things, but your reader doesn't care about all that, so keep your descriptions romantic and evocative and unparticular.

Make sure you show how Africans have music and rhythm deep in their souls, and eat things no other humans eat. Do not mention rice and beef and wheat; monkey-brain is an African's cuisine of choice, along with goat, snake, worms and grubs and all manner of game meat. Make sure you show that you are able to eat such food without flinching, and describe how you learn to enjoy it—because you care.

Taboo subjects: ordinary domestic scenes, love between Africans (unless a death is involved), references to African writers or intellectuals, mention of school-going children who are not suffering from yaws or Ebola fever or female genital mutilation.

Throughout the book, adopt a *sotto* voice, in conspiracy with the reader, and a sad *I-expected-so-much* tone. Establish early on that your liberalism is impeccable, and mention near the beginning how much you love Africa, how you fell in love with the place and can't live without her. Africa is the only continent you can love—take advantage of this. If you are a man, thrust yourself into her warm virgin forests. If you are a woman, treat Africa as a man who wears a bush jacket and disappears off into the sunset. Africa is to be pitied, worshipped or dominated. Whichever angle you take, be sure to leave the strong impression that without your intervention and your important book, Africa is doomed.

Your African characters may include naked warriors, loyal servants, diviners and seers, ancient wise men living in hermitic splendour. Or corrupt politicians, inept polygamous travel-guides, and prostitutes you have slept with. The Loyal Servant always behaves like a seven-year-old and needs a firm hand; he is scared of snakes, good with children, and always involving you in his complex domestic dramas. The Ancient Wise Man always comes from a noble tribe (not the money-grubbing tribes like the Gikuyu, the Igbo or the Shona). He has

rheumy eyes and is close to the Earth. The Modern African is a fat man who steals and works in the visa office, refusing to give work permits to qualified Westerners who really care about Africa. He is an enemy of development, always using his government job to make it difficult for pragmatic and good-hearted expats to set up NGOs or Legal Conservation Areas. Or he is an Oxford-educated intellectual turned serial-killing politician in a Savile Row suit. He is a cannibal who likes Cristal champagne, and his mother is a rich witch-doctor who really runs the country.

Among your characters you must always include The Starving African, who wanders the refugee camp nearly naked, and waits for the benevolence of the West. Her children have flies on their eyelids and pot bellies, and her breasts are flat and empty. She must look utterly helpless. She can have no past, no history; such diversions ruin the dramatic moment. Moans are good. She must never say anything about herself in the dialogue except to speak of her (unspeakable) suffering. Also be sure to include a warm and motherly woman who has a rolling laugh and who is concerned for your well-being. Just call her Mama. Her children are all delinquent. These characters should buzz around your main hero, making him look good. Your hero can teach them, bathe them, feed them; he carries lots of babies and has seen Death. Your hero is you (if reportage), or a beautiful, tragic international celebrity/aristocrat who now cares for animals (if fiction).

Bad Western characters may include children of Tory cabinet ministers, Afrikaners, employees of the World Bank. When talking about exploitation by foreigners mention the Chinese and Indian traders. Blame the West for Africa's situation. But do not be too specific.

Broad brushstrokes throughout are good. Avoid having the African characters laugh, or struggle to educate their kids, or just make do in mundane circumstances. Have them illuminate something about Europe or America in Africa. African characters should be colourful, exotic, larger than life—but empty inside, with no dialogue, no conflicts or resolutions in their stories, no depth or quirks to confuse the cause.

Describe, in detail, naked breasts (young, old, conservative, recently raped, big, small) or mutilated genitals, or enhanced genitals. Or any kind of genitals. And dead bodies. Or, better, naked dead bodies. And especially rotting naked dead bodies. Remember, any work you submit in which people look filthy and miserable will be referred to as the 'real Africa', and you want that on your dust jacket. Do not feel queasy about this: you are trying to help them to get aid from the West. The biggest taboo in writing about Africa is to describe or show dead or suffering white people.

Animals, on the other hand, must be treated as well rounded, complex characters. They speak (or grunt while tossing their manes proudly) and have names, ambitions and desires. They also have family values: *see how lions teach their children?* Elephants are caring, and are good feminists or dignified patriarchs. So are gorillas. Never, ever say anything negative about an elephant or a gorilla. Elephants may attack people's property, destroy their crops, and even kill them. Always take the side of the elephant. Big cats have public-school accents. Hyenas are fair game and have vaguely Middle Eastern accents. Any short Africans who live in the jungle or desert may be portrayed with good humour (unless they are in conflict with an elephant or chimpanzee or gorilla, in which case they are pure evil).

After celebrity activists and aid workers, conservationists are Africa's most important people. Do not offend them. You need them to invite you to their 30,000-acre game ranch or 'conservation area', and this is the only way you will get to interview the celebrity activist.

Often a book cover with a heroic-looking conservationist on it works magic for sales. Anybody white, tanned and wearing khaki who once had a pet antelope or a farm is a conservationist, one who is preserving Africa's rich heritage. When interviewing him or her, do not ask how much funding they have; do not ask how much money they make off their game. Never ask how much they pay their employees.

Readers will be put off if you don't mention the light in Africa. And sunsets, the African sunset is a must. It is always big and red. There is always a big sky. Wide empty spaces and game are critical—Africa is the Land of Wide Empty Spaces. When writing about the plight of flora and fauna, make sure you mention that Africa is overpopulated. When your main character is in a desert or jungle living with indigenous peoples (anybody short) it is okay to mention that Africa has been severely depopulated by Aids and War (use caps).

You'll also need a nightclub called Tropicana, where mercenaries, evil nouveau riche Africans and prostitutes and guerrillas and expats hang out.

Always end your book with Nelson Mandela saying something about rainbows or renaissances. Because you care. ■

Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa— Origins and Contemporary Forms

by SAMIR AMIN*

CONTEMPORARY Black Africa can be divided into wide regions which are clearly different from one another. But it is more difficult to analyse these differences – and to study their nature, origin, and effects – than to see them.

The unity of Black Africa is, none the less, not without foundations. On the contrary, leaving aside the question of ‘race’ – in Africa, they are no more homogenous nor less mixed, since pre-historical times, than are the other ‘races’, whether white, yellow, or red – the common or kindred cultural background, and the striking similarities of social organisation, make a living unity of Black Africa. This physical reality, extensive and rich, did not wait for colonial conquest to borrow from, or give of itself to, the other wide regions of the Old World – the Mediterranean in particular, but also Europe and Asia. The image of an ancient, isolated and introverted Africa no longer belongs to this age: isolation – naturally associated with a so-called ‘primitive’ character – only corresponded to an ideological necessity born out of colonial racism. But these exchanges did not break the unity of Africa; on the contrary, they helped to assert and enrich the African personality. The colonial conquest of almost the whole of this continent strengthened this feeling of unity in Black Africa. Seen from London, Paris, or Lisbon, Black Africa appeared to European observers as a homogenous entity, just as the North Americans regard Latin America as a continent which extends south of the Rio Grande.

Looked at from the opposite point of view, that is to say from inside, Black Africa, like Latin America, evidently appears as extremely variegated. It is true that the present states are the result of an artificial carve-up, but almost nowhere does this constitute the sole or even the essential basis of their diversity. We would be wrong again to think that this pattern, however recent, has not yet left its mark on Africa and is not likely – for better or for worse – to consolidate itself, at least as far as the foreseeable future is concerned. Of even more significance, per-

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haps, are some 100 or 200 micro-regions, varying in width, which readily cross the frontiers of the present states. They constitute yet another aspect of the reality; they do not derive their definition from their geographical position alone, but above all because of the homogenous nature of their social, cultural, economic, and even political conditions.

Between these two extremes – African unity and micro-regional variety – the continent can be divided into a few wide macro-regions. I propose to identify three, and shall discuss the basis for such a distinction.

Traditional West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, former French West Africa), Cameroun, Chad, and the Sudan together constitute a first macro-region, which I wish to describe as *Africa of the colonial trade economy*. I shall give a precise definition to this term, which, unfortunately, is too often treated lightly. This integrated whole is clearly divisible into three sub-regions: (i) the coastal zone, which is easily accessible from the outside world, and which constitutes the 'rich' area; (ii) the hinterland, which mostly serves as a pool of labour for the coast, and as a market for the industries which are being established there; and (iii) the Sudan, whose particular characteristics will be examined later.

The traditional Congo River basin (Congo-Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and the Central African Republic) form a second macro-region, which I wish to define as *Africa of the concession-owning companies*. Here also it is necessary to explain how, over and above the difference in the policies and practices of the French and Belgian Governments, genuine similarities in the mode of colonial exploitation characterise the whole of the region, and this justifies its demarcation.

The eastern and southern parts of the continent (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa) constitute the third macro-region, which I wish to call *Africa of the labour reserves*. Here also, apart from the varied nature of each country, the region was developed on the basis of the policy of colonial imperialism, according to the principle of 'enclosure acts' which were applied to entire peoples.

Ethiopia, Somalia, Madagascar, Réunion, and Mauritius, like the Cape Verde islands on the opposite side of the continent, do not form part of these three macro-regions, although here and there are to be found some aspects of each. However, they also display features of other systems which have played an important part in their actual development: the slavery-mercantilist system of the Cape Verde islands, Réunion, and Mauritius; and the 'pseudo-feudal' system of Ethiopia

and Madagascar. Obviously questions of frontiers between the regions remain: Katanga, for example, belonged to the area of the labour reserves, and Eritrea to that of the colonial trade.

TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF PERIODS IN AFRICAN HISTORY

My proposed distinction is deliberately based on the effects of the *last* period in the history of Africa: that of colonisation. It will be necessary to study how the dialectic reveals itself between the major colonial policies and the structures inherited from the past. To do so, we have to go back in time, and to distinguish four separate periods.

The pre-mercantilist period stretches from the earliest days until the seventeenth century. In the course of this long history, relations were forged between Black Africa and the rest of the Old World, particularly from both ends of the Sahara, between the savannah countries (from Dakar to the Red Sea) and the Mediterranean. Social formations emerged which cannot be understood if they are not placed, here as elsewhere, within the context of all the multitude of other social systems and their relationships with one another. During that period, Africa, by and large, does not appear as inferior, or weaker than the rest of the Old World. The unequal development within Africa was not any worse than that north of the Sahara, on both sides of the Mediterranean.

The mercantilist period stretches from the seventeenth century to 1800. It was characterised by the slave trade, and the first retrograde steps date back to this time. It was not only the coastal zone which was affected by this trade: there was a decline in productive forces throughout the continent. There were two distinct slave-trading areas: the Atlantic trade (by far the most harmful, due to the great numbers involved), which spread from the coast to the whole of the continent, from Saint-Louis in Senegal to Quelimane in Mozambique; and the Oriental trade operating from Egypt, the Red Sea, and Zanzibar, towards the Sudan and East Africa. This second type of mercantilist activity was carried beyond 1800, because the industrial revolution which shook the foundations of society in Europe and North America did not reach the Turkish-Arab part of the world.

The next period lasted from 1800 to 1880-90, and was characterised by attempts – at least in certain regions within the influence of Atlantic mercantilism – to establish a new form of dependence with that part of the world where capitalism was firmly entrenched by industrialisation. These attempts, however, had very limited backing, as we shall see why later. The area of influence of Oriental mercantilism was not affected.

The fourth period, that of colonisation, completed the work of the previous period in Western Africa, took over from Oriental mercantilism in Eastern Africa, and developed with tenfold vigour the present forms of dependence of the continent according to the models of the three macro-regions mentioned above. The present throws light on the past. The completed forms of dependence – which only appeared when Africa was actually made the periphery of the world capitalist system in its imperialist stage, and was developed as such – enable us to understand, by comparison, the meaning of previous systems of social relations, and the way in which African social formations were linked with those of other regions of the Old World with which they had contact.

I. THE PRE-MERCANTILIST PERIOD: UP TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

During this time, Black Africa was not on the whole more backward than the rest of the world. The continent was characterised by complex social formations, sometimes accompanied by the development of the state, and almost invariably based on visible social differentiations which revealed the ancient nature of the process of disintegration of the primitive village community. The great confusion which arises in any discussion of traditional African society is due to a number of reasons, especially: (i) the scarcity of documents and remains of the past, leaving only the accounts of Arab travellers; (ii) the confusion between the concepts of 'mode of production' and 'social formation' which calls for clarification and a basic differentiation; (iii) the confusion between different periods of African history, particularly between the pre- and actual mercantilist periods – and the justifiable concern of scholars to relate history in all its continuous detail, enhances this confusion; and last but not least, (iv) the ideological prejudices against Africa, clearly connected with colonial racism.

This is why I have formulated three sets of propositions, so that we can see our way clearly through this history, without claiming to recast its evolution. My intention is to emphasise the main differences between the Africa of this period – the only true 'traditional' Africa, neither isolated nor primitive – and that which followed.

The first thing to make clear is that *a society cannot be reduced to a mode of production*. This is an abstract concept which does not involve the notion of a fixed historical sequence with regard to the progress of civilisation, from the first differentiated communities up to the capitalist form of society. It is feasible to distinguish five types: (i) the primitive

community mode of production, the only possible one to come first, for obvious reasons; (ii) the 'tributary' mode of production which involved the persistent parallel existence of a village community *and* a socio-political structure which exploited the former by exacting a tribute – this, the most common pre-capitalist mode, developed sometimes from earlier into evolved forms, when the village family community lost the right of ownership of land to feudal masters; (iii) the slave-based mode of production, which was less common but scattered; (iv) the small-scale trade mode of production, quite common but never likely to form the main structure of society; and lastly, (v) the capitalist mode of production.¹

It is necessary to emphasise that social formations are *concrete* structures, organised and characterised by a *dominant* mode of production which forms the apex of a complex set of subordinate modes. Thus it is possible to have a small-scale trading mode linked to a dominant tributary ('early' or 'developed feudal'), and even based on a slave or a capitalist mode of production. Likewise, the mode based on slavery may not be of the dominant type, and this seems to be the rule when it is related to a dominant tributary mode of production (or even a capitalist mode, as in the United States until 1865); and only in exceptional cases does it become dominant itself, as in the classical societies of ancient times.

Modes of production, then, do not actually constitute historical categories, in the sense of occurring in a necessary sequence of time. On the other hand, social formations have a definite age, reckoned on the basis of the level of development of the productive forces. This is why it is absurd to draw any analogy between the same mode of production belonging to societies of different ages – for example, between African or Roman slavery and that of the nineteenth-century United States.²

Secondly, *social formations cannot be understood when taken out of their context*. Sometimes the relations between different societies are marginal, but often they are decisive. The problems connected with long-distance trade are thus very important. This is obviously not a mode of production, but a method of articulation between autonomous societies. This is the essential difference from internal trade, which is made up of

¹ For further details, see my *L'Accumulation à l'échelle mondiale* (Paris, 1970), especially pp. 31, 165–8, and 341–72; also my article on 'La Politique coloniale française à l'égard de la bourgeoisie commerçante sénégalaise', in Claude Meillassoux (ed.), *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa* (London, 1971), pp. 361–76.

² This idea of the cumulative nature of technological progress, and the importance of the age of the social formation in assessing the significance of a mode of production to which it belongs, is stressed by H. S. Michelina, 'The Economic Formation: notes on the problem of its definition', I.D.E.P. paper, Dakar, October 1971.

exchanges between dealers in a particular society. Such exchanges are characteristic of the simple trading mode of production or that based on slavery (in this case a combination of both), which are elements of the society in question. But internal trade may also be an extension of long-distance trade, if the goods involved penetrate deeply within that particular society.

Long-distance trade brings into contact societies unknown to one another – i.e. it involves the exchange of products for which each is unaware of the other's cost of production, 'rare' goods for which there are no substitutes in the importing country. As a result, the social groups engaged in that activity enjoy a monopoly position from which they derive their profits. Such a monopoly frequently explains the 'special' nature of these groups, often specialised foreign traders belonging to a particular caste or ethnic community, for example the Jews in Europe and the Dioula in West Africa. In this kind of trade, the subjective theory of value still had some significance – but it is meaningless when the cost of production of the goods is known to the respective trade partners, as in the capitalist system of exchange.

This long-distance trade could, in certain societies, become a decisive factor. This is the case when only a limited surplus is able to be extracted from the producers in a particular society by the dominant local classes. The reason for this may be the low development of the productive forces, and/or difficult ecological conditions, or the successful resistance by village communities to the extraction of this surplus. In such a case, long-distance trade makes possible, through its characteristic monopoly profit, the transfer (not, of course, the generation) of a fraction of the surplus of one society to another. For the receiving society, this transfer may be of vital importance, and may serve as the principal basis of the wealth and power of the ruling classes. Civilisation may then wholly depend on this trade, and any shift of trading centres can cause one region to fall into decadence, or create conditions for it to prosper, without bringing about either any regression or any noticeable progress in the level of its productive forces. This, in my opinion, is the explanation for the ups and downs in the history of the Old World and the Mediterranean, particularly with regard to the so-called Greek miracle, and the prosperity and decline of the Arab world.¹

¹ Cathérine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Recherches sur un mode de production africain', in *La Pensée* (Paris), April 1969, rightly emphasises the decisive role which long-distance trade played in the constitution of some African states. Cf. Ahmad El Kodsy, 'Nationalism and Class Struggles in the Arab World,' in the *Monthly Review* (New York), July–August 1970; and also Antoine Pelletier and Jean-Jacques Goblou, *Matérialisme historique et histoire des civilisations* (Paris, 1969), who suggest this for Greece.

The third point is that *the African societies of the pre-mercantile period developed autonomously*, although they followed a parallel course to that of the Mediterranean world, both Eastern and European. The semi-arid zone which stretches diagonally across the Old World, from the Atlantic coast to Central Asia, has always separated the regions which were ecologically conducive to a high productivity in agriculture: monsoon Asia, tropical Africa, and temperate Europe. This zone has seen the birth of some brilliant civilisations, almost all founded on long-distance trade, particularly Greece and the Arab Empire,¹ whose vicissitudes followed the course of this trade. On either side, autonomous societies – those of feudal Europe and, at least, some of those of tropical Africa, particularly in the Sudan-Sahel region immediately south of the Sahara – developed along parallel lines, precisely because of the long-distance trade which linked them all. Thus one can say that this part of Africa was already fully integrated, as much as Europe, into the history of the world.

This is why the trans-Sahara trade was so significant. It enabled the whole of the Old World – Mediterranean, Arab, and European – to be supplied with gold from the main source of production in Upper Senegal and Ashanti, until the discovery of America. The importance of this flow can hardly be adequately stressed. For the societies of tropical Africa, this trade became the basis of their organisation. The mining of gold under the orders of the king provided the ruling classes of the countries concerned with the means to obtain across the Sahara, on the one hand, rare luxury goods (clothes, drugs, perfumes, dates, and salt), and on the other, and in particular, the opportunity to establish and strengthen their social and political power by the acquisition of horses, copper, iron bars, and weapons. This trade thus encouraged social differentiation, and the creation of states and empires, just as it promoted the improvement of instruments, and the adaptation of techniques and products to suit local climatic conditions. In return, Africa supplied mainly gold, a few other rare products, notably gum and ivory, and some slaves.²

Some European historians, for obvious political reasons, have tried to confuse this trade between equal autonomous partners with the later devastating slave trade of the mercantilist period. The small number of black people in the southern areas of the Maghreb – a few hundred

¹ Except for Egypt and Mesopotamia, and hence the frequent mistake of speaking of 'Arab feudalism' criticised by El Kodsý, loc. cit.

² The role and the nature of this trade were highlighted for the first time by E. W. Bovill, *Caravans of the Old Sahara* (London, 1933), later revised as *The Golden Trade of the Moors* (London, 1958).

thousand compared with about a hundred million in America – shows the futility of this confusion. On the other hand, the stock of gold built up in Europe and in the East throughout these centuries, originating from tropical Africa, reminds us of the principal nature of this trade. After all, this is why the ideas which accompanied the traders were easily accepted – for example, the early adoption of Islam in the Senegal River areas. The important volume of this trade, its egalitarian nature, and the autonomous character of the African societies, are unambiguously described in the Arab literature of the period. Furthermore, one can understand the admiration expressed in the accounts of the Arab travellers if it is remembered that the development and structure of the societies of North and West Africa belonged to the same technological age, just as the place they occupied in the world system of the time was similar. The link between the royal monopoly of the mining of gold, and its marketing by Muslim traders, forms the basis of the structure of these societies. These traders were, as was very often the case, organised in a kind of caste system, and here belonged to a religious minority.

For centuries the Mediterranean societies and those of tropical Africa were united by a bond, for better or for worse. The vicissitudes of one area had quick repercussions on the other, just as wealth and glory reached them all simultaneously. Thus the gradual shifting of routes from west to east found a parallel shift in the civilisation and power of the nations both in North Africa and in the West African savannah lands – reflected, for example, in the successive might of the ancient Empires of Ghana and Mali, the Hausa cities, Bornu, Kanem, and Darfur. This also explains why there was a crisis in Africa when the centre of the newly born European mercantile capitalism moved from the Mediterranean towards the Atlantic. This shift, studied by Fernand Braudel with his usual talent and care for detail, heralded the decline, in the sixteenth century, of the Italian towns which, since the thirteenth century, had opened the way for a decisive evolution in the future history of mankind.¹ Similarly we can say that this change was to cause the downfall of both the Arab world and the Sudan-Sahel regions of Black Africa. Soon afterwards the presence of Western Europe along the coasts of Africa was to become a reality. This shift of the centre of gravity of trade in Africa, from the savannah hinterland to the coast, was a direct consequence of the change of commercial emphasis in Europe from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. But the new trade between Europe and Africa was not to play the same role as that of the

¹ Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris, 1949).

preceding period; henceforth it was to take place under mercantile capitalism.

2. THE MERCANTILIST PERIOD: THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

As I have pointed out elsewhere, the mercantilist period saw the emergence of two poles of the capitalist mode of production: (i) the creation of a proletariat resulting from the decline of feudal relationships, and (ii) the accumulation of wealth in the form of money.¹ During the industrial revolution the two became united; money wealth turned into capital, and the capitalist mode of production reached its completed stage. During this long period of incubation covering three centuries the *American* periphery of the Western European mercantile centre played a decisive role in the accumulation of money wealth by the Western European bourgeoisie. Black Africa played a no less important role as the *periphery of the periphery*. Reduced to the function of supplying slave labour for the plantations of America, Africa lost its autonomy. It began to be shaped according to foreign requirements, those of mercantilism.

Let us finally recall that the plantations of America did not constitute autonomous societies, in spite of their slave-based form of organisation. As I have argued previously, this mode of production was here an element of a non-slave-based society, i.e. it was not the dominant feature of that society. The latter was mercantilist, and the dominant characteristic of the plantation economy was the trade monopoly which, under its control and for its benefit, sold the products of these plantations on the European market, thus quickening the disintegration of feudal relations. The peripheral American society was thus an element in the world structure whose centre of gravity was in Western Europe.

The devastating effects of the mercantilist slave trade for Africa are now better known, thanks to the works of several historians free from race and colonial prejudices. I wish here to mention a recent and brilliant study of the Kingdom of Waalo by Boubacar Barry,² from which two main points emerge.

First, while the pre-mercantile trans-Sahara trade, in which the Waalo participated, had strengthened state centralisation and stimulated progress in that autonomous Senegalese kingdom, the Atlantic trade which replaced it (as soon as the French settled in 1859 in Saint-Louis), did not give rise to any productive forces; on the contrary, this caused a disintegration of the society and of the Waalo state. This

¹ See my *L'Accumulation à l'échelle mondiale*, ch. 2, section 3.

² Boubacar Barry, *Le Royaume du Waalo, 1659-1859* (Paris, 1971, mimeo).

explains why force had to be used by the French to cut off the trans-Saharan links, to subjugate that region of Africa, and to alter its external relations to suit the requirements of the French trading post of Saint-Louis. African societies obviously opposed this worsening of their situation, and Islam served as the basis for their resistance.

The traders of Saint-Louis paid with weapons for the slaves they bought from the king (*Brak*). This ruptured the former balance of power between (i) the *Brak* who maintained a permanent army of captives (*tyeddo*) under crown control, (ii) the council of elders (*seb ak baor*) which nominated him, and had a system of prerogatives superimposed over the collective clan-ownership (*lamanat*) of lands in the village communities, and (iii) the village communities themselves, based on the *lamanat*. The customary dues paid by the traders of Saint-Louis encouraged a civil war which involved the *Brak*, the *tyeddo*, and the *kangam* (leading notables), and a ransacking of communities to obtain slaves. The muslim priests (*marabouts*) tried to organise a resistance movement: their aim was to stop the slave trade, i.e. the export of the labour force, but not to end internal slavery. Henceforth, Islam changed its character: from being a religion of a minority group of traders, it became a popular movement of resistance. The first war led by the *marabouts*, 1673-7, failed in its attempt to convert the people of the Fleuve region and to stop the slave trade. A century later, in 1776, the Toorodo revolution in Toucouleur country overthrew the military aristocracy and ended the slave trade. But in the Waalo Kingdom, being too near to Saint-Louis, the attempt by Prophet Diile in 1830 failed in the face of French military intervention in support of the *Brak*.

Secondly, a study of the Waalo case is of special interest because the slave trade took place parallel to the trade in gum. However, the latter did not have the same impact on African society. The export of goods (instead of labour) does not necessarily have a devastating effect and may, on the contrary, lead to progress. This type of export was not characteristic of the mercantilist period for Africa as a whole, which almost exclusively supplied slaves. But here, rather exceptionally, it played an equally important role, because the slaves, like the Galam gold, mainly followed the road to Gambia. However, gum was supplied by the Waalo, and also in particular by the Trarza Moors. They could export this either via Saint Louis to the French alone, or via Portendick which was open to competition between the English and the Dutch. To cut off the Portendick route, the French helped the Trarza to settle in the Fleuve region, and to cross it during the 'Gum War', in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Such circumstances thus introduced

a contradiction of secondary importance between the Waalo and the Trarza. It was this which explains the failure of the 'War of the *Marabouts*' in the seventeenth century, led simultaneously by those who were hostile to the slave trade, and by the Moors who put increasing pressure on the Waalo in order to monopolise the gum trade.¹

The mercantilist slave trade had similar devastating effects on all the regions of Africa where it took place. Along the coast, from Saint-Louis to Quelimane, it affected almost the whole of the continent, except the north-eastern area of the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and East Africa. The similarity between the history of the Waalo and that of the Kongo Kingdom should be recalled.² The slave trade here also brought about the disintegration of the central authority, and led to anarchy which opened the way for the Yaga raids. Such examples abound. There were wars and anarchy almost everywhere on the continent, and the flight of peoples towards regions of shelter which were difficult to reach and also very often poor – such as those of the paleo-negritic peoples in the over-populated mountains of West Africa. It all ended with an alarming decrease in the population. The processes of integration were stopped, as well as the construction of large communities, begun in the pre-mercantilist period. Instead there was an incredible fragmentation, isolation, and entanglement of peoples, and this, as we know, is the root cause of one of the most serious handicaps of contemporary Africa.

It is necessary to conclude this section with the question of the Oriental mercantilist period. I have certainly hesitated to define in this way the relations of the Near East (Egypt and southern Arabia) with Africa of the Nile and the eastern coast, from the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as far as Mozambique. Neither the Ottoman Empire, nor Egypt under Mohammed Ali, and still less the southern Sultanates, were mercantilist societies similar to those of Europe from the renaissance to the industrial revolution. The disintegration of pre-capitalist relations – the necessary condition for the formation of a proletariat – was almost non-existent. This was the obstacle which Mohammed Ali attempted to overcome by setting up an entirely new state apparatus. I do not propose to study this here, except to bring out the main trends in the evolution of the Sudan, which Egypt was to conquer in the second half of the nineteenth century.³ It was during the pre-mercantilist period

¹ Ibid.

² See Jan Vansina, *Introduction à l'éthnographie du Congo* (Brussels, 1967), and G. Ballandier, *La Vie quotidienne au royaume du Congo du XVI au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1965).

³ See, inter alia, R. Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-81* (London, 1959), P. M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-98* (Oxford, 1958), and J. S. Trimingham, *Islam in the Sudan* (Oxford, 1949).

that two Sultanates were established here, based on long-distance trade with Egypt and the East: the Sultanate of Darfur, still powerful at the time of the Egyptian conquest, and the Sultanate of Fung, between the two Niles, weakened through the wars waged by Ethiopia. Mohammed Ali's aim was very simple: to loot the Sudan of gold, slaves, and ivory, and to export them in order to intensify the industrialisation of Egypt. This was a process of primitive accumulation similar to that of the European mercantilist period, and this is the reason for speaking of Oriental mercantilism. The industrial revolution had already occurred, and this was known to the Pasha; consequently the pre-mercantilist period and that of the capitalist system were mixed up in an attempt to industrialise Egypt by raising finance through state taxation of the peasants, the monopoly of foreign trade and, whenever possible, the looting of the colonies.

Up to 1850 it was the Egyptian army itself which hunted for slaves and robbed the Sudan of local products. After that date, the soldiers handed the job to Sudanese nomads, particularly the Baqqara, who sold the slaves they seized to Turkish, Copt, Syrian, and European merchants established under the aegis of the Khedive. These operations quickly entailed changes in the social system of the nomads concerned; their clan organisation was succeeded by 'nomad feudalism', founded on a territorial basis, and dominated by warrior nobles. In the zones of agriculture that had been thoroughly conquered, the Egyptian army destroyed the old chiefdoms and subjected the villagers to a tax in kind – livestock and grain – for the purpose of feeding the administration and the army of the conquerors. *Sheikhs* were created by the Egyptians and made responsible for the collection of taxes; they rapidly became rich by this means. Moreover, the best lands were taken from the communities and given to Egyptian *beys* and to some Sudanese *sheikhs*. Peasants were taken from their villages and attached to these lands as half-slaves and half-serfs; the proceeds of their commercial farming went to swell the Egyptian Treasury. Other peasants, hunted by the nomads and impoverished by the *sheikhs*, flocked into the market towns, established by the army at cross-roads, and on the borders of the slave-raiding areas. A craft industry grew up, distinct from agriculture, while on the land given to the *beys* and *sheikhs* Egyptian farming methods were introduced with higher productivity. By 1870 it was feasible to replace the tax in kind with a money tax, because of the increased marketed surplus. The Sudan was becoming unified, Islamised, and Arabised.

The Mahdist revolt, 1881–98, was a rebellion of those oppressed by that system: the people of the village communities, the slave-peasants of

the estates, and the craftsmen, slaves and beggars of the market towns. The successful revolt drove out the Egyptian army, the *bey*s and the *sheikhs*. But after the Prophet's death, Khalifa Abdullahi changed the power structure of the Sudan. The military leaders of the revolt, whose origins were in the people, and the Baqqara warrior chiefs who joined it, reorganised to their advantage a state similar to that of the Egyptians; they seized the estates and levied taxes on their own account. It is true that the export of slaves was prohibited, but this had largely lost its old importance at the beginning of the conquest, because that labour force was now used on the spot. But the new state intended to continue exploiting the masses to its advantage and, for that purpose, destroyed the popular elements surrounding the Prophet. His family was imprisoned and several of the people's military leaders were executed. Furthermore, the Mahdist state resumed the export of slaves, but this time for its own benefit: the Khalifa organised slave raiding among the neighbouring peoples of the Upper Nile, Darfur, and Ethiopia; he kept a large number to strengthen his army and his economy, but authorised Sudanese merchants to export some of them. The Khalifa's army, which had lost the popularity which made up its strength at the time of the revolt, did not resist the British colonial expedition at the end of the century.

The slave trade organised from Zanzibar in the nineteenth century certainly falls within a mercantilist framework. For centuries, Arab trade on the coast was carried out in a pre-mercantilist context, which brought these regions of Black Africa into contact with India, the Indian archipelago, and even China. Here products were more important than slaves, as is shown by the very small black population of southern Arabia and the countries bordering the Indian Ocean. There would seem to be one exception, at the time when the Khalifa of Abbasside was organising sugar-cane plantations in Lower Iraq for which he imported black slaves. This short period ended with the Qarmat revolt.

From 1850 the slave trade suddenly became much more intense. There were in fact two new markets: the island of Réunion which was supplied in this way – although the slaves were disguised as 'contract labour' since the British had abolished the slave trade – and the island of Zanzibar itself. In 1840 the Sultan had transferred his capital from Oman, and gradually established a slave plantation economy producing the cloves for which European trade now offered a market. Zanzibar, hitherto a trading post, now became a plantation on a model very similar to that of the West Indies, Réunion, or Mauritius – the Arab West Indies. Thus we once again see that integration into the world capitalist

system was responsible for a devastating slave trade which had no resemblance to the long-distance trade of the pre-capitalist period.

3. INTEGRATION INTO THE FULL CAPITALIST SYSTEM: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The slave trade disappeared with the end of mercantilism, that is to say essentially with the advent of the industrial revolution. Capitalism at the centre then took on its complete form; the function of mercantilism – the primitive accumulation of wealth – lost its importance, and the centre of gravity shifted from the merchant sector to the new industry. The old periphery of the plantation of America, and its African periphery of the slave trade, had now to give way to a new periphery whose function was to provide *products* which would tend to reduce the value of both constant and variable capital used at the centre: raw materials and agricultural produce. The advantageous terms under which these products were supplied to the centre are revealed by the theory of unequal exchange.¹

However, central capital had only very limited means of achieving that goal, until the end of the nineteenth century. It was only when monopolies appeared at the centre that large-scale exports of capital became possible, and when henceforth central capital had the means of organising directly in the periphery, by modern methods, the production which suited it under appropriate conditions. Until then the centre could only rely on the ability of local social systems to adjust ‘spontaneously’, ‘by themselves’, to any new requirements. The Americans could do this in their own country; the British imperialists could impose this in India, as could the Dutch in Indonesia. In certain Eastern countries, notably the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, the joint efforts of ‘spontaneous internal adjustment’ and external pressure produced some results. This is not the place to trace that history. Even in tropical Africa some new crops were produced, exclusively due to the internal adaptation of African societies. There are a number of studies which are highly informative on the mechanism of these adjustments.

I wish again to refer to the exciting research work of Boubacar Barry. The project of establishing a colonial agricultural settlement in Waalo, making plantations for cotton, sugar cane, and tobacco, was first formulated by the British Governor of Saint-Louis at the end of the eighteenth century; but it was put on the agenda again after the French Revolution, as a consequence of the slave revolt of Santo Domingo.

¹ For further details, see my *L'Accumulation à l'échelle mondiale*.

When Waalo was 'bought' in 1819 by Governor Schmaltz, the experiment began. Barry analyses the causes of failure: the resistance of the village communities to their dispossession in favour of European planters, which had been agreed to by the aristocracy in return for extra 'customary' benefits; and the lack of manpower, since there was no reason why the peasants should leave their communities and become proletarians on the plantations. The *Brak* provided some warriors who to all intents and purposes were slaves – long-term recruits, *engagés à temps*. But the French settlement could only use 'tinkering' methods. It was not until the colonial conquest that ample resources enabled a proletariat to be created: by taxation, by pure and simple dispossession, and by forced labour – in short, by all the methods used in Africa after 1880, which were similar to those used earlier by the British in India, the Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Algeria, and the Egyptians in the Sudan.

The fact remains that the Waalo agricultural settlement ended in failure in 1831. But the attempt had accentuated the people's hatred of the aristocracy, and had prepared the way for their conversion to Islam: outside the official authority, Muslim communities organised themselves defensively around the *sérigne* to whom they paid tithes. When Faidherbe conquered the Waalo between 1855–9, with the intention of restarting the agricultural settlement, and at last procuring for French industry the cotton it needed, the vanquished aristocracy embraced Islam.¹ A new chapter opened, and we shall see later how the new production came to be organised in accordance with the requirements of the centre. Thus Islam changed its structure a second time since instead of being a resistance ideology, it was now to become a powerful means of integrating the new periphery and subordinating it to the design of the centre.

Other African societies made an effort to adjust themselves to this project, even before they were conquered. Walter Rodney points out that throughout the Benin coast the slaves who were still raided, but who could no longer be exploited, were put to work inside the society to produce, among other things, the exports which Europe demanded.² Cathérine Coquery-Vidrovitch has analysed in these terms the prodigious development of Dahomean oil-palm groves.³ Onwuka Dike shows how another society, that of the Ibo, unable to have recourse to

¹ Bouhacar Barry, *op. cit.*

² Walter Rodney, 'African Slavery and other Forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast in the context of the Atlantic Slave Trade', in *The Journal of African History* (Cambridge), III, 3, 1966.

³ Cathérine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'De la traite des esclaves à l'exportation de l'huile de palme et des palmistes au Dahomey, XIX^e siècle', in Meillassoux, *op. cit.* pp. 107–23.

slaves, nevertheless adapted itself, again for the production of palm oil for export.¹ Here again many more examples could be cited.

The constitution and subsequent destruction of Samory's Empire reveals another aspect of the mechanism of integration. The collection of products for export, and the conveyance of imports received in exchange, strengthened the position of the Dioula Muslims, a minority inherited from the remote days of pre-mercantilism. The 'Dioula revolution' enabled them to establish a state which they controlled.² But this late episode occurred just at the beginning of the colonial period. The Empire had scarcely been founded by Samory, when it had to face the conquerors who destroyed it; they reorganised the channels of trade in the direction which suited them, and reduced the Dioula to the subordinate functions of colonial trade.

4. INTEGRATION INTO THE FULL CAPITALIST SYSTEM: COLONISATION

The partitioning of the continent which was completed by the end of the nineteenth century multiplied the means available to the colonialists to attain capital at the centre. We must remember that their target was the same everywhere: to obtain cheap exports. But to achieve this, capital at the centre – which had now reached the monopoly stage – could organise production on the spot, and there exploit both the cheap labour and the natural resources, by wasting or stealing them, i.e. by paying a price which did not enable alternative activities to replace them when they were exhausted.³ Moreover, through direct domination and brutal political coercion, incidental expenses could be limited by maintaining the local social classes as 'conveyor belts'. Hence the late development in Africa of the peripheral model of industrialisation by import substitution. It was not until independence that the local élites who took over from the colonial administration constituted the first element of a domestic market for 'luxury goods', according to inter-linkage relationships which I have discussed elsewhere.⁴ Hence also the markedly bureaucratic nature of the 'privileged classes'.

However, although the target was the same everywhere, different variants of the system of colonial exploitation were developed. These

¹ K. Onwuka Diké, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-85* (Oxford, 1956).

² See Yves Person, *Samori* (Dakar, 1970), 3 vols.

³ This problem of the looting of natural resources is beginning to be studied with the present-day awareness of 'environmental problems', although the term is ambiguous.

⁴ See my paper on 'Le Modèle théorique de l'accumulation dans le monde contemporain, centre et périphérie', I.D.E.P., Dakar, 1971.

did not depend, or only slightly, on the nationality of the coloniser. The contrast between French direct and British indirect rule, so frequent in the literature, is not very noticeable in Africa. It is true that a few differences are attributable to the nationality of the masters. British capital, being richer and more developed, and having additionally acquired the 'best pieces' of land, carried out an earlier and more through development than French capital.¹ Belgium, which had been forced to come to terms with the Great Powers, and had to accept the competition of foreign goods in the Congo, did not have the direct colonial monopolies which France used and abused to her advantage. Portugal similarly agreed to share her colonies with major Anglo-American capital.

In the region which I have called 'Africa of the labour reserves', capital at the centre needed to have a large proletariat immediately available. This was because there was great mineral wealth to be exploited (gold and diamonds in South Africa, and copper in Northern Rhodesia), and an untypical settler agriculture in the tropical Africa of Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, and German Tanganyika. In order to obtain this proletariat quickly, the colonisers dispossessed the African rural communities – sometimes by violence – and drove them deliberately back into small, poor regions, with no means of modernising and intensifying their farming. They forced the 'traditional' societies to be the supplier of temporary or permanent migrants on a vast scale, thus providing a cheap proletariat for the European mines and farms, and later for the manufacturing industries of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Kenya.²

Henceforth we can no longer speak of a traditional society in this part of the continent, since the labour reserves had the function of supplying a migrant proletariat, a function which had nothing to do with 'tradition'. The African social systems of this region, distorted and impoverished, lost even the semblance of autonomy: the unhappy Africa of *apartheid* and the Bantustans was born, and was to supply the greatest return to central capital. The economists' ideological mythology of the 'laws of the labour market' under these circumstances, formulated by Arthur Lewis,³ has been subjected to merciless criticism, and Giovanni

¹ Thus the structures established in the Gold Coast in 1890, which have characterised Ghana up to the present day, made their appearance in the Ivory Coast only from 1950, after the abolition of forced labour. See R. Szereszewski, *Structural Changes in the Economy of Ghana, 1891-1911* (London, 1965), and Samir Amin, *Le Développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire* (Paris, 1967).

² See Ralph Horwitz, *The Political Economy of South Africa* (London, 1967); Richard Gray, *The Two Nations* (Oxford, 1961); Serge Thion, *Le Pouvoir pâle* (Paris, 1969; and above all, Giovanni Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia* (The Hague, 1967).

³ Arthur Lewis, *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour* (Manchester, 1954).

Arrighi has restored the role of political violence to its true place.¹

Until recently there was no known large-scale mineral wealth in West Africa likely to attract foreign capital, nor was there any settler colonialisation. On the other hand, the slave trade was very active on this coast, and caused the development of complex social structures which I have analysed above. The colonial powers were thus able to shape a system which made possible the large-scale production of tropical agricultural products for export under the terms necessary to interest central capital in them, i.e. provided that the returns to local labour were so small that these products cost less than any possible substitutes produced in the centre itself.

The net result of these procedures, and the structures to which they gave rise, constituted what I have called 'Africa of the colonial trade economy' or, *l'économie de traite*.² These processes were, as always, as much political as economic, and included the following: (i) the organisation of a dominant trade monopoly, that of the colonial import-export houses, and the pyramidal shape of the trade network they dominated, in which the Lebanese occupied the intermediate zones while the former African traders were crushed and had to occupy subordinate positions; (ii) the taxation of peasants in money which forced them to produce what the monopolists offered to buy; (iii) political support to the social strata and classes which were allowed to appropriate *de facto* some of the tribal lands, and to organise internal migrations from regions which were deliberately left in their poverty so as to be used as labour reserves in the plantation zones; (iv) political alliance with social groups which, in the theocratic framework of the Muslim brotherhoods, were interested in commercialising the tribute they levied on the peasants; and last but not least, (v) when the foregoing procedures proved ineffective, recourse pure and simple to administrative coercion: forced labour.

Under these circumstances, the traditional society was distorted to the point of being unrecognisable; it lost its autonomy, and its main function was to produce for the world market under conditions which, because they impoverished it, deprived the members of any prospects of radical modernisation. This 'traditional' society was not, therefore, in transition to 'modernity'; as a dependent society it was complete, peripheral, and hence at a dead end. It consequently retained certain 'traditional' appearances which constituted its only means of survival. The Africa of the colonial trade economy included all the subordination/

¹ Arrighi, *op. cit.*

² I have analysed this colonial trade in my *L'Afrique de l'Ouest bloquée* (Paris, 1971). See also Osende Afana, *L'Economie de l'ouest africain* (Paris, 1966); and André Vanhaeverbeke, *Rémunération du travail et commerce extérieur* (Louvain, 1970).

domination relationships between this pseudo-traditional society, integrated into the world system, and the central capitalist economy which shaped and dominated it. Unfortunately the phrase 'colonial-type trade' has been used so frequently that its meaning has been reduced to a mere description: the exchange of agricultural products against imported manufactured goods.¹ Yet the concept is much richer: it describes analytically the exchange of agricultural commodities provided by a peripheral society shaped in this way, against the products of a central capitalist industry, imported or produced on the spot by European enterprises.

The results of this colonial-type trade have varied according to different regions of this part of Africa. To give honour where honour is due, it was British capital which initiated a perfectly consistent formulation of aims and procedures. At the beginning of colonisation, when Lever Brothers asked the Governor of the Gold Coast to grant concessions which would enable them to develop modern plantations, he refused because 'it was unnecessary'. It would be enough, the Governor explained, to help the traditional chiefs to appropriate the best lands so that these export products could be obtained without extra investment costs. Lever then approached the Belgians and obtained concessions in the Congo, as we shall see why later.

I have analysed elsewhere the conditions for the success of this colonial-type trade,² but these may be summarised as follows: (i) an 'optimum' degree of hierarchy in a 'traditional' society, which is exactly the case in those zones formed by the slave trade; (ii) an 'optimum' population density in the rural areas of 10-30 inhabitants per square kilometre; (iii) the possibility of starting the process of proletarianisation by calling upon immigrants foreign to the ethnic communities of the plantation zone; (iv) the choice of 'rich' crops, providing a sufficient surplus per hectare and per worker, at the very first stage of their development; and (v) the support of the political authority, making available to the privileged minority such resources – political and economic, especially agricultural credit – as would make possible the appropriation and development of the plantations.

The complete model of this colonial-type trade was achieved in the Gold Coast and German Togoland by the end of the nineteenth century, and was reproduced much later in French West and Equatorial Africa. This lateness reflected that of French capitalism, and was attributable to the attempts at quasi-settler colonialisation even under

¹ As Suret Canale does in *L'Afrique noire, l'ère coloniale* (Paris, 1960).

² See my *L'Accumulation à l'échelle mondiale*, pp. 347-8.

unfavourable conditions – for example, French planters in the Ivory Coast and in Equatorial Africa – and the corresponding maintenance of forced labour until the modern period, after World War II.

This colonial economy took two main forms. Dominant in the Gulf of Guinea, where conditions enabled this kind of trade to develop, was the *kulak* class of indigeneous planters of rural origin, who employed paid labour, and secured virtually exclusive appropriation of the land. On the other hand, in the savannah zone from Senegal through Northern Nigeria to the Sudan, the Muslim brotherhoods permitted another type of colonial trade: the production and export of groundnuts and cotton in vast areas subject to a theocratic power – that of the Mourid brotherhoods of Senegal, the Emirates of Nigeria, and the Ansar and Ashiqqa in the Sudan. They kept the form of a tribute-paying social system, but this was integrated into the international system, because the surplus appropriated in the form of tribute levied on the village communities was itself marketed. It was the Egyptian colonisation in the Sudan which created the most advanced conditions for the development of this type of organisation, which in that country tended towards a pure and simple latifundia system of large estates. The British merely gathered the fruits of this evolution. The new latifundia owners accepted the colonial administration after 1898, and grew cotton for the benefit of British industry. Powerful modern techniques were made available to them, notably large-scale irrigation in the Gezira.

There was a 'second transformation of Islam' in West Africa, after the colonial conquest opened the way to the same kind of evolution, although less definite and slower. We have already seen that Islam in this region underwent a first transformation: from being the religion of a minority caste of merchants in the pre-mercantilist period, integrated into an animist society (hence similar to Judaism in Europe), it became the ideology of popular resistance to the slave trade in the mercantilist period. This second transformation made Islam – 'restored' by the aristocracy and the colonial authorities – the guiding ideology of peasant leaders for the organisation of the export production which the colonisers desired. The Mourid phenomenon of Senegal is probably the most striking example of this second transformation. The fact that the founders of the brotherhood, and some short-sighted colonial administrators, felt hostile to each other for some time, does not matter. Ultimately the brotherhood proved to be the most important vector for the expansion of the groundnut economy, and for the submission of the peasants to the goal of this economy: to produce a large

amount, and to accept very low and stagnating wages despite progress in productivity.

To organise this colonial-type trade it was necessary to destroy the pre-colonial pattern, and to reorganise the flows in the direction required by the externally orientated nature of the economy. For there had been, before, regional complementarities with a broad, natural forest-savannah base, strengthened by the history of the relations between the West African societies. The domestic trade between herdsmen and crop farmers, and in kola and salt, as well as the outflow of exports and the dissemination of imports, constituted a dense and integrated network, dominated by African traders. The colonial trading houses had to gain control of these flows and to direct them all towards the coast; that was why the colonial system destroyed African domestic trade and then reduced African traders – when they were not eliminated – to the role of subordinate primary collectors. The destruction of the trade of Samory, like that of the people of mixed blood in Saint-Louis, Gorée, and Freetown, like that of the Hausa and Ashanti of Salaga, and of the Ibo of the Niger delta, bear witness to this other crippling socio-economic effect of *l'économie de traite*.


Thus the colonial trade necessarily gave rise to a polarisation of dependent peripheral development at the regional level. The necessary corollary of the 'wealth' of the coast was the impoverishment of the hinterland. Predisposed by geography and history to a continental development, organised around the major inland river arteries (thus providing for transport, irrigation, electric power, and so on), Africa was condemned to be only 'developed' narrowly along the coast. The exclusive allocation of resources to the latter zone, a planned policy of colonial trade, accentuated this regional imbalance. The mass emigration from the hinterland to the coast forms part of the logic of the system: it made cheap labour available to capital where capital required this, and only 'the ideology of universal harmony' can see in these migrations anything other than their impoverishment of the departure zones.¹ The culmination of the colonial trade system was a balkanisation, in which the 'recipient' micro-regions had no 'interest' in 'sharing' the crumbs of the colonial cake with their labour reserves.

¹ Elliot J. Berg, 'The Economics of the Migrant Labor System,' in Hilda Kuper (ed.), *Urbanisation and Migration in West Africa* (Los Angeles, 1965), reflects better than anyone else this non-scientific ideology. The conventional assumption is that migrations 'redistribute' one factor of production (labour) which originally was unequally distributed. If that were so, migrations would tend to equalise the rates of growth of the economies of the various regions. But we can see that they are everywhere accompanied by a growing disparity between rates of growth: the acceleration of growth *per capita* in the immigration zones, and its reduction in the emigration zones.

Thus the bounties of the colonial trade were highly relative. However, it was impossible to implement this system in Central Africa, the third micro-region of the continent. Here, ecological conditions had to some extent protected the peoples who took refuge from the ravages of the slave trade in zones unlikely to be penetrated from the coast. The low density of population, and the lack of sufficient African hierarchies, made the colonial-trade model non-viable. Discouraged, the colonial authorities gave the country to any adventurers who would agree to try 'to get something out of it' without resources – since adventure does not attract capital. The misdeeds of the concessionary companies have been duly denounced: between 1890 and 1930 they ravaged French Equatorial Africa with no result except a trivial profit. As for the Congo, it will be remembered that Levers Brothers were welcomed by the Belgians, after the firm's unsuccessful attempt to establish itself in the Gold Coast. But it was only after World War I, when the solution was adopted of having industrial plantations established directly by the major capitalists, that a small-scale colonial-type trade infiltrated as an extension of the plantation zones belonging to foreign capital.¹ As for French Equatorial Africa, this area had to wait until the 1950s before seeing the first symptoms. Thus the negative impact of this period, still omnipresent, justifies the name which I have given to the region – 'Africa of the concessionary companies'.

In all three cases, then, the colonial system organised the African societies so that they produced exports – on the best possible terms, from the point of view of the mother country – which only provided a very low and stagnating return to local labour. This goal having been achieved, we must conclude that there are no traditional societies in modern Africa, only dependent peripheral societies.

¹ Cathérine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Le Congo française au temps des compagnies concessionnaires, 1890-1930* (Paris, 1971, mimeo); and R. Merlier, *Le Congo, de la colonisation belge à l'indépendance* (Paris, 1965).



(Authors Mark Abdelsayed, Madeline Brennan, Ianthea Connelly, Alice Fahey, Carlos Giesbrecht, Sheree Green, David Hale, and Jay Frere Harvey were enrolled at TRANSCEND Peace University, term 1/2014)


Africa's current development models tend to echo the priorities of colonialism, perpetuating structural inequalities that hinder development and exacerbate existing contradictions. To remedy this, development reciprocity and African-centred governance that promote franchise, representation and responsiveness to basic needs should be adopted.

Africa's challenges over the next 50 years will be complex and multifaceted across its diverse, yet interconnected, states, nations and communities. This paper will explore six themes through a diagnostic and prognostic model, suggesting therapies to address some of the many contradictions experienced across the continent. The connections between aid, economic growth and the environment will be discussed. Political and security issues will be presented as well as social and cultural issues. Whilst the contradictions and afflictions troubling Africans throughout are known and often the substance of cliché narratives, the solutions and therapies are less reflected. This paper puts the latter forward.

POLITICS

DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS

The political landscape of the African continent is, arguably, the single biggest inhibitor to unfolding the potential of its composite nations. Sound governance is integral to human development, particularly a states' capacity to protect the physical security - the very survival of its own citizens (Cilliers, Hughes and Moyer 2011, p79). The colonial grouping of culturally diverse nations led to intertwined socio-structural fault-lines. The resulting political competition and internal fracturing all too often leads to human suffering and violent conflict. Ironically, the continued intervention of the international community - principally motivated by resources - continues to




complicate the political viability of many African states.

The prognosis for meaningful development is dire if the current political situation in numerous states is not rectified within the next 50 years. Where the organs of good governance fail – in participation, representation, effectiveness, accountability, transparency and responsiveness – the body of the state can never function as required. For the likes of Zimbabwe, CAR, DRC, Eritrea and Somalia political stagnation appears likely, at least in the short term. But successful models do exist. South Africa, Botswana and Rwanda are likely to continue to bridge community divides through political solutions.

THERAPY

Acknowledging and building on existing centres of power is key to more effective political systems in African states. More governance efforts should be concentrated along national lines. Political models must be adapted to the unique circumstances of each participatory entity – in many cases with a focus on more local, decentralised structures. A consociationalism model may be required in states such as CAR, Nigeria and DRC to enhance representation, participation and trust. Furthermore, a system of ‘non-territorial federalism’ may prove more consolidating. This may be based on traditional and other forms of local collective identities as they live around and with each other (Galtung 2008, p 76). These concepts do not negate the idea of sovereign states as the two systems can be integrated.

The relaxation of sovereign borders may help to further include the politically marginalised of the continent. ‘There would be high level of mobility of people and ideas, goods and services, not confining people within a tradition of enmity to a very limited territory’ (Galtung 2008, p 132). Politics would be local; promoting franchise, representation and responsiveness to basic needs. Policies that connect neglected border areas with the rest of a country are necessary; the development of infrastructure and focused location of industries will aid this. International stakeholders must internalize these political needs of African states. New and old forms of colonialism, in search of comparative advantages, sustain power imbalances and deny representational politics to thrive. Pan-African collaboration and



cooperation, through the AU and other institutions, must be promoted through economic, political, cultural and social integration of communities, not just states. Political solutions, whatever these are, must be locally driven and internationally embraced. A south-south-south cooperation connecting Latin-America, Africa and South East Asia could reinforce and aid development along these intra-continental political alignments. To this end, bi-oceanic railroads and highways from Dar es Salaam to Kinshasa could be endeavoured to accompany the efforts currently being financed by China from Mombasa and Nairobi in Kenya on to Uganda and Rwanda. A railroad 50 years too late, which should have been constructed at the very end of the colonial era.


SECURITY

DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS

The importation of weapons by African governments and state mandates remains a significant threat to security across the continent (Galtung, 2014). Regular and mass scale importation of weaponry will continue as long as it is profitable for exporters and there is demand from African governments. Cross-border crime such as narcotics and illicit arms trade increasingly threaten border security (Cilliers, Hughes and Moyer, 2011). State capacity to control borders will remain low and demarcation confused. Whilst militarised violence and violent conflict has decreased noticeably, violent crime has increased and is having significant destabilising effects (Cilliers, Hughes and Moyer, 2011).

Poor governance, competition for resources, weak rule of law and, critically, historical fractures through colonial polarisation, have all contributed to the ongoing threat of mass category killing (MCK) which will persist unless contradictions along societal fault-lines are addressed. Increasing urbanisation and the governance of sprawling urban spaces is presenting significant security challenges. Urban pressures, youth unemployment and service delivery deficits drive crime in urban centres (Cilliers, Hughes and Moyer, 2011).

Overpopulation and degeneration of urban spaces is likely to breed violence and



organised crime. Islamic militancy - Sahel and Horn of Africa - will pose threats to regional security (Ostebo, 2012). Evangelical Christian extremism will likely continue - Uganda and the CAR - with significant destabilising impact.

THERAPY


Massive sales of weaponry: Increasing international pressure is needed to regulate the production and trade of weapons. Strengthening existing law and monitoring mechanisms will be important as will mechanisms holding states accountable for mandates that enable the use of 'massive killer instruments' which ironically include small arms.

Narcotics and illicit arms trade: Delineating and demarcating African borders properly will remove the ambiguities of boundary lines and related issues of jurisdiction. Developing mechanisms and policies that will facilitate collaboration among border-area administrative personnel will be particularly important (Ikome, 2012). Effective state control of legitimate boundaries would be achieved by focusing international support on developing both national and inter-state capacities.

Criminalised violence: Addressing the pull factors attracting youth and other members of the population to criminalised violence is critical to reducing the proliferation. This could take the form of economic empowerment, education and enhanced social cohesion through community-centred peacebuilding. Localised investment should be complemented with a focus on enhancing cross-border cooperation.

Massive category killings: Comprehensive political decentralisation is required to empower local communities and remove cross-cutting contradictions. Mediation, conflict resolution and reconciliation, principally through local dialogues, must be prioritized to eliminate retributive attacks. The provision of basic needs - health, education and rule of law - must all be enhanced through improved governance and transparency. And, critically, the international community must engage through a prism of local needs and security instead of short-term resource gain.

Religious extremism: Public education offsetting religious antagonistic media and the



use of a mechanism of peace journalism/media would assist in alleviating hate-propaganda (Galtung 2008, p 233). The creation of education programs to be disseminated internally between religious groups and then in conjunction with bodies and institutions (specifically non-governmental) (Galtung, 2008, p. 27).

Urbanisation: Formalising housing and social protection policies may help administrations manage and transform urban slums. Promoting the drivers of productivity – human capital in small and medium enterprises – through grants, tax concessions and scholarships in vocational skills, trade, technology and management would assist in transforming the human potential in these locations.

DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT and ECONOMICS

DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS

Development understood as a one-way ‘helping action’ from the wealthy countries to less developed countries (LDC) promotes favourable market conditions for the private enterprises of donor countries and as such is not reciprocal. Foreign companies and countries make far more from tax avoidance and interest than they give in aid (Global Financial Integrity, 2012). Aid is bound to market conditions by donor countries that must be fulfilled by LDCs in order to access assistance (World Bank, 2014:3) and as these practices are put in place in the name of economic enhancement, they come with unilateral transfers of technology (read: gifts) from wealthy countries to LDCs in Africa making them dependent on spare parts and foreign capacity. Furthermore African administrations get resources, by purchasing sovereign bonds. Since 2012, the governments of African countries issue ever more sovereign bonds, significantly increasing their debt to private donors (World Bank, 2014). Foreign appropriation of local resources in LDCs, largely in the mining sector, leads to vast quantities of wealth being transferred out of the country with very little investment in and benefit for local communities (AFDB, 2012). This not only results in environmental destruction and resource depletion but also endangers food security for local communities. (Devereux & Maxwell, 2001).

The mining sector extracts resources in an unsustainable manner that destroys or




degrades the local ecology (polluting water, contaminating soil) (AFDB, 2012). This is also seen in agricultural projects, which encourage cash-cropping to the detriment of the environment (biofuels), preventing communities from growing sustainable crops for sustenance and ecological diversity (Leahy, 2013). Agricultural exports are the primary export for African countries. In relation to manufactured goods, agricultural exports have not held their value. Farmers in Africa are forced to produce more yet increasingly earn less, deepening poverty in the region (Arcal&Maetz, 2000).

If the current climate continues, African countries are likely to become ever more indebted and will mortgage current resources which in turn may lead to more internal and external conflict pressure. This will have a compounding impact on the environment and lead to increasing environmental destruction. More and more African countries are increasingly reliant upon foreign financial and food aid as they are unable to meet their own needs through agriculture. Despite exploitation from the 'free market', pockets of African farmers have come together to enforce fair-trade practices and some development projects have focused on sustainable permaculture to meet local needs (Leahy, 2013).

THERAPY

In order to overcome assistance/aid as a unilateral matter of neo-colonialism and to consciously focus on global development needs, one approach could be the concept of development reciprocity (Galtung, 2010, p 188). This bilateral development involves two regions developing each other, reciprocally, for mutual and equal benefits, equitably; fostering 'reciprocally developing countries' (RDCs) instead of MDC or LDC. This would turn the development focus towards sustainable agriculture projects to meet local needs for sustenance as well as create surplus crops for engagement both with local and global market: eye to eye. This entails improving the terms of trade for LDCs as well as training local farmers to adhere to the production-, documentation- and quality-requirements of standard supermarkets so they can earn. Next to developing local manufacturing capacities to add value to raw materials on-site prior to exporting them, the establishment of stronger trade links between LDCs within the continent, would curb transport costs and boost trade in complementary products – two sine qua non conditions for African progress worthy of the name (UNEP, 2005).



Finally, fostering sustainable and environmentally beneficial practices in the mining sector by integrating permaculture concepts into standard operating procedures, rather than mining in spite of the environment, would serve existential needs of Africans best.

SOCIAL


DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS

Discrimination, social exclusion, lack of healthcare and basic education and marginalization of the youth all have a vast impact on African societies. Social structures maintained by the privileged reinforce the status quo. Exclusion and marginalization are among the root causes of many of the violent conflicts (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa 2011). In assessing the futures of Africa, mainstream development is making significant progress in addressing access to basic needs. However, development in Africa remains technocratic, economic and primarily material. In order to deal with profound issues such as discrimination, gender disparity and minority conflict, it is crucial that we broaden our view of basic needs beyond the material and into the social experience of Africans.

THERAPY

Post-Conflict Reconciliation: More needs to be done to remove the conditions that perpetuate cycles of violence. Delegation of local third party mediators with the direct aim to change the perspective of both victim and perpetrator, establishment of local forms of legal tribunals which draw on culturally specific methods of dealing with trauma and establishment of a historical Truth Commissions with joint efforts of local population would all help assist in healing the fault-lines that exist in many African societies (Galtung, 2005, p 222-227) (Durr, 2014).

Women – Maternal and Child Health Care: Across the board there needs to be an improvement in neonatal care, screening of children for development diseases, promotion and protection of women’s reproductive health rights and improvement in the quality and quantity of maternal health services (UNICEF 2011). Promotion of



gender equality with the direct aim of empowerment of women in terms of being active participants in their own healthcare decisions (UNICEF 2011) are essential in the achievement of MD4 and MD5, and as such the promotion of a more stable society.


Education: It is important that education reflect the diversity of African peoples, recognising their diverse historical narratives and lived experiences in rich detail. The indigenisation of education in Africa would include a focus on local languages, histories and ways of knowing, in a sense ‘decolonising’ education (Hettne, 1995, p. 84). Furthermore, if a national curriculum is to be developed, it must reflect the diversity of all African peoples in the proposed region, especially minorities. Finally, it is imperative that Africans further develop their own body of academic literature, particularly in development studies.

Civil Society: In order to improve social cohesion and reduce the likelihood of violence, it is important that diverse groups in Africa communicate with each other effectively and with government institutions. It is vital that strong links are established between development NGOs working in Africa and local people on the ground, particularly through community forums. Furthermore, support through funding or awareness should be provided to grassroots education, arts and community dialogue initiatives which seek to involve people in public life.

CULTURE

DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS

Decades of colonial rule have devastated the cultural foundations necessary for effective governance in numerous countries across Africa – breaking ethnic, linguistic and religious ties that had originally bound societies together (Falola, 2003). As a result, structural inequalities and cultural rifts that impede development now exist in numerous nations, while development models are largely guided by Western formal ideals of democracy that are yet to be tuned to the cultures to which they are introduced - which threatens to exacerbate conflict and further hinder development. Unless African culture becomes a central feature of regional development models, it is likely that in 2064, Western approaches will remain dominant, conflict will persist and



development will stagnate (Mac Ginty, 2010).

THERAPY

In considering the current failures of the Western development model, we propose the adoption of a cultural framework that will guide the creation of a reflexive development model that is better suited to African nations. We propose a shift away from Western ideals of development towards contemporary-knowledge based approaches. As such, we propose the following five-step plan:

Apology: Governments from relevant countries must release public apologies that: acknowledge their country's role in past and current interventions throughout Africa; acknowledge the continual negative impact of imperialism and colonialism on Africans and African cultures; guarantee information gathering and reparations to compensate cultural loss (Galtung 2008).

Information: An intergovernmental committee consisting of both African and non-African researchers, peace practitioners, community leaders and activists need to be formed to properly assess the needs of different nations. For the reconciliation process to be successful the committee(s) must engage in open dialogue with Africans from all nations and social classes based on information collected.

Cultural Reparations: Reparations could involve politicians, art scholars and artists uniting to create programs and information services that celebrate the diversity of African culture. This necessitates increased art and media funding in order to encourage and reward cultural expression.

Preserving African Cultures: To ensure the perseverance of African cultures and traditions, a special intergovernmental taskforce consisting of scholars, translators, archivists and computer technicians must be established to ensure cultural documentation occurs in the form of written records. Additionally, an intergovernmental agency must be established to maintain and disseminate written cultural records.



Education: Schools must place greater emphasis on African history, religion, and culture to allow for the development of culturally expressive, informed future generations (Banks 1993). Western governments and regional institutions should work together with African cultural leaders and experts to produce resources that explore the African experience and promote peace culture. These departments should employ experts and performance artists to visit communities to host public lectures, community meetings and perform African art.

African Peace-building Approaches: African peacebuilding and development approaches must become the main focus of inquiry for governments and research institutes. Traditional knowledge of peace-inducing methods should be learned by establishing intergovernmental research foundations concentrated on discerning and implementing African peace cultures.

CONCLUSION

Africa's futures will largely be determined by the acceptability of development initiatives across the region. Current development models tend to echo the priorities of colonialism, perpetuating structural inequalities that not only hinder development but often exacerbate existing contradictions. In order to remedy this, the concept of development reciprocity must be adopted, expanded and implemented on a case by case basis. We propose this can be achieved by innovating perceptions of development in the fields of economics, politics, culture, society and security. Politically, there is great need for the adoption of an African-centred form of governance that can stimulate community development and respond to existing national power relations. Politics and future policies need be localised; promoting franchise, representation and responsiveness to basic needs. The long-term risk of insecurity must be addressed through a range of cross-cutting thematic issues at the service of existential basic needs of Africa's populations. Regarding society, all societal pillars that marginalise individuals and delay social progress must be addressed constructively. African diversity must be recognised and factored into policy-making: culture- and diversity-sensitive frameworks must be adopted to ensure the success of participatory, sustainable and multilaterally acceptable development goals.

26 | Somalia:

A Peace & Conflict Perspective

[1] Diagnosis. The post-colonial, Cold War related devastation of Somalia is not the issue, nor the hunger-related violence.

But added to that comes the secondary conflict over the use of Somalia as a laboratory for "humanitarian assistance" and to release German funds for UN peacekeeping (as Cambodia was used for Japan). The major problem, however, is intellectual: Somalia does not fit the Western nation-state models as a set of territories administered from a capital, with some autonomy to the provinces if a federation and very little or no autonomy if a unitary state. Western democracy is based on territorial constituencies and one person-one vote, with majority-takes-all or proportional representation in a national assembly. Somalia looked like a nation-state in the sense of (roughly) one religion and one language. Mogadishu seemed to function like any capital of any nation-state, and when that model did not work violence was used at the expense of agricultural assistance.

But this was mostly virtual reality. In reality Somalia can only be understood by seeing the clans as polities. That discourse was missed from the beginning, then introduced, but in an unfortunate way.

The super-clans are **Darood** (clans: *Dulbahante*, *Majerteen*, *Ogaden*, *Marehan*); **Irir** (clans: *Issak*, *Hawiye*, *Isa* and *Godabiirsay*) and **Saab** (*Ahanwayn*). This is a different way of organizing a society, partly territorial, partly by kinship. "Modern" Westerners may decide this is the wrong way, and wish it away, but kinship, and clanship, are solid. In practice this means less solidarity where it should be according to Western cognitive maps, meaning within the nation-state of Somalia as such; and more solidarity where it should not be, along clanship lines and territory under their command.

Consequently, the society cracks at unexpected places and hangs together at others. And the clan leaders, instead of being honored, were fitted into an inadequate discourse as "warlords". The US-UN spent enormous resources in terms of time, personnel and money



hunting for some 13-14 leaders of super-clans, clans and sub-clans, particularly Mohammed Aidid, instead of doing useful work.

[2] Prognosis. Focus on the "war lords", like conceiving of Panamá in terms of Noriega. This will lead to mission failure.

[3] Therapy. If the problem is starvation, "seeds and tools" would have been a part of the package, combined with medical assistance, administered by agricultural and medical experts; bringing in the supplies by helicopter, bypassing Mogadishu, basing assistance on competent civilian personnel, with police for crowd control and order. And with equal respect for all clans.

A UN expert sent to look into the situation in August 1992 reported back to the UN headquarters along such lines and was told that "this does not fit into our concept." That concept probably demanded delivery by the military to bolster UN forces, opening for German army participation, like Cambodia was used for and by Japan.

If we now assume that the primary structure of Somalia is as a set of clans rather than a set of territories, and that the method of decision-making is dialogue till consensus has been obtained rather than debates leading to a vote-election, then one political structure for Somalia might be non-territorial federalism based on the clans as they live around each other. To avoid centralism the presidency of the Council of Heads of Clans (insulted by the West with the term "war-lord") could rotate like in Switzerland, say every half a year (like in the EU), giving each clan visibility, using the very innovative Somali *shir* as a conflict resolution mechanism.

This does not exclude a Western approach based on territorial constituencies as that is also a part of Somali reality. The two approaches could co-exist in a bicameral parliament. (929)





44 | Rwanda-The Great Lakes:

A Peace & Conflict Perspective

[1] Diagnosis. Limiting the Rwanda genocide in 1994 to "Rwanda" limits the understanding of the conflict and the search for possible remedies. Thus, the racism implicit in a genocide with clear class connotations has roots in German colonialism and "*Rassenkunde*", favoring the taller Tutsis over Hutus (let alone the "pygmies").

The Belgian successors to the German colonialists after the First World War favored the Hutu majority ("numbers over centimeters"). Democracy was "in". Western economic investment (France, Belgium) became considerable, and Rwanda-Burundi was seen as symptomatic for more important Zaïre-Congo.

Another aspect is the projection of the European (Anglo-French) tribal feud over linguistic-cultural-economic influence in Africa. Uganda-Tutsi-Bunyamelenge-Kabila anglophiles are pitted against Hutu-Mobutu francophiles. The Western media traditionally dominated by the French as "area specialists" gave an additional bias. But disasters tend to favor the spread of English as most disasters are managed in English. French-Roman Law is losing ground, it seems, and English-Common Law is pushing westward with energy.

A third aspect is the role played by development aid, and particularly Swiss aid. Development agencies want success and tend to play on dominant groups in society, thereby cementing class relations that may be explosive. The underprivileged see no alternative to violence by revolution or migration and then invasion. The over-privileged see no alternative to pre-emptive violence against the suppressed and the moderates. The result was *genocide*.

[2] Prognosis. If the conditions producing genocide are not removed, genocide will be reproduced. If they are in the structure of Rwandan society and a culture of violence, the latter reinforced by a massive genocide traumatizing victims and perpetrators, then the prognosis depends on how much is done to remove the conditions.





Tribunals locate the conditions in evil actors. But their removal by execution or imprisonment is unlikely to touch the deeper causes, and also unlikely to reconcile victims and perpetrators and both sides.

[3] Therapy. One point of departure for a therapy may be to question the availability of any lasting outcome within the narrow confines of Rwanda. Thus, a troubled married couple, deformed by the outside and by themselves, might do well to seek solutions outside the narrow confines of their apartment (note "apart"). And the solution to Rwanda might have to be located outside Rwanda.

One possible approach might be a *bi-oceanic confederation* from the Indian to the Atlantic oceans, including Uganda and Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, and the two Congos and maybe more countries, trading East-West with Asia and America, as much as North-South.

There would be high level of mobility of people and ideas, goods and services, not confining people with a tradition of enmity to a very limited territory.

Japan, with extensive programs for Africa, could contribute with East-West rail-road infrastructure. New energies could be tapped by doing what the Republic of South Africa has already done: exploiting the bi-oceanic opportunities further South.

It would also be useful if Germany, Belgium, France and Switzerland, US and the UN could assume part of the responsibility, contributing to reconciliation by taking some of that colossal burden off local shoulders. That burden is too big for such a small country.

Better bring in others, identify causes, have massive programs in the culture of peace, create a new geo-political reality, reconcile using local traditions such as the *gacaca* rather than Western style tribunals, and mobilize all forces for peace. (97y)





80 | Zimbabwe: A Peace & Conflict Perspective

[1] Diagnosis. The conflict as related by Western media pits Robert Mugabe, the president, against British settlers, and then also against his own people because of his disregard for human rights, the rapidly deteriorating economy, bad governance and rampant corruption.

Both narratives have solid rings of Truth, but there may, as usual, also be other Truths around. And a major one is the British colonialism that started in the region in the late 1800s with the British South Africa company headed by Cecil Rhodes, an infamous super-imperialist made famous through the "Rhodes scholars", a rather dubious distinction. The name Southern Rhodesia is from 1898.

From 1923 till independence April 1980 the country was ruled by a small (typically 4%) white minority that on November 11 1965 under Ian Smith produced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, UDI, denounced by London. A war of liberation started, leading to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979 with a land-reform program. This went wrong from the very beginning as land was treated as a "willing seller, willing buyer" market issue, disregarding the colonial past.

[2] Prognosis. There will be major violence in Zimbabwe and sooner or later a change of regime, with people leaving in droves.

[3] Therapy. The key to a possible solution, and it is never too late, may be in the distinction between owner and user of land. Clearly the land belongs to the Zimbabwe people made landless by the British invasion and occupation from 1880 onwards (on purpose the word "state" is not used, given the present situation of at least partial illegitimacy). Here is a list of possible measures:

- Deeds issued by the British colonial administration to British settlers are declared invalid;





- The owner of the land would be a Zimbabwe parliament chosen by free and fair elections, establishing a commission for land tenancy;
- The remaining settlers are invited to stay as users of the land under conditions like the following:
- the settler would draw a permanent minimum salary to be adjusted upward depending on farm income;
- there is a generous time limitation to be negotiated, like two generations into the future;
- the land has to be used well as it is in trust, otherwise it reverts to the Commission;
- a condition is transfer of technology to Zimbabwe land workers for later tenancy;
- another condition is participation in a land distribution program.
- there would be a Monitoring Commission to supervise the extent to which the conditions are fulfilled.

Thus, in principle there should be an orderly, peaceful – and generous, given the British onslaught – transfer of landownership to the rightful owners. But there is more to it than that.

The issue is not only land, but colonialism; not only economy, but dignity. The way to handle this is conciliation, with acknowledgment of what happened, elaboration of why it happened, and designs for the future. Such tested instruments as joint commissions for history books, maybe also Truth and Reconciliation.

Even if the process mainly applies to British colonialism, including the Smith regime, the Mugabe regime should also step forwards and declare its willingness to participate in a process of that kind. Two wrongs do not make one right, and that seems to have been the logic so far.

But two rights could make a super-right, and time is much overdue for that to happen. (062)



2. The Decade of Drift: 1975-1985

The excitement of the Bandung plan (1955-73)²

The battle for a new international economic order (NIEO): 1974-1980

Structural costs; the stakes; the struggle for the NIEO

Africa: from the Lagos plan (1980) to the world bank plan and the United Nations Conference (1986)

Debt and the threat of a financial crash

The efforts of radical African nationalism: adjustment or delinking?⁶ **Notes**

The 1975-85 period is one of continuing drift in the internal strategies of Third World countries and in world economic and political balance. Excitement came at the beginning with the Bandung plan, to build within the Third World a bourgeois national state with a capacity to make progress in solving the problems of underdevelopment in the framework of the interdependence imposed by the worldwide economy. History was to prove the impossibility of the plan in the light of the internal limitations of the practices of the states in question and the offensive led by the West to reject any calls for an adjustment of the international order to meet development needs at the periphery of the capitalist system. Step by step we reached the current situation that we describe as 'recompradorization' of the Third World. At the level of the international order the period is characterized by the beginning of the decline of US hegemony. But if this decline should lead almost inevitably to the reconstruction of a desirably polycentric world, what place would it hold for the Third World regions? In any event, the open crisis since the 1970s has delayed this evolution by inspiring a realignment of the West as a whole to the Atlantic pact (cf. Chapters 4 and 8).¹

This is the canvas on which the balancing act of prevailing opinion is painted. After the phase of ingenuous illusions of Third Worldism came the phase of aggressive anti-Third Worldism. In this way analysis and critique of what is in fact an impasse for currently existing capitalism was abandoned, and the door was closed to any close examination of the proposals for delinked national and popular development, as the basis for a necessary reconstruction of a polycentric world more responsive to people's needs.

We shall try in this chapter to sketch the main stages of this drift that in Africa's case runs from the adoption of the rhetorical Lagos Plan of Action

(1980), adhering to the logic of the battle for a new international economic order (NIEO) to surrender to the recolonization of the Berg plan (named after the American expert charged by the World Bank with its formulation). At the same time, we shall examine the internal reasons why the various African attempts at alternative development have not so far yielded any but the most sparse results.

The excitement of the Bandung plan (1955-73)²

More than 30 years ago the principal heads of state of those Asian and African countries that had regained political independence met for the first time at Bandung. The experience of the new authorities they represented was still slight: India and Indonesia had been independent for fewer than ten years, Communist China for only five, and it was only three years since the Egyptian monarchy had bowed out of history. The battle for the achievement of the historic task of independence was not over: the first Vietnamese war was only just finished and the second was already in prospect, the Korean War ended with the status quo, the Algerian war was in full flow, decolonization of sub-Saharan Africa was not even yet foreseen, and the drama of Palestine was in its first phase.

The Asian and African leaders meeting in Bandung were far from resembling one another. The political and ideological currents they represented, their vision of the future society to be built or rebuilt and its relations with the West all provoked different attitudes. But a common plan brought them together and gave their meeting meaning. On their minimum common programme was the achievement of political decolonization of Asia and Africa. Moreover they all appreciated that regaining political independence was a means and not an end, the latter being winning economic, social and cultural liberation. On this, two views divided the Bandung guests: there was a majority view of those who believed in a potential 'development' within 'interdependence' in the world economy, and a view of the communist leaders who believed that a withdrawal from the capitalist camp would lead - with, if not behind the USSR - to the building of a world socialist camp.

The leaders of the capitalist Third World who did not expect to 'leave the system' or 'delink' did not all have the same strategic and tactical view of 'development'. But in varying degrees they did think that the building of an economy and an independent developed society (albeit within global interdependence) entailed an element of 'conflict' with the dominant West (the radical wing regarded it as essential to put a stop to control over the national economy by foreign monopoly capital). In their further concern to preserve the regained independence, they refused to join the planetary war games and serve as bases for the encirclement of socialist countries that US

hegemony was seeking. However, they believed too that refusing to join the Atlantic military pact did not imply a willingness to come under the umbrella of its adversary, the USSR. Hence 'neutralism' and 'non-alignment'. The then secret history of relations between China and the USSR, whose crisis was to become public knowledge two years later, was to show that this position was not really very different from the one taken by China in the 1960s. It was also the position in which Yugoslavia found itself after the break of 1948. The formation of a non-aligned front had, therefore, Tito's active sympathy from the very start.

The drawing together of the Afro-Asian states had already begun with the establishment of the Arab-Asian group in the United Nations, in order to defend the cause of independence for the struggling colonies. Bandung reinforced this drawing together and gave the struggle a fillip. Three years later, in liberated Accra, Kwame Nkrumah declared 'Africa must unite'. But once independence was gained and Nkrumahist pan-Africanism failed and there was the demonstration of the impotence of the two camps constituted around the Congo issue (the Casablanca bloc and the Monrovia bloc from 1960 to 1963) African unity was to take the minimal form of the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.

During the 1960s and the 1970s at one summit meeting after another 'non-alignment' was gradually to slide from the standpoint of a political solidarity front geared to support for liberation struggles and rejection of military alliances to a posture of 'a trade union of economic claims on the North'. The battle for a 'new international economic order' engaged upon in 1975 after the Middle East war of October 1973 and the adjustment in the price of oil was the apotheosis of this evolution only to sound its death knell.

Neither at political nor economic level was the West lightheartedly going to accept the Bandung spirit. Was it mere chance that one year later France, Britain and Israel would try to overthrow Nasser by the joint aggression of 1956? Imperialist capital's rejection of the Bandung political vision was shown by the real hatred the West manifested for the Third World radical leaders of the 1960s (Nasser, Soekarno, Nkrumah, Modibo Keita), who were nearly all overthrown in the same period, from 1965 to 1968, which included Israel's aggression of June 1967. It was, therefore, a politically hamstrung non-aligned camp that was to face the global economic crisis from 1970-71. The West's non-acceptance of the proposed NIEO showed the genuine connection between the political and economic aspects of the Afro-Asian initiative crystallized from Bandung

What may nowadays be called 'development ideology', in a crisis that may be terminal, had its 'moment of glory' between 1955 and 1975, but never

gave rise to an interpretation shared by everyone and understood in the same way.

The traditional communist camp was also not prepared to accept the aims that emerged from Bandung. In 1948 Jdanov proclaimed the division of the world into two camps - capitalist and socialist - and, in advance, condemned as illusory any attempt to stand outside them, and hence to wish to be 'nonaligned'. Within this spirit the communists could not envisage any winning of independence by a national liberation movement they had not led. India's independence was marked by the Indian Communist Party as a 'day of national mourning'; in South-East Asia the Chinese and Vietnamese models were thought desirable to be extended to Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Burma. It was only after the first 'stabilization' of the 1950-55 period (the victory in China, armistice and partition in Korea and Vietnam, the admitted defeat of guerrillas elsewhere in South-East Asia), after the Third World 'bourgeois' new regimes had proved their viability, after the start, albeit under 'bourgeois' leadership, of their conflict with the West, and after Stalin's death (1953) and Khrushchev's ideological overtures, that the notion of the possibility of a 'viable third camps and a 'third path of development' began to be appreciated.

The non-communist Third World leaders did, however, believe in a 'third path of development' that would be neither 'capitalist', nor an imitation of the socialist models of the USSR and China. Their rejection of Marxism was tempered with considerations of varying kinds: they sometimes saw Marxism as the descendant of European culture and incompatible with their own people's value systems (and religious conviction, Islam, Hinduism or the peculiarities of negritude); sometimes they were merely fearful of losing their independence (Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, denounced by Tito, was on show to fuel their fear); sometimes they were more drawn by the Western model of efficiency and consumption, or freedom (although the latter was less highly valued), than by the Soviet and Chinese models (less efficient or too austere and so on). Out of these ambiguous attitudes were to emerge perhaps the ideologies of particular socialisms' (for example, African, Arab).

'Particular socialisms' or 'particular paths to a socialism of universal application'? This is the locus of debate. The question is not yet settled and may be more open today than ever. The - now open - crisis of 'existing socialisms' may in fact cast doubt on the model of a supposedly achieved socialism. But this crisis has gone through stages and indicates only the interaction of different levels of critique.

The Sino-Soviet dispute certainly had two aspects: one national and the other in regard to the social and political view of a plan for society. It cannot be doubted that China, as a potential great power, was not going to leave Moscow the sole responsibility of deciding the strategies and tactics of confrontation with the United States. It suspected the USSR of being too susceptible of sacrificing the interests of other peoples for its own, whereas Peking was convinced that the 'socialist revolution' was on the agenda in the 'storm zones', that is, the Third World. At the same time, Maoism felt bound to make a critique of the Soviet model of development and embark on an alternative path and an approach that would not reproduce the models of labour organization, consumption and the Western capitalist way of life, by replacing capital ownership with state ownership.

The subsequent arguments, polemics, realities and evolutions make it possible now to have a clearer picture of the divergences and diagnostics of the problems. But opinions and theorizations will go on producing different pictures of the Soviet and Chinese systems that call themselves socialist, of the genuine problems encountered in historical construction (development of the forces of production and new social relations), the emerging gap between the results achieved so far and the idea of socialism (especially Marx's idea), the ideological roots of these evolutions (the historical limitations of Leninism and Maoism as regards the state, the relationship with an avant-garde party, the avant-garde and the people, and so forth), and the effects of these evolutions on the world socialist movement and its integration in world politics and so on.

These realities call for a consideration of the hiatus in the leftist nationalism of Bandung, for subtle judgement and a refusal to utter 'condemnations' in the name of some absolute values supposedly achieved in nearly perfect, or truly perfect models. But they call, too, for a critical approach to the propositions of 'particular socialisms'. The latter have not proved themselves to be a step forward in the solution of problems facing the so-called socialist societies. On the contrary, they have reproduced the shortcomings of the latter, sometimes to the point of caricature: the single party (sometimes with only a paper existence), absolute power, contempt for democracy and basic human rights, without such faults bringing any compensation in terms of economic (or military) efficiency. The ease with which such efforts are overturned revealed by experience justifies some severity on this score.

There was a Bandung plan, albeit implicit and vague, that might be described as the 'bourgeois national plan for the Third World in our age. Although it has particular forms and national characteristics it could be defined as follows: (i) the desire to develop the forces of production and diversify products (namely industrialize); (ii) the desire to ensure for the

national state direction and control of the process; (iii) the belief that 'technical' models provide 'neutral' data that can only be copied, albeit by mastering them; (iv) the belief that the process does not primarily require popular initiative but merely popular acquiescence in state action; (v) the belief that the process is not essentially in contradiction with participation in exchanges with the world capitalist system, even if the process does provoke occasional clashes with it.

The context of capitalist expansion in the 1955-70 period to some extent encouraged crystallization of the plan. But by what criteria is the success of the bourgeois national plan to be judged? Certainly not the apparent criterion of per capita income.

The implementation of the national bourgeois plan implies a series of controls by the hegemonic national bourgeois class, through the state, at least over the following processes: (i) control of reproduction of labour power, which entails a fairly complete and balanced development such that local agriculture can supply the essential ingredients of this quantitative reproduction and at appropriate prices to bring a return on capital; (ii) control of national resources; (iii) control of local markets and the capacity to penetrate the world market on competitive terms; (iv) control of financial machinery to ensure centralization of the surplus and a say in its productive use; (v) control of the technologies in use to the relevant level of development of the forces of production.

On this basis the Third World experiences can be classified under two headings: countries that have attempted no more than to speed up growth without worrying about the foregoing conditions (Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, among others) and the long list of countries that have attempted to fulfill those conditions (for example, Nasser's Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania, India, Brazil, South Korea). As can be seen the classification does not necessarily distinguish regimes concerned for a measure of social justice and reform, especially land reform (such as Nasser's Egypt or South Korea) from those which have had no hesitation in accepting widening social inequalities (Brazil for example). It does not necessarily distinguish attitudes in regard to transnational capital (Brazil and Kenya are both open to it but the former seeks to relate the capital to its national policy, whereas the latter is happy to adjust to capital's demands), nor even the issue of political relations of contestation or alliance with East and West. Some correlations can be found but the make-up in terms of conjunctures makes each Third World country a special case.

Putting aside the variety of the experience it can be seen that the most coherent achievements have occurred when an acute nationalist combat is

combined with a powerful social movement. Nasser's Egypt was certainly one of the best examples of this.

It is no longer possible to ignore the shortcomings of these attempts that have not withstood the vagaries of fortune. The agricultural and food crisis, the foreign debt, the mounting technological dependence, the poor capacity to withstand military aggression, the arrival of the capitalist models of conspicuous waste and the effect of this on ideology and culture are all signs of the historical limitations of the attempt. Even before the current crisis brought an opportunity for a 'Western offensive' to reverse the changes, the shortcomings had already brought things to a halt. This is not to say that the experiences were bound to stop short where they did and that their 'failure' was inevitable. We should argue that to go any further, a genuine 'revolution' was crucial, one that would destroy the double illusion of national development unless it arose from genuinely popular authority, and the possibility of any such development without 'delinking' from the world system. It is not to say that some evolution in this direction was possible in this or that instance, in Egypt for example. It did not happen and now history has moved on.

It is in this sense that we say the plan warrants the description as a bourgeois national plan: and meanwhile it has been found to be impossible. In the same way history has shown that in our day the national bourgeoisie is incapable of achieving what it has done elsewhere, in Europe. North America and 19th century Japan. This thesis is no novelty and it is not the first failure of the attempt in question. Again to give just one example, Egypt's history since Mohamed Ali is one of a succession of bourgeois national attempts smashed each time by the combination of their internal fragility and imperialist aggression: in their own way Mohamed Ali, Khedive Ismail, Orabi (if his revolution has been successful), the Wafd achieved a great deal, in the context of their times, with the means that the modalities of formation of the Egyptian bourgeoisie offered within the framework of the overall capitalist system of the day; their imprint remains strong and in some respects the changes they made are irreversible. But it has to be acknowledged that their failure opened the way each time to a 'compradorization' of Egypt in the style of the time.

No more needs to be said. A study of other Third World countries and regions would in our opinion illustrate the same thesis: an unbroken succession of national bourgeois attempts, repeated abortions and surrender to the demands of the subordination that has followed each time in Latin America since the 19th century (to mention only the most recent examples of the Mexican revolution in the 1910s to 1920s and Peronist Argentina), in India (whose evolution from Nehru's 'first plan' to the return of the right to

government after Congress's first failure is eloquent), and in numerous Arab and African countries.

The post-Second World War circumstances were unusually favourable. At the economic level the North's strong economic growth made 'adjustment' in the South easier. At the political level the peaceful coexistence emerging from the growth of Soviet industrial and military power (from the first Sputnik space flight to the 'strategic balance' achieved in the 1960s to 1970s) in combination with the decline of the former British and French colonialism and the upsurge of the Afro-Asian independence struggles gave the Soviet alliance real effectiveness.

Successes are always crowned with disappointment. An illusion of 'gradual' and virtually painless evolution towards socialism was fostered by the formulation of the theory of the so-called 'non-capitalist road'. Of course this theory did not convince everybody. China denounced it forcefully in the 1960s as an opiate intended to lull the peoples to sleep and damp down the explosions in the 'storm zones'. Che Guevarism tried to counter it with immediate military revolution.

History has now moved on again. Since the early 1970s, the West's economic boom has been smothered to give way to the structural crisis under way, while competition between Europe, Japan and the United States took over from reconstruction under American protection. In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's promises - to overtake American living standards in 1989 - and the attempts at rapid democratization in the wake of the 20th Congress gave way to Brezhnev's stick-in-the-mud, timid and ineffectual reforms to overcome the management crisis of a system faced with the challenge of moving from extensive to intensive accumulation. Gorbachev's initiatives may mark a new departure, but it is early days to judge their extent and effectiveness.³ In China, the about-turn following Mao's death showed that neither the issue of economic efficiency nor of democracy have found their 'definitive' response. Throughout the Third World the food crisis (to the extreme of chronic famine in Africa), the foreign debt crisis and the standstill of imported technology have brought a series of surrenders to the dictates of transnational capital, organized around the Paris and London Clubs, the IMF, the World Bank and the consortium of the large Western banks. In the radically inclined countries, *coups d'état* and military aggression (the 1967 war was no chance) have largely contributed to halting the experiences under way. The Bandung era is past.

The axis of the new world conjuncture is Western capitalist aggression against the Third World peoples, with the aim of subordinating their further evolution to the demands of redeployment of transnational capital.

Is this a painful but passing phenomenon that must necessarily be followed by a new blossoming of 'national bourgeois' advances? Or is it a historical turning point that will no longer allow the following of these successive national bourgeois plans characteristic of at least a century of recent history? This is where the real debate on the character of the challenges and the options for the future lies.

The battle for a new international economic order (NIEO): 1974-1980

From the late 1960s to the early 1970s (before the 'oil crisis' of 1973-74), the world system entered a long period of structural crisis from which we had not emerged some 18 years or so later. A more systematic analysis of the character of this crisis will be offered below (cf. Chapter 8).⁴

The overt crisis of the world system over more than 15 years is evidence of a new dimension to what is at stake in the international division of labour, since the crisis commits all the forces of earth to a great battle that will decide the pattern of international power for generations to come. Shall we see a perpetuation of the polarization between the United States and the USSR? Shall we see a polycentric world of five partners (United States, Europe, Japan, USSR and China)? Or shall we see a polycentric world with a more even balance between the great powers and the regions of the Third World (India, Brazil, Latin America, South-East Asia, the Arab and African world)?

The perspectives opening to Africa and the Third World must be seen in this light. More particularly the issue that arises is as follows: on what axes can the international division of labour evolve in regard to the differing strategies of the powers? What strategies can the Third World regions devise in response to the differing strategies possible?

If we must look ahead and not backwards, identify the changes under way in the international division of labour and study their significance, it is because the history of underdevelopment is one of adjustment by the periphery to mutations and evolutions at the centre. In other words 'development' of the periphery has never allowed it to 'catch up' the centre, since each stage of the centre's evolution has meant a new stage in the international division of labour, and the latter goes on being unequal and assigning the periphery subordinate roles.

We have tried elsewhere to trace this history of stages in unequal international specialization, particularly for Africa, in regard to the stages of the constitution and evolution of the world capitalist system. For the Third

World as a whole we have come to an end of certain characteristics of the previous periods, but not so in the majority of African countries; these characteristics are mainly subordination of the periphery in the role of suppliers of raw materials and agricultural crops, then import substitution industrialization for the local market (a market distorted by unequal income distribution engendered by the previous stages). The next stage may be accelerated industrialization of the periphery for exports to the centre, through the dumping on the periphery of light and heavy 'classic' industries, and concentration at the centre of new industries as the basis for a renewed model of accumulation: atomic and solar energy, space, genetic engineering and synthetic food production, exploration of the seabed, information science.

This new model of distribution of tasks would remain unequal like the previous (surviving) model. The very logic of the system, the reason for dumping classic industries on the periphery is the possibility of exploiting manpower that is cheap not only in absolute terms but also relative terms, that is in comparison with the productivity of the labour it can supply.

The battles fought during the 1970s were over control of this new international division of labour in prospect. The bourgeoisies of the periphery understanding of their proposals for a new international economic order was that they would participate as partners worthy of the name, whereas the multinationals had an opposing concept of industrial relocation entirely controlled by worldwide capital.

The development of the so-called newly industrializing countries, particularly in east Asia, which did accelerate in this period, was part of this logic. Concentration of clusters of industries in certain parts of the periphery led to the question being raised of possible candidates in Africa. In this context a country can attract multinational companies' capital provided it can already offer a numerous proletariat, skilled cadres - at least of intermediate level - and some capital (to provide the necessary infrastructure and later finance the establishment of industry properly speaking) and as long as the multinational companies retain control of operations through a monopoly of technology and market influence. Few African countries fulfil these conditions, with the exception of South Africa. But the great oil producers (Algeria in particular) and the few countries less heavily populated and more advanced in urbanization and secondary and university education (Egypt primarily and then perhaps Nigeria and Morocco) did seem potential candidates.

One topic of debate of the time was the character of these potential 'sub-imperialisms'. Such 'sub-imperialism' is characterized by the concentration of

exports of capital and technology from the centre, intended to enable the beneficiary to export classic industrial products to the centre and secondarily to the less favoured areas of the periphery and by this means to cover dues to the centre on capital and technology. The concentration of classic industries in these countries, combined with the high rates of exploitation of their proletariats, would enable the bourgeois 'sub-imperialists' to benefit from a sufficient share in the surplus to ensure the system's economic and political balance. If ambiguities and false issues are to be avoided in this debate, it is absolutely essential to give up the unfortunate expression 'cub-imperialism' that first came into use to describe the phenomenon of Brazil, as the expression is a poor description of the new stage in the unequal development of the periphery. The reference to imperialism suggests the export of capital, whereas in fact the 'sub-imperialisms' under discussion are importers, just as they import their technology from the centre. The significant point is agreement on content, namely the position occupied by the countries in the new international division of labour. The expression 'conveyor belt' or 'lumpen-development' would, in our opinion, be more appropriate.

The outlook implies a sharpened differentiation within the Third World. The cleavages already apparent in Africa (coastal countries and the so-called 'less developed' of the interior) are accentuated by this new factor. The great majority of African countries are still typically colonial in their economic and social structures, based on a colonial trade economy, as the 'development' policies pursued since independence have done no more than continue those implemented before the 1960s. But it was possible at the time to believe that some countries in Africa were in a position to play the role taken on by others elsewhere: Mexico and Brazil in Latin America, Iran in the Middle East, India in south Asia, Korea in east Asia.

At the time and in contrast to the prospects of the world system's reorganization, certain African countries insisted on their determination for autonomous, self-reliant, and 'socialist' development. Under the circumstances they could do no more than express a more or less serious political intention, as there had been no change in the economic and social structures: or go forward with the initiation of new social patterns characterized by internal class alliances in contradiction with the position offered the country in the international division of labour - whether that inherited from the previous stages or that in prospect.

The prospect of the new international division of labour was scarcely encouraging. For the conveyor belt countries it could mean no more than a kind of 'lumper development', marked by rising unemployment and immiserization of the masses, for the other countries a status of 'cub-colony'

and a worsening of their situation as was already to be seen in the Sahel region hit by famine, and for the cause of African unity a step backwards that might be irrecoverable.

To the degree that the 'rationalist' social patterns entered into contradiction with this outlook, it was possible to envisage an 'alternative strategy'. This proposed to compel the North to adjust to the demands of the NIEO and by this means institute a transition that could still be called socialist, with its own social aims (full employment, education, social justice). Algeria under Boumedienne's government seemed to be leading this group of countries. It must, however, be understood that so long as dependence on technology and access to external markets are not challenged, the institute of transition to socialism remains vulnerable. Here, Egypt's experience should be considered. At the level of industrialization Egypt was by far the most advanced African country. Egyptian industry, entirely nationalized, was well ahead of that in any other country on the continent. The internal social relations peculiar to Nasser's Egypt explain why these nationalizations were not accompanied by more radical challenges as to the destination and type of product, the technologies, and so on. The result was a blockage in this type of development, contradictory only in part with the international division of labour. This blockage (how was imported technology to be paid for, how could further industrialization be financed) led to the about-turn we know of, indicating the surrender of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to the dictates of world capitalism and of its American component in particular.

The actual changes that ensued, especially after 1980, dashed the hopes of the earlier years. Not only were the claims of the NIEO rejected, but also there was virtually no redeployment. The Reaganite counter-attack, aimed at restoring the threatened US hegemony, led to Western unity, albeit transitorily, and to the West's lining up as a whole against the Third World. A strategy of 'recompradorization' of the latter replaced the collective negotiations and concessions. Under the hammer blows of the 'preadjustment' offensive imposed by the IMF, taking advantage of Third World debt, the nationalist regimes surrendered one by one. But the widespread recompradorization did not prevent further differentiation within the Third World. We shall come back to the significance of this in Chapter 7. In our view the so-called newly industrializing countries are the real periphery of today and tomorrow, while the others - 'delinked by default' - are passively undergoing the fate of the 'fourth world' as it is called nowadays. This sad outlook for the greater part of the African continent, and one that tempers the extent of the seeming 'economic successes' of the countries appearing to be exceptions to the rule, is not surprising. It should come as a surprise only to those who fail to understand that the process of

the worldwide expansion of capitalism is not solely a process of development but likewise a process of destruction.

All these negative evolutions have wiped out past hopes in a positive drawing together of the European, Arab and African worlds within the prospect of rebuilding a polycentric, balanced world conducive to better development of the Third World. We shall return to this striking move backwards and the political regression that has occurred north and south of the Mediterranean and the Sahara (cf. Chapter 4).

Structural costs; the stakes; the struggle for the NIEO

The claims by Third World states for a 'New International Economic Order' formed a coherent whole whose logic was perfectly comprehensible. Substantial and sustained rises in raw materials prices, strengthened by a debt reduction and more favourable conditions for the transfer of technology, were the method par excellence of improving the financial prospects of a new stage of Third World industrialization. This industrialization, based on what conventional wisdom regards as 'comparative advantages', was conceived on the dual basis of relatively cheap manpower and natural resources allowing for exports to the developed world in an expanded network of world trade. The opening up of developed countries' markets to the export of the manufactures of the Third World would, according to the conventional wisdom, serve the collective interest by making the international division of labour more responsive to the source of inputs. Furthermore, industrial exports would help bridge the Third World food gap through imports replacing aid.

The rise in oil prices at the end of 1973 strengthened the credibility of this programme by showing that it was possible to secure alternative prices for raw materials, and that these were certainly not 'unbearable' for the developed world. It showed that the financial resources generated in this way could be devoted to an acceleration of industrialization in the beneficiary countries. In this sense, October 1973 marks a turning point in the history of international relations, the moment of consciousness of the Third World countries not *of* their rights but of their power.

It was, therefore, a programme in total accordance with all the sacrosanct principles defended by Western liberal orthodoxy. A programme taking greater heed than ever of the objectives of world economic interdependence and seeking to place this on a footing of comparative advantages. A programme that should have been shaped and proposed by the economics professors in the most conservative institutions rather than by the

governments who had constantly been lambasted by those institutions for their bent to 'nationalism', a supposedly obsolete philosophy contrary to the interests of their peoples. It is an irony of history that the initiative came from the 'rationalist' Third World and was unanimously rejected by the apostles of the principles on which it was based!

The claim of the NIEO coincided with the most serious post-war crisis. It was even argued that the oil price rise - the first (and as yet sole) indicator of the implementation of the Third World programme for the NIEO - was the 'cause' of the crisis. A veritable campaign was orchestrated on this theme in 1973 and 1974, using every kind of argument and despite all the facts: the beginning of the international monetary crisis and the appearance of US external deficits since the mid-1960s, the precedence of stagflation, the scale and persistence of inflation rates irrespective of the calculable increase attributable to oil, the (still massive) placing of oil revenues on the Western finance markets, the modest role of petro-dollars in comparison with the movable assets of the transnationals in speculative fluctuations, and so on. The campaign has of necessity long hung fire: erosion of the oil price in the 1980s and the reversal of the conjuncture ('the end of the era of OPEC') have never allowed it any funkier take-off.

The fact is, that the crisis has its main origin in the international division of labour in force, that challenged by the claims of the NIEO. We should remember that the former international division of labour confined the developing countries to the export of (agricultural and mineral) primary products, as their (import substitution) industrialization was strictly limited to their domestic market. This international division of labour was one of the bases on which the continuing prosperity of the previous quarter of a century was built. A prosperity confined, if truth be told, to the developed centres of the system. If the centres at the time in question enjoyed a high level of employment, continual growth in productivity and comparable growth in wages, for the underdeveloped peripheries and their growth rates the same mechanisms that give rise elsewhere to full employment and growth in real wages produced a continual rise in unemployment and underemployment, stagnation, or a fall in real wages and the rewards for rural producers; there the crisis was permanent. Only from the 1970s did the crisis begin to spread throughout the world system, that is, to pass to the developed centres as well.

If this is the case the best way to overcome the crisis would be to change the ground rules of the international division of labour and accept the claims of the Third World. It must be obvious that export industrialization in the Third World would provide work for a substantial number of the Third World's unemployed, create new outlets for the machine tools of the

developed world and correct the imbalances in the profitability of various industrial sectors, since the falling rate of profit shown by the crisis arises from the inappropriateness of the current international division of activity.

Such measures to revise the international division of labour serve only to highlight the economic logic of the system. Here lies its logical strength and current weakness. Since: a) the world system cannot be reduced to a simple 'pure' economic logic, namely maximization of profit on a world scale, without regard to the division of the world into nations, the locus of operation of essential and immediate political forces; and b) the crisis cannot be surmounted except by implementation in a co-ordinated and systematic manner of the new international division of labour, nor is this the 'beet' solution in the light of national factors, nor is this solution the most 'probable'.

Peaceful, co-ordinated and systematic implementation of a new international division of labour might be the dream of a technocrat with a single purpose: the maximization of profit. Oddly enough the Third World states have behaved like this collective technocrat, while the Western authorities, apostles par excellence of the philosophy of profitability, have recoiled from the logical consequences of their own philosophy and rejected the industrial relocation that was on offer.

Accordingly, the internal logic of the programme for the NIEO reflected the contradictory character of capital accumulation on a world scale. To some extent the programme was initially a scheme to deepen the international division of labour through a levy on the rate of surplus value (super-exploitation of labour power at the periphery) it would have permitted a rising rate of profit on the world scale (and at this level looked like a programme of capitalist development), but in another way, within the framework of this common aim of capitalist development, the strategies of the monopolies and the imperialist states and those of the bourgeoisies and the peripheral states would have come into contradiction.

The imperialist monopolies took a narrow view of the 'new order'. To them it meant taking greater profit from the cheap manpower and natural resources of the Third World, by relocating segments of the production processes they themselves controlled. Under this strategy relocation was not aimed at creating integrated national industrial economies in the Third World, however outward-looking. On the contrary, the interest of the monopolies was in exporting discrete segments in such a way as to retain control over economic life as a whole on the world scale. In this framework the monopolies could make small concessions to the 'host countries', or even in extreme cases renounce formal ownership of the capital. Competition, the

absence of integration of the segments, their technological dependence, such as the obligation to sell their output on the oil-rich markets controlled by the monopolies, all reduced the meaning of formal ownership of the capital; the monopolies could impose very harsh conditions on their partners. It was *laissez-faire* on the scale of a world under monopoly domination. In such circumstances, even the financing of the relocation through the Third World countries' own means could bring an additional benefit to the monopolies as vendors of turnkey factories. This profitable exaction was in effect included in the pricing structure. Meanwhile the exaction could be enlarged through visible financial transfers by way of technology sales, licenses and trade marks, and through interest on loans for plant expansion. Sometimes even the pricing structure was distorted to remove the apparent profitability from the segments transferred: loans supposed to make good 'management deficits' are nothing less than resurrected forms of capitalism's perennial tendency to plunder. Financial neo-capital, in imitation of the old mercantilist capital, appeared anew, as at the dawn of capitalism: 'primitive' accumulation is always with us.

This strategy has its own name - and not by chance - of 'redeployment'. It has the active support of the World Bank, the IMF and other institutions of the developed capitalist states, and wins acceptance as a 'new order' for the new enclaves of the 'free zone' kind. Obviously the strategy reduces to a minimum the local state's role, which becomes a mere administration policing the exploited labour force. It also aims to divide the Third World not only by widening the gap between countries of 'strong growth' and 'stagnant' countries, but also in setting the former to compete against one another.

What the Third World, or at least the driving element among the nonaligned, meant by a new international order was very different. Revision of the international division of labour along the lines described was intended to accompany and implement the establishment of a self-reliant industrial national economy.

The strengthening of the national state, and the active role of state policy were, in this strategy, to ensure that industry was not made up of discrete fragments, but of every stage of the production process. The resort to importation of the ingredients of these production lines (the purchase of turnkey factories) entailed a high level of exports, whether of 'traditional' raw materials or new industrial products. Hence the success of the strategies was largely dependent on the capacity to win concessions, which was in turn the programme for the new international economic order.

The conflict of these two 'interpretations' of the new order has appeared in all the negotiations on the industrial international division of labour and

relocation. The points of discussion were the character and options of establishment, the degree of decentralized decision-making, the methods of financing the transfers, issues of personnel training and management, and access to external markets. The Third World states generally pressed for: the establishment of as complete industries as possible, with upstream and downstream links, agreed rules subjecting the management of industrial units to the state's industrial policy, an option for management of units by local staff, access to international distribution networks for manufactured goods to localized firms (as the lowering of protectionist barriers by the developed countries was not regarded as a sufficient guarantee of access to these markets), support for national technological research, regulated financing (to avoid, for example, a subsidiary of a multinational financing its investment by calling on local banking sources without bringing in new capital), regulation of transfers (a sharing of risks, ceilings on exportable profits, obligations to invest part of the profit in the national economy) and so on.

These demands were regarded as unacceptable by the multinationals whose sole interest was in partial relocation through subsidiaries under their virtual control.

Gradually, most of the Third World states have had to come to terms with the redeployment strategy. The only states in a position to negotiate are those that refuse the direct establishment of subsidiaries and seek an alternative in the purchase of turnkey factories within the framework of their overall industrialization policy.

The strategy of these states counted on the possibility of successful change of the international order through unilateral joint action, and through further action from North-South collective negotiations. The idea, it should be remembered, was to organize cartels of Third World producers who could insist on price revisions for raw materials. National control over natural resources should allow scope for manoeuvre not only on supply, but also and above all on exploitation of the resources that took into account long-term national interests and halted the rates of exploitation governed entirely by the needs of the developed world. With this new-found strength, the Third World countries hoped to enjoy a genuine negotiating power that would oblige the North to make concessions: for instance, access to its markets, a code of conduct for transfers of technology. Co-operation between Third World countries ('collective self-reliance') was part of this bid for strength (cf. Chapter 7).

This is the essential context for discussing the use of oil surpluses. On some views the NIEO was to be no more than the rise in oil prices alone and the

relocation of export industry a minor operation. On this view the oil revenue surpluses should be made available to the developed financial markets to supply their own policies of intervention in relations between developed countries, and marginal support for the 'survival' of the old international division of labour in the developing countries. This rescued the attitude of 'aid' as a permanent safety-valve ensuring the perpetuation of a system that was increasingly unjust day by day. The actual use of oil surpluses has in fact served this purpose (cf. Chapter 6).

In the mid-1970s there was still the hope that the Third World would reject this narrow view. The non-aligned movement and the group of 77 were seeking a strategy for collective battle for across the board increases in raw materials prices, as the resolution on the solidarity fund and producers associations taken at Dakar in February 1977 showed. This strong and valid approach was not sustained. Under the pressure of the developed countries and the bias of UNCTAD and endless 'negotiation' and 'dialogue', the 'stabilization' fund strategy replaced that of producers associations for collective unilateral intervention where such was required.

So, in the end, the battle for the NIEO was lost. As well as the failure being noted, the causes have to be studied. Are they purely circumstantial (in the economic crisis)? Can they be attributed to 'tactical errors' by the Third World (its own divisions and weaknesses)? Or do these circumstances and weaknesses show the impossibility of autocentric development at the periphery of the modern capitalist system? We shall return to these fundamental issues (cf. Chapter 8).

This failure being so, what has actually happened? Relocation advances at tortoise-like pace, heightening differentiation with the Third World, feeding the illusion of possible compromise between the bourgeois national plan and integration in the world system for some, and marginalization for others. The seeming successes of Korea, Brazil and India have forced the collective plan of the NIEO into the background. We shall return to these successes (cf. Chapters 6 and 7) to assess their character and extent.

Africa: from the Lagos plan (1980) to the world bank plan and the United Nations Conference (1986)

Few now remember the Lagos Plan of Action, adopted by the OAU summit in 1980, in the tracks of the euphoria that five years earlier had marked the Third World's adoption of a charter for a 'new international economic order'.⁵

Once the euphoria of the early 1960s was over, the tares of colonial development suddenly resuscitated by the newly independent regimes were not slow to sprout. Then 15 years of systematic efforts by some to bring to Africa the concept of autocentric development were at last to find a response. The whole strength of the Lagos Plan lay in the fact that it was based on this masterfully simple idea that Africa's development could not be merely a passive result of the world system's or evolution of the European Economic Community, to which the continent's states had been bound by the association named after the agreements of Yaoundé and Lomé. The explicit option for a new, self-reliant development strategy arose from this crucial idea.

But the Lagos Plan did not draw the conclusions implied in the logic of this option. It was satisfied with the easy part of the task, namely showing how this option did make it possible to overcome the handicaps of extraversion. In this spirit the Lagos Plan set itself the target of strong growth (7% a year) based on a genuine agricultural revolution (4% annual growth) and subsequent industrialization (9.5% annual growth). At the same time, it declared the aim of economic and even cultural and social integration for the continent.

As soon as we move from intentions to a consideration of the means of implementation, however, we find the weaknesses of the plan. These were manifest in the 'technical' method employed to calculate the 'means' in question. The calculation, starting from projection of demand, then used known technologies and a tabulation of input and output to define the desirable structure of production. Hence could be deduced the amount of investment and imports needed and consequently the corresponding exports demanded. A routine methodology, whose reputation for 'neutrality' in relation to the aims is certainly vouched for by the planners. But the methodology is not neutral: it assumes the given demand and hence reproduces the distortions in the specific income distribution of peripheral capitalism, along with the negative effects of the imported model of consumption; it accepts the structure of world prices as the criterion for economic rationality, although this structure reproduces the dual polarization between the centres and the peripheries and in income distribution within the peripheral societies.

Little wonder that the use of this methodology brought results in direct contradiction with the declared principle of autocentric development. The Plan's calculations were based on imports growing faster than the GDP (8% a year for imports) and a significant contribution from foreign capital (since exports were to grow at the rate of GDP, 7% a year). The Lagos Plan,

despite its declaration of principle, was a classic plan for development by way of greater integration in the world economy.

The genuine implementation of the principle of autocentric development implies very different reasoning that has the nerve to challenge the criteria of economic rationality observed by conventional economics.

Without dwelling at great length here on the details of an alternative methodology consistent with the option of autocentric development, it may be recalled that this option requires the determination of a pricing structure delinked from that governed by the worldwide law of value, such that it ensures approximately equal rewards for labour in the various sectors of production (and therefore substantially reduces the gap between town and countryside, industry and modern informal sectors, and so on). On this basis of a national and popular economic rationality it may be possible to formulate development policies whose benefits can really bring improved standards of living to the broad mass of the people (cf. Chapter 5).

Priority for agriculture must come within this framework, as was shown earlier in the critique offered of the prevailing concepts of agricultural development. Similarly industrialization within this framework must be industrialization in support of the agricultural revolution, at least as a prolonged first stage.

In these areas the Lagos Plan was content to wage a rearguard action against the colonial onslaught of the World Bank. For example, it correctly defends the principle of industrialization that had been challenged on the grounds of conflicting with agricultural development! This is a throwback to the old colonial prejudice of an Africa 'naturally agricultural', as if agricultural development was really possible without industrialization, and contrary to the whole of the world's history. In the same way the Lagos Plan correctly defends the principle of basic industry. But it stops there and fails to challenge the mundane model of industrialization followed on the continent so far. It is obvious that the industrialization required is not an industrialization on all fronts, undefined and general and mainly for import substitution and exports through the processing of mineral resources. The spurious argument about export industry or import substitution industry has obscured the real argument. The Lagos Plan could not escape from a view of industrialization subordinate to the demands of the international division of labour. By adopting the UNIDO industrialization plan (the Lima targets: a 2% share of world industrial output for Africa by the year 2000), plus the plans of the

African states, the Lagos document demonstrated both a disturbing lack of imagination and a low level of consciousness of the character of the option of self-reliance.

This is all the more serious since the Lagos Plan is still within the area of exploitation of natural resources, and the traditional colonial and neo-colonial view of Africa as a 'source of supply' for the development of others. It is not enough that the very concept of control over natural resources is overlooked (and from this point of view the Lagos document is a step backwards in comparison with the concepts of the NIEO), that the Lagos document naively declares its confidence in the multinationals developing these resources(!) and hopes that the African states will show a united front in their shared demands, but also and principally that the Lagos Plan envisages the exploitation of Africa's resources on the basis of world demand. On the energy issue, however, we note that the Lagos Plan did try to avoid the narrow and fruitless discussion of 'oil costs'.

We are brought back to the central issue of foreign trade. Development 'within the world system' (in fact based on further integration with it) does come from worldwide demand and hence always seeks to maximize exports in line with that demand. Conversely, autocentric development regards foreign trade as a remainder. It begins with a calculation of essential imports for each stage of the implementation of the autocentric strategy, and on the basis of this figure sets the level of export needed to finance imports. This approach leads to the conclusion that the maximization of exports of mineral resources is often not only useless but also dangerous because of the distortion and increased dependency it brings.

Other aspects of the Lagos Plan's development strategy are treated in the same way, in contradiction with the declared option of self-reliance. This is the case for the issue of technology, perceived simply as acquisition of technologies in use in the West. In this regard the plan is caught in the trap of the old argument on the technology said to be 'appropriate' to the factors of production, as it confuses the role of technological research with the problems of management. It does likewise with education, whose objectives are defined in purely quantitative terms without serious regard to the alienation it may bring; without any consideration of the changes necessary to keep pace with autonomous scientific and technological development; with transport and communication no more than a cumulative list of national projects. As for comments on environmental and feminist issues, they take the form of wishful thinking additions to fall in with current fashion.

The obvious result is that the Lagos Plan concludes with a giant 'finance gap'. When the UN General Assembly at its special session in 1986 came to

consider the extent of foreign aid required, we were back to square one, as such aid was unimaginable in the prevailing circumstances.

In short, the Lagos Plan, despite its declaredly 'self-reliant' intentions, despite its strong criticism of the colonial and neo-colonial heritage, could not escape the conventional methodology closely associated with the conventional strategy of peripheral capitalist development. Its technical and institutional

(not to mention bureaucratic) approach - whereby for each 'problem' area the plan proposes the establishment of a Pan-African organization to deal with it (!) - its naive view of African integration through 'the common market' (in contradiction with historical experience showing that the market can only aggravate inequalities between the regions it incorporates), its astonishing silence on the identification of the agents of change (states, or private enterprises, and which ones) and on the structures of economic power in Africa, are clear indicators of the unresolved conflict between praiseworthy intentions and the possible ways and means.

This might seem harsh criticism. It may be tempered by reference to numerous positive and passing aspects of the document, but unfortunately the latter do not make up for the overall line of thinking pursued.

The question of development strategy for Africa, as for the Third World, is complex and ambiguous. Should development be conceived in accordance with the demands of the international order, or conversely, is it necessarily in conflict with it? Can the international order be transformed and 'adjusted' to the priority demands for Third World development, or conversely can the latter only be the result of the reverse 'adjustment'? The merit of the NIEO proposals was that they raised these issues without prejudice. The NIEO was trying to be both 'realistic' and 'optimistic'. It accepted that the, inescapable demands of autocentric development were not necessarily in total conflict with 'worldwide interdependence'. It therefore proposed a transformation in the international order conducive to a reconciliation of interests, to the advantage of all.

The facts have shown that this view was based on a naive illusion as to the laws governing existing world capitalism. The West's categorical rejection of the NIEO proposals has brought about first a resumption of the development initiative by the agencies charged with implementing traditional Western ideas, and second a range of attempted 'compromises' falling back from the NIEO plan.

The World Bank's 1980 plan for sub-Saharan Africa, drafted by the North American expert Elliot Berg is a typical example of the former. This plan, directly following the principles of Reaganite orthodoxy, seeks merely to legitimize the maximum demands of worldwide capital, as was shown above.

Whatever the deep contradictions, shortcomings and naivetés of the Lagos Plan, it was more realistic, less ideological and even more soundly scientific (notwithstanding the inadequacies of its methodology) than the virtually skimmed work of the World Bank. But the powers that be in the world exchequer are such that the Lagos Plan, far from being a point of departure, was soon buried, while the World Bank's language became the leitmotiv of official policies.

Undoubtedly, the international conjuncture was altogether unpromising as the NIEO proposals were rejected even as a basis of discussion. The Europe of the EEC, with its special responsibility for Africa, inherited from colonialism, then came to the fore. The Lagos Plan had refrained from even discussing the structures of overall power accompanying the association conventions of the ACP and EEC, presumably to avoid hurting feelings beyond the Mediterranean. The inadequate aid projected within the framework of association (here, too, the Lagos Plan refrained from making any judgement on the structures of power associated with so-called 'co-operation'), the inadequate resources available to stabilize agricultural products, with Stabex unable to withstand a deep and prolonged crisis, the even more dubious character of the Sysmin mechanism, which enshrines the control of worldwide capital over the continent's principal resources, encouraged reformist circles, such as those the Brandt Commission aroused briefly, to offer modest corrective solutions. The latter have been no better received than the earlier, more radical, proposals of the NIEO.

The new language of South-South co-operation was, in the circumstances, an ambiguous advance. Undoubtedly the national and popular policies for self-reliance had every interest in mutual reinforcement through complementary South-South co-operation, if only to offset the difficulties of a too restricted market in the smaller countries, or modest amounts of such and such a resource in other cases, for example. But in the absence of a genuine autocentric option at national levels, South-South co-operation meant very little. As we shall see in Chapter 6, it was inevitably to become a complement to the North-South inequalities against which it was aimed. Despite these inevitable limitations in the current situation, genuine co-operation efforts such as Afro-Arab cooperation (cf. Chapter 6) and the establishment of the South-South Commission may be useful investments that could bear fruit later when the current wave of 'compradorization' has exhausted its disastrous impact.

The collapse of the bourgeois national plan in the Third World, combined with the eclipse of the national and popular forces exposed by this failure, created favourable conditions for an offensive by the most reactionary forces, symbolized by the IMF and World Bank.

In the light of this offensive the Western ideological currents not hostile to Third World peoples were entirely disarmed, at least for the time being. This no doubt explains why to date they have offered nothing more than proposals representing pious hopes.

The first Brandt Report shares the general philosophy - of which its very sub-title, 'A Programme for Survival', is a reminder - according to which interdependence is synonymous with the shared interests of partners. What has to be saved is therefore this threatened 'global interdependence'. The world system must be maintained, and the various national societies must find their role and fit their development to the overall development of the system. The entire report, recommendations and analyses (or more precisely lack of analyses) are based on this option. The hypothesis that the common interest prevails over the conflict of interests leads inevitably to the language of pious hopes: we quote what the world's governments would like...

History offers too many denials of this philosophy for its continued acceptance: (i) since history to date has been precisely that of interdependence and asymmetry of this (hence the very expression of interdependence is inaccurate and that of dependence more appropriate); (ii) the history of this unequal development is that of unequal evolution of the power of the partners and hence of a succession of phases of development in the system ('A' phases of overall growth in a system defined by rules-particularly of the division of labour - hierarchies, one or more hegemonies, and so on) and crises, enforced transition from an A1 phase to an A2 phase by B crisis (defined by challenge to the rules and hierarchies); B phases of crisis, demonstrating the conflict of interests and the change wrought by the resolution of the conflicts, are based on the acknowledgement of the new balance of power; (iii) the changes in power relations owe their origin to the cumulative effects of unequal interdependence and internal transformations in societies.

Our period is clearly one of a B phase of crisis. It serves no purpose to deny the conflicts of interest, which are primary, or to treat them as insignificant. This would prevent any understanding.

The remedy for the global crisis that the report proposes is one of world Keynesianism, in Andre Gunder Frank's felicitous turn of phrase. The report

says: 'Advocates of various schemes of "massive transfers" of funds from North to South have argued that such action would amount to a pump-priming of the world economy. We view them as contributing to growth and employment creation in the North as in the South.' (pp. 67-8 of the report).

The NIEO proposals in this regard were better and stronger and without the dubious diversion of the 'large-scale transfers'. The NIEO proposed simply export industrialization from the South to the North, based on low wages and abundant natural resources. This massive relocation of industry would doubtless have raised the global rate of profit. In this area Keynesianism is more simple: it attributes the crisis to insufficiency of demand that may be stimulated by income redistribution. It refrains from going on to the organization of production. The NIEO was aimed directly at the latter. Relocation evidently brings both redistribution of the forces of production, and hence of income, and an increase in the rate of profit. The NIEO moreover, far from begging for additional 'transfer', whose limitations and largely harmful character have been shown in history, envisaged an increase in prices for the traditional exports from the South and the mobilization of the additional resources generated in this way (mining and oil royalties in particular) to finance the new stage of growth without any 'transfers'.

Clearly the partners of the redistribution in question are not the 'peoples', but countries. The NIEO did not make the naive mistake of confusing them. In fact export industrialization based on cheap manpower presupposes: (i) exploited agriculture that supplies the towns with a superabundance of proletarianized labour power and cheap foodstuffs: and (ii) urban unemployment, a poor working class and subordinate middle class. The plan therefore was not one of 'development to the benefit of the poor', but one of capital accumulation. Clearly, too, the partners in the conflict were the ruling classes; the battle for the redistribution in question was between capital in the North and states in the South on the ground of division of an increasing surplus.

The absence of analysis of the causes of the defeat of the states in the South leads the Brandt Report, for each issue dealt with, to propose inadequate, misleading and generally naive solutions, a) The report's recommendation - to accord priority to agriculture - is superficial. Such a priority is unquestionable. But the models of colonial exploitation, founded on the same priority (the colonial trade economy, the concessionary companies and the reserves) are the historical source of the current wretchedness of the African countryside. The 'new' policies (bureaucratic incorporation, kulakization or agro-business - proposed by the World Bank) reducing the food priority to food production plans without questioning the overall policy

of world integration - are bound to aggravate the wretchedness of the peasants.

'Food priority' should mean something very different (i) a challenge to all aspects of the global policy (income distribution, real wages and agricultural prices, taxation and finance, and so forth); (ii) establishment of industries to serve the agricultural priority and not export, or to meet the relevant demand on the basis of existing structures; (iii) autonomy for peasant communities in the conception and execution of their development plans (and this goes much wider than the land reforms proposed in the report); and finally (iv) detachment from the criteria of profitability, on the understanding that the establishment of a national and popular economy and society will be in contradiction with the demands of 'international competition'.

What has been said of agriculture is *mutatis mutandis* also true of other sectors of popular concern: small businesses and crafts serving popular consumption. The Brandt report proposes assistance to the informal sector; it overlooks that this sector, geared as it is to an economy that does not seek to satisfy popular needs, is therefore exploited. Classic language of 'social services' is no substitute for the demands for genuine autonomy for the collective bodies of the people.

Building an economy seeking to satisfy popular needs does certainly require 'internal reforms'. But history and politics show that these reforms are scarcely compatible with the demands of integration in the world system. And why does the report shy away from condemning the policies of 'destabilization' of popular regimes conducted by international powers and institutions such as the IMF?

b) In dealing with the 'less developed' countries the report acts as if it were dealing with a homogeneous group, while a historical analysis has led it to postulate various types of country 'less developed' for differing reasons and tending to their integration in the world system as 'peripheries of peripheries', with some supplying migrant labour (two examples: (1) the second degree trade economy of Burkina Faso in relation to Côte d'Ivoire; or (2) reserves, such as the bantustans or Lesotho) and others foodstuffs (an example: the Sahel countries exporting meat and recently cereals to the Benin coast),

c) The timidity in regard to dominant monopoly capital to be observed in the chapter on trade. Was it not ludicrous to propose common funds and other ways of stabilizing trade without taking account of the failure of negotiations? Why ignore the possibility, entertained in 1975, of forming

cartels of Third World producers? Surely that was the only way to shift the balance of power in favour of the South?

(d) With respect to energy and mineral resources, where Northern interests are at stake, the report suggests only: (i) accelerating the search for mineral resources in the South through a special fund; (ii) that poverty in the South is produced by the high price for oil! But why accelerate the pillage of the natural resources of the South and preserve waste in the North? Why does the report remain silent on the political economy of the mineral rent and its relationship to the international division of labour?

e) On industrialization, the report seems to regard as positive the results obtained in the 'NICs' - the semi-industrialized countries of Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, etc. But it overlooks: (i) that a global strategy of localization would necessarily accentuate the unequal development of the South; (ii) that this strategy was based on repressive social policy; growth in GDP and industrial output is accompanied by a stagnation or fall in workers' pay and peasant incomes; (iii) for this very reason the populations of the NICs do not appear to welcome the proposed model: Iran's Shah fell when there was accelerated growth; the democratic revolution in South Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere directly attacks the model entailing political repression; (iv) that, contrary to the model's suppositions, the priority option for export industry does not improve the external balance; are not the NICs the most heavily indebted of all Third World countries?

f) The report limits its comments on the transnationals virtually to a case for a 'code of conduct'. But is there not a further danger for Third World countries in agreeing to bow to the demands of a new stage in the transnationals' penetration of the world economy by granting it a juridical status it does not yet enjoy?

g) Finally, the report regards international labour migrations as advantageous for both partners. What a mistake, when history has shown that the countries of emigration are for ever being impoverished (consider Ireland which had the same population as England when it was sadly conquered, and the effect of emigration), and that in the exceptional case when a country does develop, it ceases this impoverishing emigration (consider modern Italy and Spain).

Of course, the proposed compromises led nowhere. Africa went on drifting. In their weakened condition the African states surrendered. In these circumstances the UN special session on Africa (1986) produced the sad spectacle of Africa begging for 'aid' to keep the system going without any prospect of development. Naturally the aid did not come. Nor has Africa won

anything in the area of debt relief, the subject of a special African summit in 1987. Africa is the most vulnerable of empty bellies throughout the contemporary Third World.

Latin America in general is characterized by the newly industrializing countries. It also seemed more resistant to the crisis and maintained respectable growth rates in the 1970s, when these were falling in the developed capitalist world and in some other Third World regions, Africa in particular. Latin America believes it can sustain this kind of development, further complementing the range of export industries by a range intended for the local, national and regional markets. It believes this is necessary to maintain access to capital markets and to massive import of technology. It is thereby accepting increased dependence, just as it tends to line up with the developed world on energy policies.

The Arab world (and Iran), although revealing a level of urbanization and industrialization comparable to that of Latin America, has suffered the consequences of its massive but unequally distributed share of oil production. Agricultural weakness (with a reduced and very uneven potential), the Palestine issue, superpower competition in the region, impasses of the political forces in the forefront over three decades, are jumbled up and lead to a fairly chaotic situation.

The NICs in east Asia are threatened by the narrowness of their internal markets and their extreme dependence on the world market, to a greater extent than in Latin America. The maintenance of their economic model may be difficult and the political chaos in South Korea is doubtless not unconnected with the difficulties of 'change-over'. The south and south-east Asian countries, like the whole of Africa, are suffering from the massive impact of the crisis. The collapse of growth and productive investment, like the worsening of public financial and external deficits, is already commonplace.

Africa's situation in general is even more grave since, as has been shown, neither agricultural revolution nor industrialization has really begun. In these circumstances Africa is on the way to being 'marginalized', to undergoing a 'passive delinking'. The modish expression 'fourth world' indicates a 'rediscovery' of the commonplace that the worldwide expansion of capitalism is not synonymous with 'development everywhere', but of development, albeit peripheral in this instance, and destruction in another. Africa, under these circumstances, is bound for such destruction. The real periphery of tomorrow will be the NICs of Asia and America (that is why describing them as 'semiperipheral' is inaccurate, cf. Chapter 6), while the African 'fourth

world' will no longer represent the 'typical periphery', but the last remnants of the periphery of yesterday en route for destruction.

Debt and the threat of a financial crash

The first Brandt Report attached great importance to immediate issues and in particular to the threat of a global financial crash, in connection with world inflation and the galloping increase in the external debt of some countries. Andre Gunder Frank went so far as to suspect that the real aim of the report and of the proposed summit that eventually was held at Cancun - was to examine ways and means of avoiding a financial crash.

The solution, establishing a link between the issue of international liquidities and development aid, envisaged many years ago then dropped, was taken up by the report. This link would make it possible to avoid financial collapse for certain Third World countries whose foreign debt threatened the global balance. This, according to Gunder Frank, was the 'true ground of mutual interest, for states as a whole'. But is a link of this kind possible?

The report's general considerations on the international monetary system seemed naive. The report sought the establishment of a 'fair world monetary system...'. This has never been the case to date. First, there has never been a monetary system except in periods of economic hegemony of a national centre. It was the case in the 19th century, and up to 1914, when the gold (but really sterling) standard corresponded to British hegemony. It was again the case from 1944 (Bretton Woods) to 1971 (suspension of dollar convertibility) while US hegemony lasted. By contrast, during what Arrighi calls 'the 30 years war for the British succession', between the US and Germany from 1914 to 1945, there was no world monetary system but a great deal of chaos. The reason for such chaos, including the 1929 crash, was not that there was no world monetary system, but on the contrary, the fact of their being no world hegemonic power made it impossible to have a world monetary system. With the beginning of the decline of US hegemony, we have once more entered a period of this kind.

Disorder inevitably encourages inflationary pressures; this was the case during the 1914-45 period. It was the case again from the second half of the 1960s, in new guises but for the same basic reason. The crisis began in relations between the dollar and the mark, yen and other European currencies, and not by chance. The United States' incapacity to meet economic responsibilities (decreasing world market competitiveness with Japan and Germany) and political role (the Vietnamese war) led to the fall of the dollar. Artificially boosted by the Reaganite policy of high interest rates, the dollar lost ground again.

Undoubtedly inflation has its internal structural causes relating to the strategy of the monopolies to abandon price competition, and to the social order achieved through 'collective bargaining'. This is why inflation has continued to gallop since 1945. This inflation was bound sooner or later to bring a revaluation of gold, and the readjustment of exchange rates in keeping with the unequal distribution of those rates. But as long as the A phase (1945-70) was in effect, the overall structural balance (including, in general, the balance of payments; never mind the chronic invalid, Great Britain, sustained by the US boss for past services, and a few epidemic invalids in the Third World) ensured the operation of the world monetary system based on US hegemony. When the B phase began the system broke down. In a first phase (1965-80) rising inflation was at a trot, then a gallop, and its rate was increasingly unequal (from 7% to 30% a year); exchange rates fluctuated wildly; gold could no longer be pegged (from 1971) and the yellow metal rose from an official rate of US\$ 35 to the ounce to a henceforth free market rate, around \$600 to \$700 to the ounce with some peaks of nearly \$1.000; the crisis was then accompanied by a new phenomenon: stagflation. It serves no purpose to complain, as Robert Triffin does, of these factors: instability in exchange rates, inadequacy of reserves, the absence of machinery of adjustment: there is no monetarist cure for a disease that originates elsewhere than in the currency. Would the monetarists understand this? Since 1980 rises in domestic prices have been stifled by policies treating this control as an absolute priority, but at the cost of even more pronounced stagnation and a boost to financial speculation.

It must be supposed that there are mechanisms for adjustment. In the A phase there certainly are. This is why the IMF worked on the hypothesis that a country's deficit was due entirely to its national policy. But in the B phase the imbalance is structural and global, and the deficit of some has its counterpart in the surplus of others. It is no longer possible to blame these deficits on 'inadequate' national policies; they are the inevitable counterparts of surpluses that are no less difficult to reabsorb.

Regional or world monetary order - or monetary disorder - reflects the balance of power, or want of balance, between the developed capitalist countries, and not North-South relations; what has actually changed is relations between developed countries. Hence language such as 'specific needs of developing countries' (and the 'link') is ingenuous.

Is the threat of financial crash genuine? or only a bugbear? The failure of a great financial institution can always be avoided if the central bank prefers to come to its rescue (by nationalization) and accepts the ensuing inflation. In 1929 this option was impossible without suspending convertibility. This is not the case nowadays. Certainly the central bank of a given state may

hesitate if it is acting alone, since the resulting acceleration of national inflation would weaken the standing of its currency in relation to others. But has the safeguard not already been put in place by the association in consortia of all the lender countries for any significant international loan? In this case the default of any significant borrower would threaten the entire system and the system therefore behaves with solidarity to avoid the crash.

But who are the borrowers? The countries of the East and the NICs of the Third World. In fact loans provided for these countries are never called in for repayment; the structural surplus of the lenders would forbid this. These loans, even if not always destined for determinate investments, are the modern form of foreign investment. They are intended to show their return through interest payments. They are also used as a means of constant pressure to subject local policies to the wishes of monopoly capital. By the same token an exaction is made on the real income of the Third World. This is why the threat of a crash is more remote than might be thought. Either these countries will go on mortgaging their independence (and their income) through indefinite pursuit of this kind of development, and all will be well; or, through political change, they will refuse to repay and, as in previous historical situations, will be able to do so to the degree that they are subjected to reprisals driving them into national or collective autarky. In that case the central banks associated with the lending centres will come to the rescue of their own 'victims'.

The threat of a crash comes from elsewhere: the erratic flows of liquidities held by the transnationals (rather than by the oil-producer countries) and observing only the rules of short-term speculation. In this regard the supporters of floating exchange rates have acted to the advantage of the speculators, but to the detriment of the collective interest in avoiding disaster. Hence perhaps after so much infatuation with the Milton Friedman school, for reasons of ideological alienation linked to the neo-liberal revival, the West's monetary and political authorities have begun to revert to less foolish behaviour.

The efforts of radical African nationalism: adjustment or delinking?⁶

Of all regions *of* the Third World Africa shows the greatest number *of* attempts at development other than that arising spontaneously out of the worldwide expansion of capitalism. In a score of the 50 or so African states, at some time or other, and to a more or less radical degree, the authorities have declared an intention to 'break' with the colonial and neo-colonial past and embark on a new, national and radical path, an independent socialist development, whether this socialism was specific and particular (Arab or

African) or declaredly scientific, Marxist, or Marxist-Leninist. According to circumstances, this declared break with the past has been made in heat, in the aftermath of the victory of the movement seizing independence, sometimes after a long and bitter war (Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Zimbabwe), or in the euphoria of gaining independence (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania), or as a sequel to significant social and political changes (the overthrow of the Egyptian and Libyan monarchies), or as a result of anti-neocolonial popular movements (Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Madagascar, Uganda, Rawlings' Ghana). In most, if not all cases, the army has played a significant role in the political switch in question.

But Africa also reveals among these experiences a high proportion of dubious or unimpressive results, scarcely distinguishable from those achieved by the classic neo-colonial development of others. Neither the aim of economic liberation from dependence on the world capitalist system, to complement political liberation, nor of building a new society remote from that of the capitalist Third World, seem to have made sufficient progress as to reach a point where the process cannot be reversed. Furthermore, a reversal of the trend and a sometimes vociferous return to 'development' as the Western powers want it to be has occurred in a number of countries, whether as a result of a *coup d'état* or of gradual drift. And, in today's crisis all, or virtually all, of them are severely threatened with being compelled to surrender to the dictates of the West.

A halt must be called to both sides of this equation.

World capitalist expansion has always been and continues to be divisive. From the outset it has caused and perpetuates a centre/periphery dichotomy inherent in currently existing capitalism. In this sense peripheral development has always been a story of perennial 'adjustment' to the demands and constraints of dominant capital. The centres are 'restructured', the peripheries are 'adjusted' to these new structures; never the reverse.

The violence of the effects of these successive adjustments, however, is not the same in every phase of the history of capitalism, since this worldwide expansion takes the form of a succession of long cycles (from 20 to 50 years) with alternating A phases of 'prosperity' and accelerated growth then B phases of structural crisis of the global system. During the A phases of prosperity 'adjustment' seems less difficult, or even palatable, for some countries: export demand rises at a high rate, capital is on offer and looking for a home, conflict is at a low ebb (the period is often a long one of relative peace) and so on. The adjustment amid general growth is certainly unequal. The periphery fulfils various roles in the global system and must be treated in the plural. There are 'rich' peripheries, of interest to the system at the

stage in question, which supply products whose worldwide marketing is more on the increase than the products of others (as they are related to the key technological advances) and which in return provide markets of interest to capital and to the goods of the centre. The ease of their 'adjustment' encourages many illusions, such as those the World Bank and other ideological mainstays of capital have built up in regard to the NICs, although clearly the foreign debt their success engenders was not foreseen.

But there are also the 'left behind' of no interest to the characteristic structures of the system at the time. They have sometimes fulfilled a significant role at a past stage of the system's evolution, but have fallen out of favour. They become the 'fourth world', the 'less advanced', as if they were something new, when in reality they have always been a by-product of capitalist expansion. A sad but fine illustration of this former fourth world is the region of slavery in the America of the mercantilist period' north-east Brazil and the Caribbean (including Haiti). These regions were once regarded as 'prosperous', and they formed the heart of the periphery in the system of their day. Later the new structures of capitalist development marginalized the relative importance of these regions, and they are among the most appallingly wretched in the Third World of today. The history of capitalist expansion is not only that of the 'development' it has wrought, but also of the savage destruction on which it was constructed. There is within capitalism a destructive element that is too often omitted from the flattering image painted of the system.

In periods of harsh restructuring in the crisis (B phases are the moment of truth of the system's evolution) illusions fall away. The difficulties - whose menace has been denied - become the means by which dominant capital imposes its will. It is no longer a question of the fantasy of independence; the law of profit reminds the 'underdeveloped' of their fate: super-exploitation and submission. 'Recompradorization' is on the agenda, by every possible economic and financial means (nowadays the pressure exerted through the foreign debt and the food weapon), plus the political and military means (*coups d'état*, interventions such as that of the armour represented by Zionism in the Middle East).

Africa holds a specially vulnerable place in this long succession of misfortunes that capitalist expansion has meant for the peoples of the periphery. Whole regions of the continent ravaged by the slave trade for the benefit of mercantilist capitalism have yet to recover from this early destruction. Colonization has carried on this toll of destruction of the continent. We have two clear examples.

The first is settler colonialism in North Africa (principally Algeria) and in East and Southern Africa (South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe). The current difficulties facing Algerian agriculture - the loss of rural population accelerated by the war - have part of their origin in the distant past. In Zimbabwe the high land appropriated by the whites leaving the Africans confined to meagre and inadequate reserves and obliging them to furnish cheap manpower - owe their apparent 'prosperity' to this exploitable manpower and to the waste they represent of the country's natural resources. The country's liberation has cast some light on the supposed 'success' of settler farming. But colonization has also bequeathed a problem that has still to be solved.

The second example is the plunder of land resources and the super-exploitation in areas of the colonial trade economy. Here, as was shown above, colonization secured a surplus at nil cost: without investment in intensified production methods (access to water, implements and mechanization, and so on), or agricultural research (except for some export crops, to the detriment of food crops). The surplus was undoubtedly modest in absolute terms, but a heavy burden on the peasantry and the country's future, through damage to the soil on which the trade was founded. Here, too, the current difficulties of African agriculture, even the famine in the Sahel, have origins in the distant past.

In truth Africa, in the heyday of the triumph of colonialism, occupied no more than a marginal role in the world system. Its essential role was as a mining reserve. Later, as independence and neo-colonialism came along, the plunder of agricultural land and mining royalties was not challenged, far from it. So neither the agricultural revolution nor industrialization have begun on a scale to respond to the demands of our day.

The discouraging prospect afforded Africa by capitalist expansion explains the frequency of the rejections and the high level of effort to 'do something else', to escape the simplistic logic of capitalism. But at the same time the objective conditions caused by this historical legacy make the task particularly difficult. This difficulty could be expressed in the formulation that the especially unfavourable external factor is combined with fairly unfavourable internal factors that have been largely shaped by that very external factor.

The response to the challenge of our age that we propose is called 'delinking'. The concept is to some extent half of an equation 'adjustment or delinking'.

We shall not expand here on the theory of delinking but, to avoid any misunderstanding, say merely that delinking is not synonymous with autarky but only subjection of external relations to the logic of internal development (whereas adjustment means binding internal development to the possibilities afforded by the world system). In more precise terms, delinking is the refusal to submit to the demands of the worldwide law of value, or the supposed 'rationality' of the system of world prices that embody the demands of reproduction of worldwide capital. It, therefore, presupposes the society's capacity to define for itself an alternative range of criteria of rationality of internal economic options, in short a 'law of value of national application'.

What social forces may be the historical subject of this option of a break? The evidently almost tautological reply is that the forces can only be such as are victims of peripheral capitalist development and not its beneficiaries. Capitalist development as it stands not only has a global polarizing effect (by creating the centre-periphery dichotomy) but also polarizing effects within the societies of the periphery (as it does not have within the central capitalist societies). In other words, income distribution is more unequal at the periphery than at the centre, being relatively stable at the centre over time, but tending to increasing inequality with the development of the periphery. The result is that the 'privileged classes' have a genuine interest in pursuing capitalist expansion as it stands, despite the subordinate position accorded them in the system and sometimes perhaps their national 'frustration'. They do have conflicts with dominant capital, and these classes will sometimes cross swords with imperialism to improve their status within the system. But only to this extent. They will judge that in the last resort there is no 'advantage' (or they would say 'possibility') in delinking. This is what they are saying day after day with their declaration of inevitable 'interdependence' ('we are all in the same boat', and so forth). The character of these privileged classes has also undergone historical evolution. Recently the dominant element of the local bloc allied to imperialism was often constituted by an oligarchy of great landowners (in Latin America, India, China, Egypt, for example) or by chiefdoms (in Africa). The national independence movement was obliged to stand against this bloc and replaced it with a new one dominated by new classes of a bourgeois character (local industrial and finance bourgeoisies, bourgeoisies of rich peasants, state bourgeoisies, and so on), and generally an industrialist force. This by no means insignificant shift of world social alliances has gone alongside a global restructuring of the system, since the worldwide social alliances, by their nature, define the appropriate structure for the stage of capitalist development attained.

The privileged classes in question form a minority in the societies of the periphery, a minority ranging from negligible (1 or 2% of the population) to more substantial (10 to 25%). As for the popular classes victimized by capitalist expansion, they have varying status and by virtue of the character of the expansion tend not to be homogenized or reduced to a single model. These include the poor peasantries (in the plural), the working classes, the urbanized jobless peasants in the shanty-towns, the former (artisan) and new (lower ranks) petty bourgeoisies. With the further point that peripheral capitalist development, with its centrifugal tendency, is an obstacle to national crystallization and tends even to disrupt the old nations where they exist, it can be seen that there are numerous additional reasons for division in the camp of the popular forces: ethnicity and dialects, religions, and - particularly marked in Africa - artificial frontiers bequeathed by colonization and balkanization.

Delinking implies a 'popular' consent, that is anti-capitalist in the sense that it is in conflict with dominant capitalism but shot through by a multiplicity of divergent interests (aside from the anti-system convergence) of various fractions constituting the population in question. This is why we argue that the 'post-capitalist' period will be a very long historical phase marked by permanent conflict between three poles determining the society's internal trends, local capitalism (responding to the needs shown by the development of the forces of production), socialism (expressing the anti-capitalist aspirations of the mass of the people), and statism (produced by the autonomy of the authorities in the light of capitalist and socialist forces and expressing at the same time the aspirations of the new class in control of the state). The conflicting balance of these tendencies is itself clearly variable according to particular circumstances and the rhythm of evolution.

A social force is essential to cement the popular alliance, overcome its internal conflicts, formulate the alternative national and popular plan, lead the popular bloc in hoisting itself into power, build the new state and arbitrate the conflicts shown above as characteristic of the long national and popular transition. This is the task of the revolutionary intelligentsia, the 'organic intellectual', responding to the objective demand of our day. It is a category peculiar to the situation of the peripheries in the capitalist system, with no resemblance to the problematic of the 'petty bourgeoisie' (a confused class as always) or of the 'one party' born out of national liberation, or of the role of intellectuals as a channel of expression for various social classes.

Evidently in these historical circumstances, at least two fundamental issues are posed for the intelligentsia and people's power: democracy and the cultural content of the societal plan.

As far as the cultural aspect is concerned we should state here that the challenge is not answered by superficial Westernization of the compradorized strata following the consumerist model of the developed world (this transmission of the consumerist model is just the tip of the cultural iceberg), or its apparent opposite - but really identical twin - the culturalist nationalisms on which the so-called religious fundamentalisms feed. The dual impasse to which either of these options leads is an indication of the genuine complexity of the plan.

The only relevant consideration is what faces the option of national and popular delinking in contemporary Africa, for good or ill. The absolutely first requirement in material action is a development of the forces of production and a raising of living standards of the great mass through a dual agricultural and industrial revolution, for which colonization has done no groundwork.

Has it been realized that the European agricultural revolution occurred in a world where the concomitant population explosion was controlled through the escape-valve of massive emigration? Europe at the time populated all of the US and other parts of the world. Without this escape-valve the population to be supported by Western and central Europe would have been some three times larger (since the 400 million Europeans of today would have been supplemented by the 800 millions across the Atlantic who are of emigrant descent). The modern Third World with its population explosion does not have this option of expanding outwards. Furthermore, modern industry is incapable of absorbing the internal migration from countryside to the towns at the rate possible at the time of the European industrial revolution. It is essential, therefore, to find technological and social prescriptions for genuine progress that for a long while to come holds the majority of the population in the rural areas of origin, where this is still possible, or finds ways of useful employment for the urbanized poor masses.

Clearly the national liberation movement, rightly focusing in its early stages on the preliminary winning of simple political independence, was not fully aware of the extent and scale of the challenge. This cannot be held against it, but we must be aware that the glorious page of history it wrote is over. A re-examination of the past does not excuse the present. We must be patient. We must be aware that the first wave of national liberation is spent, and that the forces entrusted with the second wave - with its national and popular content have not yet been assembled around an adequate alternative plan. We are passing through a trough in the wave, shown by this disarray and intellectual and political surrender.

The various studies of African radical experience show both the extent of the problems to be 'resolved' and the limitations of the conceptions held by the national-radical state.

The past 30 years have been punctuated with debates on these issues. It is worth highlighting here the debate on the so-called 'non-capitalist path', which had its moments of glory in the 1960s when Nasserism was at its height and Nkrumahist pan-Africanism had not been stifled in the gradual crystallization of new African states. It is also worth highlighting what, in the jargon of African progressive intellectuals, is called the 'Dar-es-Salaam debate', which in the early 1970s tried to focus on the issue of building socialism in Africa. But this is not the place to assess these arguments that have never ceased.

Along with the efforts and attempts in the national context, Africa has been the stage for a significant series of regional co-operation plans, whether the 'common market' kind (Economic Community of West Africa, of East African States, the Arab and Maghrebi common markets), or 'common concerns' kind (the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference in the face of South Africa), or financial support (Afro-Arab co-operation). We shall return to these issues in Chapter 6.

Notes

1. See Samir Amin's contributions to Amin, Samir. Faire. Alexandre, Hussein, Mahmoud and Massiah, Gustave, *La crise de l'impérialisme*, Paris, Minuit, 1975, and Amin S., Arrighi G., Frank A. G, and Wallerstein I., *Dynamics of Global Crisis*. New York. Monthly Review Press, and London, Macmillan. 1982. Amin, Samir and Frank. Andre Gunder. *N'attendons pas* 1984. Paris. Maspero 1985.

2. Amin, Samir, 'Il y a trente ans. Bandung', Cairo. UNU, 1985.

3. Amin, Samir, 'Perestroika and Glasnost', 1988. (in Arabic).

4. Amin, Samir, 'Développement et transformations structurelles', *Tiers Monde*, No. 51, 1972: 'CNUCED III. Un bilan', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*. No. 3. 1972, Oslo: 'UNCTAD IV and the New International Economic Order', *Africa Development*, CODESRIA, Dakar, No. 1, 1976; 'A propos du NOEI, et de l'avenir des relations économiques internationales'. *Africa Development*. No. 4, 1978; 'A propos du rapport de la commission Brandt', *Africa Development*, No. 3. 1980. See too references in *Delinking*, London, Zed Books, 1989.

5. OAU-ECA. The Lagos Action Plan. Addis Ababa, 1980; see too, the ECA's preparatory documents.

6. Mahjoub, Azzam, et al., *Adjustment or Delinking: The African Experience*, and Amin, Samir, *Delinking*.
